NATO’s Role in Protecting Critical Undersea Infrastructure

CSIS – NATO is not ready to mitigate increasingly prevalent Russian aggression against European critical undersea infrastructure (CUI). Despite its depleted ground forces and strained military industrial base, Russian hybrid tactics remains the most pressing threat to CUI in northern Europe. Despite its current limitations, NATO is the primary actor capable of deterring and preventing hybrid attacks on its allies and has expedited its approach to CUI protection by establishing new organizations to that aim. At the 2023 NATO Vilnius summit, allies agreed to establish the Maritime Centre for the Security of Critical Underwater Infrastructure within NATO’s Allied Maritime Command (MARCOM), which focuses on preparing for, deterring, and defending against the coercive use of energy and other hybrid tactics. To help NATO planners and staff at the new center conceptualize and prioritize their efforts, this issue brief provides immediate and long-term recommendations to set the new center up for success.

Into the Cold: Special Operations in the Arctic

Wavell Room – Strategic competition has superseded the Global War on Terrorism as the central organizing principle for America’s military. Conflict has returned to the European continent with Russia’s expanded invasion of Ukraine.  The accession of Finland to NATO, and hopefully Sweden soon, the Arctic environment has taken on new importance in strategic calculus. As the defence enterprise writ large shifts to this new environment, so must Special Operations Forces.

European forces flex their Indo-Pacific reach

Defense News – For decades France served as the European Union’s main representative in the Indo-Pacific, and as the sole member to maintain regional territories, conducting two to three deployments per year. But in the past two years, the number of allies and partners stretching their ability to launch long-distance, rapid deployments and maintain operational capacity in the area has increased.

NATO Must Shore Up Control of a Key Maritime Chokepoint

Defense One – One of NATO’s geographic advantages—control of the lands around a key maritime chokepoint—may be in peril. For decades, alliance forces have used nearby bases to keep tabs on Russian submarines, surface ships, and aircraft transiting the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom, or GIUK, Gap, which consists of a 200-mile stretch of ocean between Greenland and Iceland and a 500-mile gap between Iceland and Scotland. But strong independence movements in Greenland, the Faroe Islands southeast of Iceland, and Scotland could soon jeopardize this position. 

Why NATO Needs a Standing Maritime Group in the Arctic

CIMSEC – Since the Cold War, the U.S. has maintained a steady presence in the Arctic—specifically the European Arctic, or High North—primarily through nuclear submarine deployments while relying on NATO allies in the region for logistical support. However, melting ice caps, an increase in commercial maritime activity, and ongoing territorial disputes necessitate stronger NATO cooperation in the region to achieve a deterrence posture against Russia and safeguard maritime security. Deterring Russian aggression is important in all European bodies of water, and the Arctic will increasingly face the same maritime security issues as other parts of the world, including illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing by China and the movement of migrants and refugees by sea.