The Surface Navy in an AI World: Rethinking the FFX

CIMSEC – Instead of going back to the drawing board to pack more high-end warfighting capability into an ever-smaller package, rethinking what a frigate contributes to the human-machine team allows us to see a small surface combatant in a new light. Instead of a platform for employing weapons, it provides a ringside seat for the humans to influence events, especially when mindful, eyes-on, hands-on actions are needed for success. It is a way to use the science of war to empower the art of war. It is a way to demonstrate that the United States is willing to risk involvement in a sticky situation and engage opponents in a meaningful way. The LUSVs, MUSVs, or XLUUVs that could serve as the primary weapons systems for the FFX will help its crew give as good as they get until the Joint Force Arrives. Even in the age of sail, no one could realistically expect a small surface combatant to do more than that.

The Iran War Makes the Case For the United States to Recognize Somaliland

CIMSEC – The chokepoints are the symptom, but the region is the system. The big Gulf bases have just shown how vulnerable they are, and strategic inertia moves toward dispersal and partnership. In that setting, Somaliland offers something rare: a stable, democratic partner you can keep rather than rent, one whose own course is already making the argument. Israel has taken the step to seize the opportunities afforded by an official relationship with Somaliland. To best secure its regional interests, the U.S. should be the next country to do the same.

US Navy’s ‘Sub Tsar’ Unveils Four-Pillar Plan to Accelerate Submarine Deliveries

Naval News – Vice Adm Rob Gaucher – the US Navy’s (USN’s) Director, Submarine Programs – has set out a four-pillar strategy for accelerating the navy’s submarine-building output. This process is designed to reflect and underpin the USN’s Chief of Naval Operations’ (CNO’s) testimony that a raised production rate will be in place by 2032.

Research & Debate—Forms of Military Strategy: Historical Parallels between the American Confederacy and Imperial Japan, and a Way Forward

US Naval War College Review – Two cases, almost eighty years apart, in which a weaker power—the Confederacy and imperial Japan—sought to achieve an end to the war before the United States could mobilize its material advantages and before the weaker side’s limited resources ran out provide useful insights into this western Pacific conundrum. Studying the failure of both challengers bears particular lessons for the United States in its potential conflict with China, in ways that studying our past victories against these adversaries cannot.

The Cognitive Dimension of Mobilization—Reconsidering American War Preparation in an Age of Persistent Cognitive Warfare

US Naval War College Review – American war mobilization doctrine is built on an industrial-era paradigm that assumes the primary contest is material: who can most efficiently convert economic capacity into military power. An evaluation suggests that this paradigm, while necessary, is no longer sufficient.

The Armyfication of the Navy

CIMSEC – The United States Navy has set a course that will see it morph into an army on the sea. The differentiating factors between the sea services and its landbound compatriots are fast eroding, diminishing the value of the fleet as its capabilities are more constrained. Traditionally, the utility and strength of the U.S. Navy revolved around the supreme maneuverability of the fleet and its ability to pass without a trace, skills the U.S. Army could only dream of. Now, however, fleets have never been more visible or more movement constrained, exposing them to the same strategic limitations an army on campaign faces. Adding to these challenges is the development of a set-piece mentality within the force over the previous decades as the U.S. Navy acted as mobile strike assets for ground wars. Redressing this army-fication, however, will be key to ensuring the continued success of the sea services and ultimately the safety of the United States.

The Human Element of Sea Power: Ports, People and Presence in the South China Sea

CIMSEC – The U.S. Navy does not need to match the People’s Liberation Army Navy’s local presence ship for ship in the South China Sea. Instead, the U.S. Navy needs access that links lawful operations at sea to port visits, exercises, repair arrangements, and partner relationships ashore. The human element of sea power, built on trust, access, and routine cooperation, turns ship presence into influence. The decisive factor in the South China Sea is not ship numbers or capabilities alone, but the human infrastructure of access, repair, and partner trust that allows ships to operate with purpose and endurance.

Strategic Assets: The Intelligence Vulnerabilities of the American Shipbuilding Workforce

Center for Maritime Security – It’s widely established that near-peer adversarial actors have actively and clandestinely targeted the U.S. defense industrial base; notable actions include cyber operations and corporate obfuscation to embed itself within the lower tiers of the U.S. supply chain. This extends to the United States’ MIB, with a 2025 Section 301 Investigation Report by the Office of the United States Trade Representative indicating China’s multi-decadal systemic campaign targeting and marginalizing the U.S.’s maritime, logistics, and shipbuilding sectors to diminish the U.S.’s naval dominance and destabilize its maritime enterprise. Accordingly, the shipbuilding enterprise has evolved into a principal arena intensifying the active U.S.-China competition.

US Navy destroyer USS Benfold suffers four-day power blackout in South China Sea amid growing fleet crisis

Army Recognition – On July 24, 2026, the Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS Benfold (DDG-65) suffered a four-day total electrical blackout during routine operations in the South China Sea. An engineering casualty involving its gas-turbine generators paralyzed propulsion, maneuvering, climate control, and life-support systems, requiring the warship to be towed to Subic Bay in the Philippines for repairs. The failure highlights acute maintenance and operational force-structure pressures on forward-deployed U.S. Navy surface combatants in the Indo-Pacific theatre.

(Thanks to Alain)