Trends in Maritime Challenges Indicate Force Design 2030 is the Proper Path

War on the Rocks – We are concerned about the quality of thinking, data, analysis, and synthesis that informs the decisions to reorganize the Marine Corps to meet its fundamental statutory obligations. It is because of that concern that we see that Force Design is indeed improving, not diminishing, the effectiveness of the Marine Corps to respond to the crises of today’s and tomorrow’s security environment. The current events impacting modern security challenges are providing empirical evidence to bear that observation out. We anticipate these real-world indicators will positively support the Force Design 2030 decisions when they are included in the congressionally directed report in the coming year.

Resolute Dragon: Reassurance, Deterrence and a Call for Coordination

War on the Rocks – This October, American and Japanese forces conducted an operationally focused bilateral exercise, rehearsing missions that would have been unthinkable a few short years ago but that now prove vital when deterring Chinese aggression. Resolute Dragon 23.2 not only demonstrated each force’s lethality and interoperability but also strengthened their military partnership in defense of Japan.

Stubbs Demonstrates Effectiveness Of Force Design For U.S. Navy

1945 – Force Design 2030 is a sound idea, but ideas exist to be falsified—in other words, debunked or amended. That’s how the scientific method works. No theory is ever proved—only disproved. Ideas about strategy, operations, and tactics are no exception. The retired marines were unconvincing when they appealed to Congress to overturn General Berger’s concept. They offered little more than sloganeering. But that doesn’t mean the concept is invincible. Bruce Stubbs raises problems that, while not insoluble, are eminently worth taking into account.

Ten challenges to implementing Force Design 2030

Atlantic Council – Implementing the Marines’ A2/AD capabilities requires as many as thirty-five new Navy amphibious ships to transport the new Marine units to land-based deterrence and warfighting positions, especially those located in the archipelagic and maritime nations of the Indo-Pacific theater. Fielding these new Marine A2/AD and Navy amphibious lift capabilities has raised a number of issues. This commentary identifies ten key challenges, but, like Congressional Research Service (CRS) reports, it does not offer solutions. Resolving these issues with objective analysis will help support informed decision-making regarding the implementation of Force Design 2030.