RUSI – China’s test of a submarine-launched ballistic missile on 6 July reveals that its drive to truly assure second-strike capability is maturing.

Global Times – China’s state broadcaster has aired footage of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Air Force’s intelligent strike-planning system, showing more than 100 tactical units conducting coordinated strikes with split-second precision after it passed its final live-fire test. Chinese military experts said the technology reflects the PLA’s accelerating shift from platform-centered operations toward AI-enabled, system-of-systems warfare.

The War Zone – During a long-endurance trek across the Pacific, a small uncrewed surface vessel (USV) owned by a California company had an encounter with a Chinese guided missile destroyer near the Philippines. The Lightfish USV, owned by Seasats, came close enough to the Type 052D guided missile destroyer that it was able to capture the warship on video.

Ashai Shimbun – Experts believe that the Chinese have constructed a new nuclear-powered attack submarine that is topped with a low-profile sail and has advanced stealth capabilities.

(Thanks to Alain)

The War Zone – Putting YJ-20s on Type 052D destroyers, not just the giant Type 055, distributes the capability across many more hulls and potentially a much larger area.

China Maritime Studies Institute – Vice Admiral (VADM) Zhang Zheng (张峥) appears to have been promoted to the most senior billet in the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy (PLAN). He seems to have taken up this responsibility as early as December 2025.

China Maritime Studies Institute – From 17-23 July, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) deployed a 3,000-ton fisheries research ship, the Lan Hai 201, to waters east of Taiwan. China’s Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs, which owns the vessel, declared that the cruise was intended to “comprehensively understand the state of fisheries resources in China’s jurisdictional space.” During its cruise, the Lan Hai 201 engaged in survey activities in the EEZs of Taiwan, Japan, and the Philippines, in clear violation of their sovereign rights to regulate fisheries resources under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.

China Maritime Studies Institute – Foreign media sources believe that, in recent years, the Chinese Navy has shown keen interest in “small-reactor” nuclear submarines—vessels utilizing compact nuclear reactors as air independent propulsion (AIP) systems—and do not rule out the possibility that engineering trials have already been conducted. So, what exactly is the Chinese Navy’s requirement for such submarines, and through what technical pathways might this requirement be realized?

Covert Shores – Chinese social media is sharing official imagery of an amphibious exercise using a civilian ferry. While these are routine in China, they bear special attention as indications of readiness and hints at capabilities which may apply to cross-strait scenarios with Taiwan.

China Maritime Studies Institute – Foreign media sources believe that, in recent years, the Chinese Navy has shown keen interest in “small-reactor” nuclear submarines—vessels utilizing compact nuclear reactors as air independent propulsion (AIP) systems—and do not rule out the possibility that engineering trials have already been conducted. So, what exactly is the Chinese Navy’s requirement for such submarines, and through what technical pathways might this requirement be realized?

Global Times – Official Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) media consecutively released photos showing that the Y-9 anti-submarine patrol aircraft – following its debut during the 2025 V-Day military parade – has now appeared in military exercises for the first time, with an upgraded variant also making its first official public appearance. A military affairs expert said that this indicates that the new anti-submarine aircraft has been put into operational training and achieved initial combat capability, with upgraded radar and magnetic anomaly detector (MAD) enhancing its search, attack and survivability.

China Maritime Studies Institute – Despite its impressive expansion, the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) is more of a “decision-taker” than a “decision-maker,” with its growth driven by top-down political directives from leaders like Xi Jinping rather than by its own institutional influence. The PLAN’s bureaucratic influence within the high command remains modest, with minimal representation on the powerful Central Military Commission (CMC) or in its subordinate departments. The PLA Army (PLAA) continues to dominate top leadership and management roles, limiting the navy’s ability to compete for resources and influence key decisions despite a strategic shift toward the maritime domain.

CIMSEC – For years, the public debate over a possible Chinese Communist invasion of Taiwan has focused on a single question: Does the People’s Liberation Army have sufficient amphibious lift to move an invasion force across the Taiwan Strait? That question remains important. However, recent Chinese exercises suggest that the People’s Liberation Army is not simply trying to solve the problem of getting forces onto a Taiwanese beach. It is rehearsing how to move, sustain, and conceal a large amphibious campaign across multiple locations.

The War Zone – The catapult-equipped Fujian is now unlocking the J-15T’s strike potential.

RUSI – The ‘Bashi Breakout’ – China’s maritime operation east of Taiwan – is a warning that disruption to maritime trade is spreading to the Indo-Pacific.

War on the Rocks – Normandy was unprecedented in scale but not in kind. A Taiwan invasion would present the reverse problem: Taiwan’s size is not the unprecedented part — the operational challenges are. Analysis of a potential Chinese invasion of Taiwan typically emphasizes the People’s Liberation Army’s rapid modernization and the possibility of strategic surprise. Far less attention is paid to operational precedent. Three key missions at the heart of any cross-strait campaign have never been successfully executed under modern threat conditions: an amphibious landing against a credible coastal anti-ship missile threat, a large-scale airborne drop against modern air defenses, and a large, opposed air assault at extended range. In other words, the People’s Liberation Army would have to make history three times in the same campaign. I refer to these as the “Three Nevers,” a deliberately tongue-in-cheek nod to Chinese Communist Party doctrinal formulations, or tifa.

