How the Weak Can Beat the Strong in War at Sea

US Naval War College Review – Modern asymmetric naval technologies have not erased the effects of geography. As fortress fleets evolved from dominating harbors to dominating near-sea expanses, weaker naval powers continued to blend the land with the sea to overcome their relative weakness. In response, the stronger naval power must stand ready to win command of the sea through an equally blended strategy.

Sharpening Surface Force Lethality: The Latest in Surface Warfare Advanced Tactical Training

CIMSEC – CIMSEC had the opportunity to ask Warfare Tactics Instructors (WTIs) of the Naval Surface and Mine Warfighting Development Center (SMWDC) about the evolution of the Surface Warfare Advanced Tactical Training (SWATT) events. These events are some of the most advanced combat training events surface units experience, and play a critical role in preparing units for high-end operations. In this discussion, the WTIs highlight how SWATT events are becoming more advanced, what core principles undergird the learning experience, and how Sailors and WTIs are growing from these events.

U.S. Maritime Strategy in the Arctic—Past, Present, and Future

US Naval War College Review – Warming waters and melting sea ice will create new challenges off our northern shores, and the Navy and Marine Corps must be prepared to provide a presence in the Arctic that will ensure peace and prosperity in the face of aggressive Russian militarization and expanding Chinese interest. Lessons from America’s Arctic past can illuminate what needs to be done.

Organizing to Fight and Win at Sea: The Surface Force Imperative

CIMSEC – As we look at our readiness to fight and win at sea, it is clear that our organizational structure is not optimized for the challenges ahead. For the past 30 years, the Surface Force’s administrative and operational chains of command centered on the Destroyer Squadron (DESRON) and the Amphibious Squadron (PHIBRON). These core organizations stand at the crux between the Surface Type Commander (TYCOM) and the Carrier Strike Group Commander or, alternatively, the numbered fleet commander. They are charged with ensuring the material readiness of their ships as well as their operational employment in times of conflict. This model has supported our force in the decades since the collapse of the Soviet Union. However, as we confront the return of strategic competition, a renewed focus on maritime power demands evolving the way we prepare our force to fight and win.

Another U.S. Ballistic Missile Submarine’s Movements Peculiarly Publicized

War Zone – The U.S. military has made yet another unusual public announcement about the location and activities of one of the U.S. Navy’s 14 Ohio class nuclear missile submarines, or SSBNs. U.S. Strategic Command’s official statement today disclosed a visit by the USS West Virginia to the British island territory of Diego Garcia, which hosts major American military facilities, earlier this year.

Invisible Blockades and Strategic Coercion

War on the Rocks – When the U.S. seeks to counter aggression, state-sponsored terrorism, or other threats without conducting a full-scale war, the use of naval mining for strategic ends could help it to achieve its aims, as an alternative or complement to aerial bombing. In addition to economic and diplomatic measures, which may not be sufficient, demonstratively mining a nation’s ports can apply pressure both directly and via third parties. Without casualties, and while managing potential escalatory risks, the U.S. can coerce another nation to modify its behavior. The naval mining of North Vietnam was the archetype of such a campaign, one which achieved its limited aims of freeing Americans and enabling withdrawal. Given a modicum of investment in U.S. mining capabilities, overt naval mining could be used to coerce adversarial states by constraining them with an invisible blockade. 

Accelerating capability for the fleet: The case of the CMV-22B

Breaking Defense – The Navy faces a key strategic decision. Will it leave a very predictable contested logistics gap for the fleet? Or will it close that gap by ramping up its buy of CMV-22Bs with a hot production line in place? By adding 24 CMV-22Bs to the buy, provision for carrier resupply in contested operations would be significantly enhanced. This kind of decision, which provides an ability to ramp up fleet capabilities in the midterm and provide an input the kind of capabilities which the US Navy and allies like the Aussies need as well, for the Osprey can provide for point-to-point support to Aussie ships as well.

How The U.S. Navy Can Compete With China In The Gray-Zone

1945 – U.S. political and military magnates must make the conscious strategic choice to compete with China in the gray zone. That means mounting a standing presence in the South China Sea in the form of U.S. Navy, Marine, and Coast Guard seafarers, ships, and planes. In other words, it means setting aside the past practice of showing up once in a while and then steaming away.