China is Rehearsing More Than Amphibious Landings

CIMSEC – For years, the public debate over a possible Chinese Communist invasion of Taiwan has focused on a single question: Does the People’s Liberation Army have sufficient amphibious lift to move an invasion force across the Taiwan Strait? That question remains important. However, recent Chinese exercises suggest that the People’s Liberation Army is not simply trying to solve the problem of getting forces onto a Taiwanese beach. It is rehearsing how to move, sustain, and conceal a large amphibious campaign across multiple locations.

The Three Nevers: To Invade Taiwan, China Would Have to Make Military History Thrice

War on the Rocks – Normandy was unprecedented in scale but not in kind. A Taiwan invasion would present the reverse problem: Taiwan’s size is not the unprecedented part — the operational challenges are. Analysis of a potential Chinese invasion of Taiwan typically emphasizes the People’s Liberation Army’s rapid modernization and the possibility of strategic surprise. Far less attention is paid to operational precedent. Three key missions at the heart of any cross-strait campaign have never been successfully executed under modern threat conditions: an amphibious landing against a credible coastal anti-ship missile threat, a large-scale airborne drop against modern air defenses, and a large, opposed air assault at extended range. In other words, the People’s Liberation Army would have to make history three times in the same campaign. I refer to these as the “Three Nevers,” a deliberately tongue-in-cheek nod to Chinese Communist Party doctrinal formulations, or tifa.

CMSI Translations #32: The U.S. Marine Corps Concept for “Stand-In Forces”—Analysis and Response

China Maritime Studies Institute – “Stand-In Forces” (SIF) is an operational concept proposed by the United States Marine Corps (USMC) within the context of strategic transformation, emphasizing the development of combat forces capable of sustained forward presence within the “weapons engagement zone” (WEZ). These forces can conduct surveillance and reconnaissance, gain long range target custody, and engage in interference, deception, littoral zone harassment, rapid littoral strike, sustainment, protection, and security operations, as well as other actions to address changing conditions and challenges. To counter the continuous penetration and encroachment into our near seas, we must proactively engage and establish effective countermeasures. We must focus on addressing weaknesses and enhancing our amphibious systems warfare advantages; prioritize innovation and advancement to accelerate the development of maritime unmanned combat capabilities; and emphasize advancing the establishment of cyber- and information systems to address our core priorities.

CMSI Note 21: The New Normal East of Taiwan

China Maritime Studies Institute – Since early June, the China Coast Guard (CCG) has maintained a continuous presence in waters east of Taiwan. Beijing describes these operations as a response to a joint statement issued by Japan and the Philippines in late May, in which the two countries pledged cooperation to delimit their maritime boundary.

Given their duration, these operations differ from past practice, in which CCG cutters appeared east of Taiwan for short periods of time, ostensibly to signal dissatisfaction with the island’s political leadership.

On 4 July, the original CCG task force deployed after the joint statement was issued was relieved by two new ships, suggesting that Beijing intends to normalize CCG presence in these waters.

Normalized CCG presence east of Taiwan would pose challenges for Japan and the Philippines, as China would likely apply elements of its longstanding East and South China Sea playbook to this new ocean area.

Aside from sovereignty patrols, the CCG could be directed to support operations that exercise China’s claimed coastal state rights east of Taiwan. It could, for instance, escort PRC survey and fishing vessels operating in this disputed space. Using a catalogue of non-lethal means, CCG patrol cutters might also obstruct the operations of foreign fishing and survey vessels.

Taiwan might face these same challenges, while also being confronted with the prospect that normalized CCG operations east of Taiwan could enable a more rapid transition to quarantine operations.

