The Bay of Bengal Gray Zone: U.S. Navy Roles in Integrated Campaigning

CIMSEC – The strategic visions of the U.S Navy envision greater cooperation with international partner navies. The U.S. Navy should identify how to increase collaboration to bolster deterrence and effectively compete below the threshold of war. It is imperative to formulate a shared framework for early diagnosis and prompt reaction to any prospective gray zone activities. Operational cooperation between the U.S Navy and the regional navies of the Bay of Bengal can be a regular matter of discussion to sort out shared maritime security challenges, and develop an integrated campaign that can competitively advance rules-based order.

Revise Force Generation to Create Campaigning Opportunities

CIMSEC – Moving forward, the Navy needs to continue to improve its force generation within its existing model and decide how best to use its forces in the sustainment period. In tandem with these efforts, the Navy needs to reconsider what constitutes the effective use of forces in the context of campaigning while it competes with many demands for its forces. Current processes are limited, but if the limits are understood in more precise detail, then the fleet can plan and resource more effective utilization of forces to support campaigning and strategy. Resources will always be constrained, but utilization and effectiveness within these resources can be improved to best address the evolving threat environment.

The MQ-9B Sea Guardian and the revolution in anti-submarine warfare

Wavell Room – Amidst the advancements in artificial intelligence, hypersonic missiles, quantum computing, cyberattacks, and lethal autonomous weapons, there is one aspect that has been overlooked in the current discourse on the revolution in military affairs (RMA) – the new revolution in anti-submarine warfare (ASW).  Using uncrewed aerial vehicles (UAVs), such as the MQ-9B Sea Guardian, in anti-submarine roles will significantly alter how ASW is conducted.  The shift will be significant, as submarines have been notoriously difficult to find and target.  

Focus Areas For Putting Warfighting First

CIMSEC – Perpetual administrative burdens, general military training, perfecting PowerPoints and quad charts, cataloged trackers for trackers, and continuous connectivity to every servicemember erodes the quality of the military’s preparation and conduct of warfighting. Few practical steps exist below the four-star level that can offer substantial relief from these numerous demands, but warfighters must still strive to exercise deliberate management and find ways to put warfighting first.

Warfighting Culture Starts With the CO

CIMSEC – Warfighting is as much a culture as it is an activity. To foster warfighting culture, commanders must include it in every aspect of their command – from training to administration to damage control to routine ship operations. Every aspect of shipboard life is connected to warfighting and therefore should be treated as such. This ethos begins with the commanding officer, but must also be embraced by the wardroom and the chief’s mess.

Simulating Global Naval Warfare: Captain Chris Narducci on Large Scale Exercise 2023

CIMSEC – In Large Scale Exercise 2023, numerous naval forces from around the world engaged in simulated warfighting under one global scenario. CIMSEC had the opportunity to discuss LSE23 with lead exercise planner Capt. Chris Narducci. In this discussion, Capt. Narducci describes what makes LSE unique, what the Navy is looking to learn from the event, and how LSE prepares the fleet for conflict against strategic competitors.

Crew Shortages, Bad Mattresses Causing Navy Surface Sailors to Lose Shut-Eye, Watchdog Says

Military.com – The Navy’s surface fleet is still struggling to alleviate fatigue among sailors more than six years after two deadly ship collisions and the service’s subsequent pledge to ensure that service members have more predictable sleep and work schedules, according to the Government Accountability Office.

(Thanks to Alain)