Portugal Resident – The United States is investing in new infrastructure at Portugal’s Azores military air base, Lajes, on Terceira Island, just as the Pentagon has announced it is reducing the U.S. military footprint elsewhere in Europe.
Should the Royal Navy reconsider the Littoral Strike Ship concept?
Navy Lookout – In 2019, the MoD set aside £35 million to develop a Littoral Strike Ship (LSS), a deliberately low-cost vessel built around commando raiding operations but the idea faded as amphibious thinking consolidated into a single large programme – the Multi-Role Strike Ship. With the Royal Navy now both RN financially constrained and more doctrinally inclined to consider smaller, more dispersed platforms, the LSS could be one solution to partially recover amphibious capability.
The Fall of Fortress Singapore: Three Lessons from the Collapse of Britain’s Great Asian Bastion
War on the Rocks – What might be the most relevant lessons of the fall of Singapore for contemporary U.S. strategists and policymakers as they monitor the growth in might and assertiveness of a new — and arguably even more formidable — revisionist Asian power? Following a brief overview of the Malayan campaign, three critical dimensions of this melancholy chapter will emerge as the most immediately resonant to 21st-century defense planners.
Keel laid for Murmansk, the tenth Yasen-class multipurpose submarine
Barents Observer – Russia’s war economy is under increasing strain, but construction of the Navy’s advanced nuclear-powered submarines continues unabated.
Royal Navy officers warn NATO navies are struggling to absorb Ukraine’s maritime lessons
Navy Lookout – The war at sea in the Black Sea has entered a new and more dangerous phase, even as Western navies are still debating what the previous phase means for them. Speaking at CNE in May 2026, Cdre Steve Bamfield RN and Cdre Thomas Hanssen of the Norwegian Navy, co-leaders of the Maritime Capability Coalition (MCC) for Ukraine, gave a frank assessment of where the conflict stands and why its hardest lessons have proved resistant to translation into NATO doctrine and procurement.
ScanFish trials aboard RFA Proteus mark a step forward for Royal Navy seabed warfare capability
Navy Lookout – RN hydrographic specialists have completed a second series of at-sea trials of their new towed underwater survey system, this time aboard the Multi-Role Ocean Surveillance ship, RFA Proteus, off Portland and in Lyme Bay. The exercises mark a significant step towards integrating the ScanFish containerised Remotely Operated Towed Vehicle (ROTV) into frontline SBW operations.
Germany moves two ships to Djibouti, eyeing multinational Hormuz mission this summer
Defense News – The German Navy is moving two ships to the Red Sea in preparation for a possible mine-clearing mission in the Strait of Hormuz, the country’s defense minister confirmed on Thursday.
U.S. Ends Naval Blockade of Iran
USNI News – The United States has lifted the naval blockade against Iranian ports and coastlines.
Australia Makes Seabed Warfare a Top Defence Priority
Naval News – Australia’s latest National Defence Strategy (NDS) has underlined the country’s need to secure critical undersea infrastructure (CUI). To meet this seabed warfare mission quickly, the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) is looking to the commercial underwater industry to provide the required capability.
China is testing underwater drones the size of submarines, 148 feet long with an estimated range of 10,000 miles, the largest ever built, and U.S. analysts say they could one day reach the West Coast
autoNotion – For as long as anyone has war-gamed a fight with China, the Pacific Ocean has been America’s best defense. It is more than 5,000 nautical miles of open water, and the working assumption has always been that Chinese warships and submarines simply could not cross it in any numbers, which kept the West Coast a long way from any shooting. China is now building underwater drones the size of submarines, and crossing that ocean is more or less the entire point of them.
(Thanks to Alain)
A 132-pound underwater drone with no propeller can now sit on the seabed for three months listening for submarines with an AI trained on decades of ocean sound. Germany built it, and the UK just ordered a program around hundreds
autoNotion – Finding a submarine that doesn’t want to be found is one of the most expensive problems in modern defense. Norway spent most of 2025 shopping for an answer and picked at least five British-designed Type 26 frigates, a deal Breaking Defense put at roughly $13.5 billion, which works out to about $2.7 billion per hull. A Munich company called Helsing thinks the future of the hunt looks less like a 6,900-ton warship and more like hundreds of 132-pound (60 kg) gliders drifting along at walking pace, each one running an AI that was trained the way you’d train a chatbot, except on decades of recorded ocean sound instead of internet text.
(Thanks to Alain)
Russia’s submarine sales pitch meets hard realities in Asia
Asia Times – Amur-1650 reflects Russia’s buoyant sub export ambitions, but turning offers into real contracts and ships will be a rough ride
(Thanks to Alain)
Armed men on board: mercenaries deployed to protect Putin’s ghost oil tankers
7Sur7 – While the Kremlin’s ghost oil tankers avoid the English Channel for fear of being intercepted by the British, the French or the Belgians, an investigation shows the growing presence of armed men on board. These mercenaries, often linked to the Wagner Group, could well be there to intimidate the Western Coast Guard. It is difficult to say, however, if they would dare to open fire.
