Bolster the Navy’s Patrol Forces

USNI Proceedings – A small force of U.S. Navy patrol ships has sailed the waters of the Arabian Gulf for the last 15 years, guarding key maritime infrastructure, conducting escort operations, exercising with international partners, supporting special operations forces, and keeping an eye on regional military moves. The ten Cyclone -class patrol coastals (PC) are some of the Navy’s busiest warships and likely would be the first to see action if Iran becomes openly belligerent. Refitting the Cyclone -class might buy the Navy some time but ultimately the Cyclones inevitably are wearing and need to be replaced.

General Quarters: Evolving Combat Casualty Care at Sea

CIMSEC – Medicine is a continuously evolving field, constantly learning from previous experience and improving. This is all the more true in the wartime trauma environment where resources are limited, conditions are austere, and time is either too short or too long. Our brothers and sisters ashore learned through Viet Nam and the early days of Iraq and Afghanistan that combat injuries will become combat fatalities unless personnel on the scene can stabilize the wounded for treatment by a higher echelon of care. As we consider a return to great power conflict and war at sea, our maritime forces should avail themselves of these lessons in order to prevent unnecessary losses of life in future combat.

LCS In Pacific: Run Silent, Run Shallow

Breaking Defense – What good is a little ship in a big war on a big ocean? It can hide behind islands and in shallow waters, sniping at the enemy fleet — much like the PT boats of World War II or skirmishers in a Napoleonic army. That’s the US Navy’s newest argument for its much-criticized Littoral Combat Ship, and they have evidence to back it up from the latest LCS deployment to the Pacific.

What Happened To Our Surface Forces?

USNI Proceedings – To chart a course going forward, it is necessary that we understand what went before and how it all went wrong so we can avoid the mistakes that have led us to this place. It is not enough to remedy issues such as the lack of quality sleep available to those who serve in ships, or elapsed and waived certifications, or faulty training in seamanship and navigation. It is not enough to decide that we need to begin transmitting on the automatic identification systems (AIS), or that we should rationalize all of the bridge radars and ship control systems in the fleet, or that we should usurp a captain’s prerogative to write his or her own standing orders. This approach is tantamount to treating the symptoms of an illness instead of addressing the underlying causes. The surface warfare community must determine the answer to the following question: What is the malady that lies behind the symptoms?

The National Security Strategy’s Implications for Seapower

War on the Rocks – The 2017 National Security Strategy is a statement of Trump administration priorities, and its central tenets can be directly traced to statements made by Donald Trump on the campaign trail, albeit now framed in more genteel terms. National security experts are busily analyzing the strategy to discern its insights, pivots, oversights, inconsistencies, and priorities. This essay, however, concerns itself solely with the strategy’s implications for American seapower.