Strategy and Ship Design – History’s Lessons for Future Warship Concepts

CIMSEC – The development of the Future Surface Combatant (FSC) family of warships has widespread implications. These ships will form the backbone of the Navy’s surface force, and add sorely needed numbers to the fleet in general. They may also signal a reorganization of the Navy from its current strike group system to a more amorphous model. Additionally, the FSC’s projected service life indicates that it will encounter and employ technologies that today are only in the developmental stages. Creating requirements for this ship is obviously important.

Navy Steers Well Away From An LCS Frigate

Breaking Defense – The US Navy has issued its official wishlist for its future frigate and set a 45-day deadline for shipbuilders to respond. As acting Navy Secretary Sean Stackley had promised, today’s Request For Information (RFI) opens the door wide to both US and foreign designs. It doesn’t lock the Navy into buying an upgraded variant of the current Littoral Combat Ships, but it doesn’t rule that out, either. Overall, the performance requirements in the RFI suggest a very different vessel than the original LCS, one capable not only of auxiliary duties but of escorting aircraft carriers and supply convoys in conjunction with Aegis destroyers.

Why America’s Mighty Military Doesn’t Always Dominate the Battlefield

National Interest – The United States Navy’s recent shoot down of a Syrian Arab Air Force Sukhoi Su-22 Fitter near the town of Tabqah over Syria is illustrative of a truth in modern warfare: Weapons do not always work as advertised. During the engagement between a pair of Boeing F/A-18E Super Hornets—flying off the aircraft carrier USS George H.W. Bush (CVN-77)—and the Fitter, advanced U.S. air-to-air missiles were decoyed at short-range. Indeed, as was reported by CNN, the Super Hornets first attacked the antiquated early-1970s vintage Su-22 strike aircraft with an infrared-guided Raytheon AIM-9 Sidewinder.

In a Blow to LCS, the US Navy Finally Admits it Needs a Real Frigate

War Zone – The U.S. Navy has released the first formal requirements for a proposed new frigate design, which it is now referring to as Guided Missile Frigate Replacement Program or FFG(X). The plan leaves open the possibility the service will buy a clean-sheet design in lieu of an “up-gunned” variant of the much maligned Littoral Combat Ship (LCS). Whatever happens, the new ships will finally include a robust area air defense capability.

Good Riddance to Rotational Crews

US Naval Institute Proceedings – I have heard it said that the “turning radius” of an idea is around 30 years. At that point, it becomes “new” again, and the reasons why it was dropped in the first place are forgotten. Here’s hoping the rotational crews concept is one idea that, when its time comes around again, will just keep moving into the graveyard of dead ideas.

Organization and Innovation: Integrating Carrier-Launched UAVs

US Naval War College Review – In spite of significant advances in robotics, artificial intelligence, and UAS technology, the Navy’s unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) remain predominantly intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets, and none are carrier based. Effective employment of UAVs by the Navy’s carrier air wings requires more than the acquisition of new technology, and without focused efforts to accelerate integration it likely will take several more decades before carrier-launched UAVs (CL-UAVs) are optimized across the entire spectrum of carrier aviation missions. Throughout history, organizational changes have been instrumental to enhancing the effectiveness of military technology. The integration of CL-UAVs can be accelerated by making organizational changes that facilitate the development of an internal constituency within the carrier aviation community and foster experimentation and bottom-up innovation.

Bring Back Fleet Battle Problems

US Naval Institute Proceedings – With the urgent need to rebuild the fleet’s capability and competence in sea control, a gap in the fleet’s operational repertoire has become increasingly apparent. Simply, there are few, arguably no, venues where operational-level naval formations are permitted to rehearse their wartime tasks free from the constraints of the formal training process or the distraction of technological experimentation. The fleet is overdue for a re-introduction of the Fleet Problem.

Impacts of the Robotics Age on Naval Force Design, Effectiveness, and Acquisition

US Naval War College Review – By embracing the robotics age, recognizing the fundamental shift it represents in how naval power is conveyed, and refocusing our efforts to emphasize the “right side” of our offensive kill chain—the side that delivers the packages producing kinetic and nonkinetic effects—we may hurdle acquisition challenges and bring cutting-edge technology to contemporary naval warfare. Incorporating robotics technology into the fleet as rapidly, effectively, and efficiently as possible would magnify the fleet’s capacity, lethality, and opportunity — all critical to strategic and tactical considerations. Doing so also would recognize the fiscal constraints under which our present force planning cannot be sustained.

Submariners Must Prepare for War

US Naval Institute Proceedings – Victory in World War II was achieved because of that generation’s ability to radically alter its pre-war concept of operations, training, and personnel when faced with wartime realities that the U.S. Navy had not anticipated prior to December 1941. Submarine sailors and officers overcame the fact that the Navy leadership wasted the 1930s focused on the wrong missions and combat environment. Despite the timeless lesson of preparing in peace for future wartime operations, today’s submarine force is committing a similar error, albeit for different reasons. The current demand for peacetime submarine intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) operations is degrading wartime preparedness for a near-peer naval competitor such as China.