(In French) (Thanks to Alain)
U.S. Navy Looks to Fleet-wide Expeditionary Mine Warfare in Wake of Operation Epic Fury
Naval News – The U.S Navy’s Explosive Ordnance Disposal Training and Evaluation Unit One (EODTEU1) will evaluate a new form of mine-clearing capability after identifying a series of new requirements in the Indo-Pacific—particularly for the service’s doctrine of distributed maritime operations, according to new documents published by EODTEU1.
Sea Trident SL-1000: New Ukrainian Underwater Drone
Covert Shores – The Sea Trident SL-1000 is an extra-large uncrewed underwater vehicle (XLUUV) built by Ukrainian firm Global Mark. The company is already associated with a range of aerial drones (UAVs) and electromagnetic warfare (EW) systems, but this is its first publicly revealed underwater drone.
China is Rehearsing More Than Amphibious Landings
CIMSEC – For years, the public debate over a possible Chinese Communist invasion of Taiwan has focused on a single question: Does the People’s Liberation Army have sufficient amphibious lift to move an invasion force across the Taiwan Strait? That question remains important. However, recent Chinese exercises suggest that the People’s Liberation Army is not simply trying to solve the problem of getting forces onto a Taiwanese beach. It is rehearsing how to move, sustain, and conceal a large amphibious campaign across multiple locations.
Fincantieri CEO Opens Up About The Constellation Class Frigate Debacle
The War Zone – Fincantieri Marine Group CEO George Moutafis gives us exclusive insights into what sunk the frigate and what needs to change because of it.
How Japan Could Co-Produce the Navy’s Future Fleet
War on the Rocks – Although Japan is well-positioned to support high-tech manufacturing at scale, there are still significant legal, political, and security barriers on both sides of the Pacific. Overcoming these barriers, including security risks overseas and political resistance to offshoring in the United States, requires the correct balance of policy and financial incentives.
South Korea Could Build Nuclear Submarines, But It Shouldn’t
War on the Rocks – South Korea’s nuclear-powered submarine program risks leading South Korea’s defense industry off course. The high costs and technological complexity of developing a niche capability like nuclear submarine shipbuilding are more costly, complex, and less beneficial than Seoul may realize. Moreover, these dynamics run counter to the export-oriented strategy that has made K-defense an international success and could drain talent and resources from an innovative economic engine. Ultimately, the entire endeavor risks creating unintended budgetary and political pressures that could undermine South Korea’s procurement flexibility and constrain long-term defense spending.
Tanker capture: political theatre, or genuine crackdown on shadow fleet?
Navy Lookout – The seizure of the tanker, MV Smyrtos, on 14th June showcased the ability of the Royal Navy and other agencies to conduct a complex maritime interdiction operation. However, the timing of the boarding, against a backdrop of political turmoil over defence spending, raises questions over the political motivation and scale of assets involved.
HMS Scott finally goes back to sea on completion of life extension refit
Navy Lookout – HMS Scott, the Royal Navy’s ocean survey vessel, sailed from Falmouth yesterday on completion of her Ship Life Extension Programme (SLEP), which will see her in service until 2033.
British armed forces intercept Russian shadow fleet oil tanker in Channel
The Guardian – British armed forces intercepted and boarded a Russian shadow fleet oil tanker in the Channel in the early hours of Sunday.
Royal Navy considers lessons from 2025 carrier strike group deployment
Navy Lookout – Operation HIGHMAST was the RN’s major set-piece of 2025, a 222-day global carrier strike group deployment. At CNE 2026, Rear Admiral Anthony Rimmington, Director, Force Generation, laid out some of the lessons the RN can draw from the deployment.
SWOs Assume Amphibious Command: Why it Matters
CIMSEC – The Surface Fleet must help maximize the Marine Corps’ ability to execute its mission from the sea. That mission remains the foundation of the amphibious force, and every institutional decision surrounding amphibious command must be judged—without stint or reference to parochialism—against that standard.
The Weaponization of Frozen Assets: A New Instrument of Maritime Financial Warfare
CIMSEC – Financial warfare is conventionally understood as an instrument applied to declared, identifiable assets. Common tactics include freezing accounts, cutting off correspondent banking access, and market delisting of entities. The Hormuz conflict of March 2026 introduced a structurally distinct mechanism operating on none of those principles. What follows is an analysis of that mechanism — how it emerged, how it functions, and why existing maritime security frameworks are not adapted to recognize it.
NOSI - Naval Open Source Intelligence™ 
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