I Blame the Navy’s Strategic Woes on the Chiefs of Naval Operations

War on the Rocks – In 1988, respected Congressional Research Service defense analyst Ronald O’Rourke wrote a compelling essay in the U.S. Naval Institute’s Proceedings magazine for the Navy to maintain strategic consistency between chiefs of naval operations. As the Cold War’s end approached, he recommended that the Navy not arbitrarily discard its powerful and successful organizing concept — the 1980s Maritime Strategy. He suggested, instead, that the Navy build upon its 1980s achievements by identifying “the key organizing concepts and arguments behind those achievements” and examining whether they could be refined and applied for the 1990s. He did not propose the Navy rest on its laurels, as circumstances always change. O’Rourke, however, noted that the Navy “cannot afford to discard powerful concepts arbitrarily, simply because they are not new, particularly if they might be applicable, with refinements, to emerging circumstances.” His 1988 advice for strategic consistency still rings true for the Navy in 2024. I continue to blame the chiefs.