China Maritime Studies Institute – “Stand-In Forces” (SIF) is an operational concept proposed by the United States Marine Corps (USMC) within the context of strategic transformation, emphasizing the development of combat forces capable of sustained forward presence within the “weapons engagement zone” (WEZ). These forces can conduct surveillance and reconnaissance, gain long range target custody, and engage in interference, deception, littoral zone harassment, rapid littoral strike, sustainment, protection, and security operations, as well as other actions to address changing conditions and challenges. To counter the continuous penetration and encroachment into our near seas, we must proactively engage and establish effective countermeasures. We must focus on addressing weaknesses and enhancing our amphibious systems warfare advantages; prioritize innovation and advancement to accelerate the development of maritime unmanned combat capabilities; and emphasize advancing the establishment of cyber- and information systems to address our core priorities.

China Maritime Studies Institute – Since early June, the China Coast Guard (CCG) has maintained a continuous presence in waters east of Taiwan. Beijing describes these operations as a response to a joint statement issued by Japan and the Philippines in late May, in which the two countries pledged cooperation to delimit their maritime boundary.

Given their duration, these operations differ from past practice, in which CCG cutters appeared east of Taiwan for short periods of time, ostensibly to signal dissatisfaction with the island’s political leadership.

On 4 July, the original CCG task force deployed after the joint statement was issued was relieved by two new ships, suggesting that Beijing intends to normalize CCG presence in these waters.

Normalized CCG presence east of Taiwan would pose challenges for Japan and the Philippines, as China would likely apply elements of its longstanding East and South China Sea playbook to this new ocean area.

Aside from sovereignty patrols, the CCG could be directed to support operations that exercise China’s claimed coastal state rights east of Taiwan. It could, for instance, escort PRC survey and fishing vessels operating in this disputed space. Using a catalogue of non-lethal means, CCG patrol cutters might also obstruct the operations of foreign fishing and survey vessels.

Taiwan might face these same challenges, while also being confronted with the prospect that normalized CCG operations east of Taiwan could enable a more rapid transition to quarantine operations.

Naval News – China’s July 6 submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) test into the Pacific has drawn intense scrutiny not only for its political timing, but for what it reveals about the maturing state of Beijing’s sea-based nuclear deterrent.

Korea Institute for Maritime Strategy – This paper surveys the history and background of how the People’s Republic of China (PRC) became one of just six countries so far to possess nuclear-powered submarines, including the core subject of nuclear reactor development and improvement across three submarine generations. If South Korea decides to pursue and successfully develops indigenous nuclear-powered submarines, it will most likely become the seventh country to do so—offering six previous paths to study, of which China is a prominent example. Three-quarters of a century after beginning initial efforts under autarkic austerity, Beijing finally has a capable and growing fleet of modern nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs), nuclear-powered guided-missile submarines (SSGNs), and nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) equipped with long-range submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). What Mao sensed broadly through a geopolitical lens, modern military science shows with technical specificity: nuclear-powered submarines represent the absolute global “gold standard” for which there is no true substitute—with utterly unmatched potential in propulsion, endurance, sensor and weapons operations, and overall performance. As China’s experience shows, however, the road to success can be lengthy, expensive, and arduous. Ability to study preexisting foreign examples from afar helped somewhat, but tremendous national leadership, resources, and effort over decades have been required.

USNI News – The People’s Liberation Army Navy test fired a submarine-launched ballistic missile from the South China Sea to the Pacific Ocean on Monday, coinciding with the start of an annual naval drill with Russia.

China Maritime Studies Institute – Since 2023, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has established an annualized rhythm of loading PLA Army (PLAA) combat, engineering, and support units onto PLA Navy (PLAN) amphibious ships for international exercises. This integration signals a maturation in Chinese expeditionary logistics, providing Beijing with the proven framework to project sustained, multi-domain combat mass well beyond its regional periphery.

Naval News – More countries are building and operating submarines today than at any point in modern history. Yet amid this global expansion, China has emerged as the dominant force, launching twice as many submarines as any other nation and introducing more new classes.

autoNotion – For as long as anyone has war-gamed a fight with China, the Pacific Ocean has been America’s best defense. It is more than 5,000 nautical miles of open water, and the working assumption has always been that Chinese warships and submarines simply could not cross it in any numbers, which kept the West Coast a long way from any shooting. China is now building underwater drones the size of submarines, and crossing that ocean is more or less the entire point of them.

(Thanks to Alain)

CIMSEC – For years, the public debate over a possible Chinese Communist invasion of Taiwan has focused on a single question: Does the People’s Liberation Army have sufficient amphibious lift to move an invasion force across the Taiwan Strait? That question remains important. However, recent Chinese exercises suggest that the People’s Liberation Army is not simply trying to solve the problem of getting forces onto a Taiwanese beach. It is rehearsing how to move, sustain, and conceal a large amphibious campaign across multiple locations.