Time Out For Tactics

CIMSEC – Nobody’s arguing that inspections aren’t important. Heaven only knows what the beam of a flashlight might find under the bunk of a warship during a zone inspection. But there must be some way to reduce the 80 or so inspections a combat unit is subjected to every 18 months and use some of that time for the study of tactics.

Who is the Admiral Rickover of Naval Artificial Intelligence?

War on the Rocks – Unlike the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program (also known as the Naval Reactors program) today there is no Navy organization accountable for overseeing a practical application of any AI-enabled combat system that is ready be pushed to the fleet in the near future. Useful military AI is proven in concept. What if the Navy treated operationalizing AI enabled combat systems the way it once treated operationalizing nuclear power?

Adjusting to New Conditions for Command of the Sea

CIMSEC – Whatever character naval warfare takes on in the future sea control will always be the key to success. Being so essential one should understand its principles in order to gain sea control, but history abounds with cases where nations succeeded or failed. Some of those who initially failed were able to readjust their doctrines in time (and consequently their capabilities) to gain sea control and win.

How We Won the Great Pacific War

USNI – In the May 2018 U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Navy Captain Dale Rielage published a “future history,” written as a first-hand account of a defeated Pacific Fleet Commander in the 2025 timeframe. Titled “How We Lost the Great Pacific War,” Rielage’s article was superb—thought-provoking, well-researched, and forcefully argued. The alternative future history below is intended to provide a more optimistic view, and another potential path.

Contested Ship-to-Shore Movement, Part 2: Firepower Overmatch

CIMSEC – The age of battleships laying broadsides into beaches may have been over when the USS Iowa was decommissioned, but the increasing threat of anti-ship missiles and A2/AD may draw a curtain on the modern surface combatant doing likewise. For a contested ship-to-shore movement to be successful at the shore overmatch is required at the landing zone both in terms of quantity of troops and firepower. Unable to conjure enough firepower out on the beach due to obvious constraints, extensive supporting firepower must come from the air and the sea.

Navy Making Room for Railguns in Next Warship, But No Extra Investments

USNI News – The Navy’s next large surface combatant will have all the space, weight and power margins the sea service could need now and into the future to accommodate new weapons in development – but the director of surface warfare said the Navy would not accelerate weapons development to get them ready in time to outfit the new ships.