The Sea of Azov won’t become the new South China Sea (and Russia knows it)

Defense News – Russia’s brazen seizure of three Ukrainian navy ships on Sunday set off a firestorm of finger-pointing and appeals to international law on both sides. But the clash over the Kerch Strait and access to the Sea of Azov isn’t likely to become a long-running international spectacle like the ongoing maritime feud between the U.S. and China over China’s claims in the South China Sea.

Strategic Loss: How EU Sanctions Affect Russia’ Ability to Replace Its Sunken Dry-Dock

CIMSEC – The loss of floating dry-dock PD-50 may have a more significant long-term impact on Russia’s ability to sustain its Northern Fleet. The ability of Russia to recover, repair, or even replace the dock assumes considerable importance because it is a maintenance asset of strategic import. Russia’s ability to overcome this setback is further complicated by European Union (EU) sanctions, where the legal and practical effects of the EU sanctions regime will strongly affect Russia’s ability to replace this key maritime asset.

Russia’s Strategy in the Black Sea Basin

War on the Rocks – Although Moscow is in no position to dominate the Baltic Sea, its efforts to turn the Black Sea into a mare nostrum are bearing fruit. Over the past several years, the Kremlin has mastered the Baltic feint: By engaging in aerial and maritime provocations in a region highly monitored by the West, Russia is able to entrench its position in the Black Sea without notice. While most U.S. strategists worry about the Suwalki Gap on the Polish-Lithuanian border as a potential Russian invasion route into Central Europe, it is Russia’s buildup in the Black Sea that should concern policymakers. By using the Black Sea as a springboard, Russia can project power beyond its immediate surroundings — into the Middle East, the Balkans, and the Mediterranean — and strengthen its reemergence as a great power.