Changing Surface Warfare Qualifications: Better Incentives Make Deadlier Officers

CIMSEC – The Surface Navy needs to cut itself free of its extraneous entanglements and make concrete changes to how it improves warfighting skill. Our most urgent target for reform should not be improving individual tactics on a piecemeal level. Rather, we should be focusing on systematic changes to the personnel and training systems throughout the Surface Warfare community that will cultivate more tacticians.

The U.S. Navy’s Unmanned Future Remains Murky as China Threat Looms

USNI News – Within the last two months, the Navy and the Pentagon have created new organizational structures to connect the unmanned vision to the wider U.S. military command and control infrastructure. While operators are getting more tools to solve near-term problems, the longer-term future of the hybrid fleet and air wing is still very much an open question, frustrating both the forward-deployed Navy and the defense industry that will ultimately build the fleet.

First US submarine repairs in Australia scheduled for summer

Defense News – The U.S. Navy will conduct its first submarine maintenance work in Australia next summer using the sub tender Emory S. Land, with 30 Australian sailors embarked to learn how to repair the Virginia class of submarine. This will be an early step in establishing a nuclear-powered attack submarine maintenance capability at the HMAS Stirling naval base in Western Australia in the next few years as part of the trilateral AUKUS arrangement.

Air Samurai: Is Naval Aviation Overtraining Pilots In the Age of Automation?

War on the Rocks – Today, the U.S. military produces too few pilots, eroding experience in deployed squadrons. It risks a similar path as Japan in the event of hostilities. A chronic shortage of pilots will plague the U.S. military for years. One reason is that outmoded training systems and syllabi needlessly prolong flight training and exacerbate acute shortages.

Outsourcing Surveillance: A Cost Effective Strategy to Maintain Maritime Supremacy

War on the Rocks – The United States has a need for military surveillance, but the most valuable forms of surveillance are costly and require significant resources. To address this, the U.S. military and its allies could scale up from the fundamental thesis of China’s maritime militia and outsource maritime surveillance in select locations vis-à-vis merchant shipping. Such a bold maneuver would enable a great increase in surveillance (in desired locations) at a fraction of what it costs to increase military vessel procurement. Using these vessels for surveillance only, all the way up to the beginning of a conflict, would spare the West from the same international finger wagging that China often receives. 

More Combat Logistics Force Ships? Yes Please!​

Center for Maritime Security – The U.S. Sea Services need more logistics ships. A lot more. The services allowed the combat-logistics fleet to wilt during the post-Cold War interregnum when Americans talked themselves into believing that their victory was for all time, history had ended, and strategic competition and warfare were no more. Why waste resources preparing for a war that will never come? Now, though, competition and conflict have come back with a vengeance. The U.S. Navy fleet—including the logistics fleet—must rebound in size and capability to keep pace with gathering dangers.

Citizen Sailors: The Missing Link in Maritime Force Structure

War on the Rocks – Put simply, the U.S. Navy does not have enough personnel to man the ships it has, much less the ones it wants to build, and is now missing its recruiting goals. And this does not even consider the need to replace trained and experienced sailors who would be lost in the event of war with China.

Yet despite this challenge, there is a proven solution readily at hand. In pursuit of its constitutional duty to “provide and maintain a Navy” and in support of the Tri-Service Naval Strategy, Congress should create a Maritime National Guard as a way to strengthen the Navy’s force structure, improve recruiting and retention, and reconnect the American populace to the sea through a new generation of citizen sailors.

The Bay of Bengal Gray Zone: U.S. Navy Roles in Integrated Campaigning

CIMSEC – The strategic visions of the U.S Navy envision greater cooperation with international partner navies. The U.S. Navy should identify how to increase collaboration to bolster deterrence and effectively compete below the threshold of war. It is imperative to formulate a shared framework for early diagnosis and prompt reaction to any prospective gray zone activities. Operational cooperation between the U.S Navy and the regional navies of the Bay of Bengal can be a regular matter of discussion to sort out shared maritime security challenges, and develop an integrated campaign that can competitively advance rules-based order.

Revise Force Generation to Create Campaigning Opportunities

CIMSEC – Moving forward, the Navy needs to continue to improve its force generation within its existing model and decide how best to use its forces in the sustainment period. In tandem with these efforts, the Navy needs to reconsider what constitutes the effective use of forces in the context of campaigning while it competes with many demands for its forces. Current processes are limited, but if the limits are understood in more precise detail, then the fleet can plan and resource more effective utilization of forces to support campaigning and strategy. Resources will always be constrained, but utilization and effectiveness within these resources can be improved to best address the evolving threat environment.

The MQ-9B Sea Guardian and the revolution in anti-submarine warfare

Wavell Room – Amidst the advancements in artificial intelligence, hypersonic missiles, quantum computing, cyberattacks, and lethal autonomous weapons, there is one aspect that has been overlooked in the current discourse on the revolution in military affairs (RMA) – the new revolution in anti-submarine warfare (ASW).  Using uncrewed aerial vehicles (UAVs), such as the MQ-9B Sea Guardian, in anti-submarine roles will significantly alter how ASW is conducted.  The shift will be significant, as submarines have been notoriously difficult to find and target.