China’s Nuclear Submarine Development Quest: Strategy, Saga, Significance

Korea Institute for Maritime Strategy – This paper surveys the history and background of how the People’s Republic of China (PRC) became one of just six countries so far to possess nuclear-powered submarines, including the core subject of nuclear reactor development and improvement across three submarine generations. If South Korea decides to pursue and successfully develops indigenous nuclear-powered submarines, it will most likely become the seventh country to do so—offering six previous paths to study, of which China is a prominent example. Three-quarters of a century after beginning initial efforts under autarkic austerity, Beijing finally has a capable and growing fleet of modern nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs), nuclear-powered guided-missile submarines (SSGNs), and nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) equipped with long-range submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). What Mao sensed broadly through a geopolitical lens, modern military science shows with technical specificity: nuclear-powered submarines represent the absolute global “gold standard” for which there is no true substitute—with utterly unmatched potential in propulsion, endurance, sensor and weapons operations, and overall performance. As China’s experience shows, however, the road to success can be lengthy, expensive, and arduous. Ability to study preexisting foreign examples from afar helped somewhat, but tremendous national leadership, resources, and effort over decades have been required.

China Maritime Report #55: Loading the Well Deck: The PLA Navy’s Maturing Role in Projecting Joint Ground Forces

China Maritime Studies Institute – Since 2023, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has established an annualized rhythm of loading PLA Army (PLAA) combat, engineering, and support units onto PLA Navy (PLAN) amphibious ships for international exercises. This integration signals a maturation in Chinese expeditionary logistics, providing Beijing with the proven framework to project sustained, multi-domain combat mass well beyond its regional periphery.

China is testing underwater drones the size of submarines, 148 feet long with an estimated range of 10,000 miles, the largest ever built, and U.S. analysts say they could one day reach the West Coast

autoNotion – For as long as anyone has war-gamed a fight with China, the Pacific Ocean has been America’s best defense. It is more than 5,000 nautical miles of open water, and the working assumption has always been that Chinese warships and submarines simply could not cross it in any numbers, which kept the West Coast a long way from any shooting. China is now building underwater drones the size of submarines, and crossing that ocean is more or less the entire point of them.

(Thanks to Alain)

China is Rehearsing More Than Amphibious Landings

CIMSEC – For years, the public debate over a possible Chinese Communist invasion of Taiwan has focused on a single question: Does the People’s Liberation Army have sufficient amphibious lift to move an invasion force across the Taiwan Strait? That question remains important. However, recent Chinese exercises suggest that the People’s Liberation Army is not simply trying to solve the problem of getting forces onto a Taiwanese beach. It is rehearsing how to move, sustain, and conceal a large amphibious campaign across multiple locations.

New Mystery Submarine Signals China’s Rapid Undersea Expansion

Naval News – China is launching submarines at a pace unmatched by any other nation. Its latest design, a distinctive and innovative vessel that dispenses with the traditional sail, marks another step in the evolution of an increasingly capable and technologically advanced submarine force. With little official information available, understanding the purpose and capabilities of this new class depends largely on intelligence gathering and expert analysis.

China Maritime Report #53: Filling the Ranks: China’s Military Recruiting System and the PLA Navy

US Naval War College Review – Despite improvements in precision recruiting, pay, and benefits, and general outreach, several challenges continue to hamper efforts by the PLAN and other services to recruit the best possible candidates. These included overburdened recruiting officials, ineffectual support for military recruitment within China’s universities, and low physical fitness among potential recruits.

China Maritime Studies Institute – Given the substantial increase in sustainment requirements for the PLA Navy’s next-generation aircraft carriers, and acknowledging the limitations inherent in the Type 901 replenishment ship due to the technological constraints of its design era, the next-generation (新型) carrier replenishment vessel is expected to undergo significant modifications compared to its predecessor in several key areas.

China Maritime Report #52: Everything Everywhere All At Once: The Growing Complexity of PLA Amphibious Exercises

China Maritime Studies Institute – In August 2025, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) conducted a large-scale exercise to simulate an invasion of Taiwan. This “capstone” amphibious exercise suggests that People’s Liberation Army (PLA) training and preparations for a future Taiwan campaign are becoming more focused, realistic, and sophisticated.