The War Zone – The first of China’s new class of big-deck amphibious assault ships is rapidly taking shape and we can now get a much better look at the vessel’s twin-island configuration. The design choice is typically made to simplify air operations and is very likely another indicator of this class of vessels being tailored, at least in part, for going to sea with enhanced air wings that include larger types of drones.

BBC – The Cambodian government has repeatedly denied such a possibility, citing its constitution which bans any permanent foreign military presence, and stating that the naval base at Ream is open to use by all friendly navies.

China Maritime Studies Institute – In April of this year, the U.S. Department of Defense released a China military power report, which stated that the Chinese Navy currently has at least six Type 094 ballistic missile nuclear submarines, and has the capability for at least one of them to be on continuous readiness duty. It also said that this is the first time it has been possible for the Chinese Navy to permanently maintain at least one strategic missile nuclear submarine at sea to perform strategic duty tasks. So, what is “continuous readiness duty” (quatianhou zhanbei zhiban), how can it be achieved, and why did the Chinese Navy only just now acquire this capability? With these questions in mind, we interviewed Professor Chi Guocang (迟国仓) of the PLAN Submarine Academy and asked him to give us a detailed explanation.

USNI News – China’s Coast Guard is for the first time operating in the Bering Sea as Beijing increasingly uses the Northern Sea Route for shipping, the U.S. commander of the 17th Coast Guard District said this week.

The War Zone – The mysterious Chinese submarine that apparently sunk in a shipyard earlier this year was the first of a new class featuring a hybrid nuclear/conventional propulsion system, according to a new report. The latest development in the saga of the Type 041 Zhou class submarine would seem to clear up some of the previous uncertainty about the boat as well as signal that China is working on novel solutions for its fast-growing underwater fleet.

USNI News – While the United States is unrivaled in projecting military power from 500-plus overseas bases, China’s investments in ports and communication technology globally show Beijing’s footprint approach as a possible means to a similar end, a panel said last week.

National Interest – James Holmes writes that the Chinese Communist Party have a political problem on their hands. The unnamed U.S. official who disclosed the Type 041 disaster to the press observed that, “in addition to the obvious questions about training standards and equipment quality, the incident raises deeper questions about the PLA’s internal accountability and oversight of China’s defense industry—which has long been plagued by corruption.”

BBC – A Chinese nuclear-powered attack submarine sank in its dock earlier this year while under construction, in a major setback for the Chinese military, according to US defence officials.

Breaking Defense – Ben Ho in this op-ed maintains that should China deploy flattops in an anti-access Taiwan strategy, it would likely be as “fleets-in-being.”

China Maritime Studies Institute – Since the mid-2010s, there has been a concerted effort to professionalize a PLAN “blue force” as an opposition force, or OPFOR, in maritime exercises and training. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) routinely refers to its blue forces as metaphorical “whetstones” used to sharpen the PLA for a future fight against enemies of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Efforts to develop a PLAN blue force appear to have accelerated over the past several years in response to Chairman Xi Jinping’s decade-long demand for more realistic combat training.

This report examines recent developments in the PLAN’s blue force. It comprises four sections. Part one provides background on PLAN efforts to professionalize its maritime blue force. Part two describes the PLAN’s blue force training units. Part three examines companies producing equipment and virtual environments for China’s blue force units, while part four discusses current blue force capabilities. The report concludes with a summary of findings and implications for the United States, its allies, and partners.

USNI News – Sabina Shoal, known to the Philippines as Escoda and by China as Xianbin Jiao, is the latest flashpoint in the South China Sea between Manila and Beijing. Located 75 nautical miles from the Philippine province of Palawan, the standoff at the maritime feature started in April following claims by the Philippines that China began an island reclamation project.

USNI News – Sending three icebreakers into Arctic waters for the first time is “a clear signal” that Beijing is serious about pursuing its great power ambitions commercially, scientifically, diplomatically and militarily in the polar regions

The War Zone – The ship has some puzzling features that point to it being even more experimental in nature than originally thought.

BBC – Miserable winter weather, snow on Table Mountain and gale force winds have not dampened Cape Town residents’ enthusiasm for free medical care being offered on a Chinese ship, currently docked in the South African city’s harbour.

War on the Rocks – Chinese leader Xi Jinping underscored mainland defense on July 30 with a speech to the Chinese Communist Party’s politburo standing committee group study session on China’s border, coastal, and air defense (边海空防).

USNI News – A resupply mission to the Philippine Coast Guard’s flagship stationed at a contested South China Sea feature was blocked by 40 Chinese vessels in the latest incident around Escoda Shoal, according to Manila.

