China’s Nuclear Submarine Development Quest: Strategy, Saga, Significance

Korea Institute for Maritime Strategy – This paper surveys the history and background of how the People’s Republic of China (PRC) became one of just six countries so far to possess nuclear-powered submarines, including the core subject of nuclear reactor development and improvement across three submarine generations. If South Korea decides to pursue and successfully develops indigenous nuclear-powered submarines, it will most likely become the seventh country to do so—offering six previous paths to study, of which China is a prominent example. Three-quarters of a century after beginning initial efforts under autarkic austerity, Beijing finally has a capable and growing fleet of modern nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs), nuclear-powered guided-missile submarines (SSGNs), and nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) equipped with long-range submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). What Mao sensed broadly through a geopolitical lens, modern military science shows with technical specificity: nuclear-powered submarines represent the absolute global “gold standard” for which there is no true substitute—with utterly unmatched potential in propulsion, endurance, sensor and weapons operations, and overall performance. As China’s experience shows, however, the road to success can be lengthy, expensive, and arduous. Ability to study preexisting foreign examples from afar helped somewhat, but tremendous national leadership, resources, and effort over decades have been required.

British jets fly first NATO air defence missions from HMS Prince of Wales

Navy Lookout – British F-35Bs have conducted NATO air defence operations from the Royal Navy’s flagship while deployed off Iceland, marking the first time the alliance has flown such missions from a European aircraft carrier. The deployment also coincides with the UK assuming command of key elements of NATO’s high-readiness Allied Reaction Force (ARF).

Ukrainian Navy Reveals Unknown Underwater Drone (UUV)

Covert Shores – When President Zelensky visited Odesa recently, the Ukrainian Navy (VMS-ZSU) presented him with a range of interesting and, in several cases previously unconfirmed, pieces of kit. These included Harpoon missiles in a disguised launcher, Norwegian NSM missiles and Swedish RBS-15 missiles. Those systems have understandably been getting a lot of attention. Yet sitting next to a couple of Seawolf surface drones (USVs) was something completely unreported. A new type of underwater drone (UUV – uncrewed underwater vehicle).

Squaring the circle: the nine decisions that will make or break the Hybrid Navy

Navy Lookout – With the Defence Investment Plan committing to Common Combat Vessels (CCV) and a family of uncrewed platforms, the Royal Navy’s hybrid navy has moved from ambition to funded programme. The question is no longer whether to build it, but how. In this guest article, Jake Rigby, Head of Innovation and Research at BMT, argues that industry’s ability to deliver will depend on how it navigates nine unresolved trade-offs.

Lightning strikes: new F-35 radar could have directed-energy attack mode

Australian Strategic Policy Institute – Bill Sweetman writes that F-35 program leader Lieutenant General Greg Masiello delivered something of a lite-beer testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee last week, with many questions deferred to a closed session. But the discussion pointed to a big and little-discussed change to air warfare technology – fighter radars so powerful that they can act as high-power microwave (HPM) weapons. And this involves not just the Lockheed Martin F-35 Lightning but also British Eurofighter Typhoons and the multinational Global Combat Aircraft Program (GCAP).

Anti-Drone Warfare: The Missing Tier in Maritime Defence Architecture

Naval News – The proliferation of autonomous one-way attack (OWA) drones has exposed a critical gap in defence architecture: Anti-Drone Warfare (ADW) is neither conventional air defence nor C-UAS. It is a distinct operational domain — with unique threat physics, unique engagement economics, and unique platform requirements. For maritime environments, that gap is structural and cannot be closed by shore-based systems alone.