Groton as a Case Study For Building Naval Capital Towns

CIMSEC – The process to build a naval capital town is incredibly difficult and requires decades of patience. The main issue for Groton has been funding. The end of the Cold War made a downturn in defense spending inevitable, with significant impacts on the submarine shipbuilding industry and the communities that support the industry. Reversing declining trends in labor over the past three decades will be an uphill battle for naval capital towns like Groton. 

Saildrone CEO says Iranian interference was valuable experience, not a surprise

Breaking Defense – Twice in the last month, Iran has attempted to abduct US unmanned surface vessels produced by Saildrone. But the company’s CEO says he was unfazed by the events, instead calling the experience “valuable” and stressing the need for any organization operating unmanned ships to be anticipate hostile interference.

Navy About To Get World’s Largest Unmanned Warship But Has No Plans To Use It

War Zone – The U.S. Navy’s Military Sealift Command (MSC) is set to receive its newest ship, the thirteenth in a series of high-speed EPF expeditionary transports providing logistics services around the globe. But Number 13 is special – not only is it the first EPF fitted with autonomous navigation and operating systems, but it is possibly the world’s largest ship capable of unmanned operation. Yet as of now, neither the Navy nor MSC has any plans to use the unmanned capability when the USNS Apalachicola (T-EPF 13) enters the fleet. Rather, MSC intends to send the vessel to the western Pacific to serve as a logistics ship with the U.S. Seventh Fleet.

Defeat China’s Navy, Defeat China’s War Plan

War on the Rocks – U.S. commanders in the Indo-Pacific will have to fight with the forces and weapons policymakers provide them. Recent wargames, like their predecessors, demonstrate the United States needs a better plan for defeating an attack on Taiwan. This means forces and concepts that match U.S. competitive advantages against China’s weaknesses while minimizing the number of forces U.S. commanders will have to position within range of China’s firepower. Fortunately, a better matchup exists, one that focuses the U.S. bomber force against China’s navy and other maritime assets. China cannot take Taiwan, the Senkakus, or other territories in the region if its maritime power is destroyed. The U.S. bomber force could be a mortal threat to China’s maritime power if U.S. policymakers and military planners begin to properly prioritize it. By making China’s maritime assets the main target for the U.S. bomber force, then arming it accordingly, Washington would be well positioned to win a counter-maritime campaign in the western Pacific.

Given China’s A2/AD Capabilities, How Would the United States Defend Taiwan?

USNI Blog – To effectively defend Taiwan from a military standpoint, the United States must be willing to defend Taiwan from outside of Taiwan. In other words, the defense of Taiwan from an invasion from China need not be confined to the main island of Taiwan, nor the Taiwan Strait. Moreover, expectations held by the United States should be that an invasion of Taiwan by China will look nothing like the previous four Taiwan Strait Crises (1954–55, 1958, 1995–96, 2022), which were generally limited, and instead be prepared for a conflict of a much larger-scale and intensity.

Command of the Sea Redux

US Naval War College Review – The United States and the West already may have lost command of the sea. To deter a Chinese invasion of Taiwan or similar aggression, the Navy may need to pursue a very different fleet architecture, further integrate the maintenance and exercise of command, and seek modifications to a Unified Command Plan that ignores the indivisibility of the world ocean.

US Navy Talks About USV, Data And MUM-T

Naval News – At the Surface Navy Associations’ Waterfront Symposium 2022, held on August 17-18, the U.S. Navy fielded audience questions regarding the status of the unmanned surface vessels (USV) that participated in Rim of the Pacific 2022 (RIMPAC 2022) naval exercise. Specifically, the USV panel discussed data and manned-unmanned teaming (MUM-T) of aerial, surface, and sub-surface vessels. 

The State of the Warfighter Mentality in the SWO Community

CIMSEC – As the United States shifts focus from the Global War on Terror to peer competitors, senior naval leaders have increased messaging to the fleet that focuses on preparing for war at sea. Considering this shift, I investigated the state of the warfighter mentality in the Surface Warfare Officer (SWO) community to gauge how the community felt about its own readiness.

A New DESRON Staff – Beyond the Composite Warfare Commander

CIMSEC – A destroyer squadron (DESRON) staff’s employment as a Sea Combat Commander in the Composite Warfare Commander (CWC) construct is unnecessarily narrow and prevents a more lethal and agile strike group. Tomorrow’s fight requires multiple manned, trained, and certified command elements. These elements should be capable of maneuvering and employing combat power. This combat power is required to support area-denial operations, assure the defense of a high-value unit, or conduct domain-coordinated advance force operations to sanitize an operating area in advance of the main body. This ability to diffuse command and control, disperse combat power, and contribute to sea control operations is imperative to fully realize the Distributed Maritime Operations (DMO) concept.

Naval Gunfire Liaisons and 21st Century Fires

CIMSEC – This article will discuss the role of the Naval Gunfire Liaison Officer (NGLO) as one human in a  JADC2-enabled theater. Any conversation about fires, lethality, and the Pacific leads either implicitly or explicitly to considerations of how naval vessels can support maneuver forces ashore. However, this legacy — maritime fires directed against terrestrial objectives — is now only one part of the equation. As concepts evolve for potential wars in the Pacific, the NGLO can provide maritime expertise that improves the integration of joint, multi-domain fires at the tactical and operational levels of war.