China Maritime Studies Institute – Key takeaways:

• The PLAN is prioritizing the development of what it calls “four core operational capabilities.” These capabilities include 1) integrated near seas operations, 2) far seas mobile operations, 3) strategic deterrence and counterstrike, and 4) amphibious warfare.
• Analysis of Chinese writings suggest the focus of these efforts is on prevailing in a high-end conflict involving the U.S. military.
• The PLAN seeks the ability to dominate the near seas, strike U.S. bases and sea lines of communication in waters east of the first island chain and in the Indian Ocean, achieve “reliable, credible, and effective” deterrence against the U.S. through SSBN patrols within and beyond the first island chain, and execute sophisticated multi-domain amphibious operations against U.S. allies and partners.

Naval News – A Chinese shipyard in Wuhan has launched a submarine which is likely to be the country’s most advanced non-nuclear type. The new boat is larger than existing ones and is the first in the country to feature X-form rudders. There are indications that it may have a vertical launch system.

The War Zone – A Chinese Type 071 amphibious transport dock has emerged from a refit sporting a new laser directed energy weapon system.

USNI News – Philippine and Chinese Coast Guard vessels collided in the South China Sea near two disputed shoals on Monday morning in the latest encounter at sea between Manila and Beijing.

China Maritime Studies Institute – The report of the 20th National Congress of the Communist Party proposed “strengthening national defense mobilization and reserve force construction.” In the face of the Era’s requirements for strengthening the country and the military, the serious situation of national security, and the real existence of the risk of war, we must place the construction of national defense mobilization and reserve forces in a more important strategic position, and strive to promote the high-quality development of national defense mobilization and reserve force construction from a new starting point.

China Maritime Studies Institute – Key takeaways:

• Since December 2008, the PLAN has deployed 46 counter-piracy escort task forces (TFs) to the Gulf of Aden on a UN-authorized mission.
• Most TFs have included two combatants—a combination of destroyers, frigates, and amphibious transport docks—and a supply ship. Starting with the 33^rd TF, which departed China in August 2019, every TF has comprised one Type 052D destroyer, one Type 054A frigate, and one supply ship.
• One TF generally is on station near the Horn of Africa at all times, while for less than half that time another TF is either on the way to relieve it or returning home after completing its mission.
• Until recently, the PLAN had normally dispatched three TFs per year, at roughly four-month intervals.
• However, the 45^th and 46^th TFs departed China on five-month intervals, suggesting a shift in deployment patterns.
• The PLAN has not explained the rationale for this apparent shift in its deployment pattern. It is possible that more onerous requirements for its surface fleet in operations around Taiwan and in the South China Sea have forced the PLAN to draw forces away from the Gulf of Aden mission, at least temporarily. Or it is possible that the PLAN may be desirous of keeping its ships clear of waters threatened by Yemen’s Houthi rebels.

Naval News – New Type 054A variant features larger flight deck and hangar for Z-20 helicopter, and new main gun. Ships under construction at two yards may grow Type 054A-fleet to 50 units or more.

China Maritime Studies Institute – Since the creation of the People’s Republic of China’s merchant fleet, the Chinese Communist Party has implemented a system of political control aboard oceangoing vessels through ship Party branches and ship political commissars. This report focuses on the ship political commissar, a Party representative assigned to oceangoing merchant ships, particularly within state-owned shipping enterprises, to carry out political and administrative work in the management of ship crews. Having peaked in authority and power during the Cultural Revolution, the ship political commissar position has evolved over the decades following economic reforms in the 1980s. Despite years of problematic implementation, the ship political commissar system is currently undergoing a revitalization in staterun shipping companies. The position has supporting roles to play in carrying out national tasking such as evacuations of overseas Chinese citizens. Most ship political commissars are former PLA officers. Chinese roll-on/roll-off ferry operators constitute a special case where the ship political commissar may have greater authority in the ship hierarchy and potentially a role in supporting PLA use of those vessels. This report focuses on the ship political commissar system over the last 20 years, providing a needed update on this understudied topic in the English-language literature.

Baker Institute – This paper addresses one of the most dangerous, consequential flashpoints on the planet today, and for years into the future: a potential attempt by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to annex Taiwan. The aftermath would likely trigger the worst economic shocks experienced in more than a century, unleashing a cycle of repression and diminishing the quality of life for populations across Asia and beyond, with devastating impacts on American interests and Americans’ well-being. Moreover, China’s annexation of Taiwan could exacerbate regional tensions and extend into a broader, global conflict. At stake are crucial interests such as the semiconductors that power today’s big data world and the national security of U.S. allies and partners. Neighboring states’ responses to PRC expansion could also result in the erosion of American military advantages as well as the destabilization of democracy and the international order.