CIMSEC – It is now more apparent than ever that the information warfare community has not been, on balance, a good bargain for all four restricted line communities. This outcome is not surprising for several reasons, but none more so than this: Despite what senior Navy leaders may have said about information warfare over the past decade or so, what they have done and continue to do reveals that they do not believe information warfare is a warfighting domain on par with the traditional warfighting communities.

Pro Publica – After the USS Bonhomme Richard fire, investigators found missing fire hoses, a broken sprinkler system and other systemic failures. The Navy is still accusing a sailor of arson, against the advice of a military judge.

CIMSEC – To really serve as an effective steady-state influencer deeply involved in great power competition, the U.S. naval services need to invoke the roadmap laid out in the Triservice Maritime Strategy to create more than mission commanders. The services need to create a cohort of geostrategists.

Breaking Defense – The problem, which arose in late December 2020, has largely subsided for the operational fleet, according to a recently deployed commodore.

USNI News – A military judge today acquitted a young sailor accused by the Navy of setting a 2020 fire that ultimately destroyed an amphibious warship as it neared completion of a major modernization and overhaul.

CIMSEC – The process to build a naval capital town is incredibly difficult and requires decades of patience. The main issue for Groton has been funding. The end of the Cold War made a downturn in defense spending inevitable, with significant impacts on the submarine shipbuilding industry and the communities that support the industry. Reversing declining trends in labor over the past three decades will be an uphill battle for naval capital towns like Groton. 

USNI Proceedings – The intellect of naval leaders, including their education and mental agility, is vital to wartime readiness.

Breaking Defense – Twice in the last month, Iran has attempted to abduct US unmanned surface vessels produced by Saildrone. But the company’s CEO says he was unfazed by the events, instead calling the experience “valuable” and stressing the need for any organization operating unmanned ships to be anticipate hostile interference.

USNI News – A program to develop an unmanned, 80-ton minelaying submarine is three years late and $242 million over budget.

War Zone – The U.S. Navy’s Military Sealift Command (MSC) is set to receive its newest ship, the thirteenth in a series of high-speed EPF expeditionary transports providing logistics services around the globe. But Number 13 is special – not only is it the first EPF fitted with autonomous navigation and operating systems, but it is possibly the world’s largest ship capable of unmanned operation. Yet as of now, neither the Navy nor MSC has any plans to use the unmanned capability when the USNS Apalachicola (T-EPF 13) enters the fleet. Rather, MSC intends to send the vessel to the western Pacific to serve as a logistics ship with the U.S. Seventh Fleet.

War Zone – Air Force’s new Quick Sink weapon uses a low-cost seeker that turns Joint Direct Attack Munition bombs into all-weather anti-ship weapons.

War on the Rocks – U.S. commanders in the Indo-Pacific will have to fight with the forces and weapons policymakers provide them. Recent wargames, like their predecessors, demonstrate the United States needs a better plan for defeating an attack on Taiwan. This means forces and concepts that match U.S. competitive advantages against China’s weaknesses while minimizing the number of forces U.S. commanders will have to position within range of China’s firepower. Fortunately, a better matchup exists, one that focuses the U.S. bomber force against China’s navy and other maritime assets. China cannot take Taiwan, the Senkakus, or other territories in the region if its maritime power is destroyed. The U.S. bomber force could be a mortal threat to China’s maritime power if U.S. policymakers and military planners begin to properly prioritize it. By making China’s maritime assets the main target for the U.S. bomber force, then arming it accordingly, Washington would be well positioned to win a counter-maritime campaign in the western Pacific.

Naval News – Naval News reached out to ShinMaywa Industries, Ltd. in Japan to inquire on if the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) might be interested in their US-2 seaplane. A representative from ShinMaywa’s Sales and Marketing Department replied. Naval News also reached out to USSOCOM for additional C-130J MAC status and comment.

War on the Rocks – A new Navy program envisions a electronic warfare and intelligence suite that will work with any platform big enough to carry it.

USNI Blog – To effectively defend Taiwan from a military standpoint, the United States must be willing to defend Taiwan from outside of Taiwan. In other words, the defense of Taiwan from an invasion from China need not be confined to the main island of Taiwan, nor the Taiwan Strait. Moreover, expectations held by the United States should be that an invasion of Taiwan by China will look nothing like the previous four Taiwan Strait Crises (1954–55, 1958, 1995–96, 2022), which were generally limited, and instead be prepared for a conflict of a much larger-scale and intensity.

US Naval War College Review – The United States and the West already may have lost command of the sea. To deter a Chinese invasion of Taiwan or similar aggression, the Navy may need to pursue a very different fleet architecture, further integrate the maintenance and exercise of command, and seek modifications to a Unified Command Plan that ignores the indivisibility of the world ocean.

National Review – Jerry Hendrix says the United States must pursue a realistic approach to its defense and economic strategies, emphasizing the sea and the competition thereon.

USNI Proceedings – U.S. forces must act more deliberately to counter China’s at-sea insurgency.

Naval News – At the Surface Navy Associations’ Waterfront Symposium 2022, held on August 17-18, the U.S. Navy fielded audience questions regarding the status of the unmanned surface vessels (USV) that participated in Rim of the Pacific 2022 (RIMPAC 2022) naval exercise. Specifically, the USV panel discussed data and manned-unmanned teaming (MUM-T) of aerial, surface, and sub-surface vessels. 

CIMSEC – As the United States shifts focus from the Global War on Terror to peer competitors, senior naval leaders have increased messaging to the fleet that focuses on preparing for war at sea. Considering this shift, I investigated the state of the warfighter mentality in the Surface Warfare Officer (SWO) community to gauge how the community felt about its own readiness.

Breaking Defense – The USV Mariner is a direct result of the Strategic Capabilities Office’s Project Overlord program. Breaking Defense recently went inside the high-tech vessel.

CIMSEC – A destroyer squadron (DESRON) staff’s employment as a Sea Combat Commander in the Composite Warfare Commander (CWC) construct is unnecessarily narrow and prevents a more lethal and agile strike group. Tomorrow’s fight requires multiple manned, trained, and certified command elements. These elements should be capable of maneuvering and employing combat power. This combat power is required to support area-denial operations, assure the defense of a high-value unit, or conduct domain-coordinated advance force operations to sanitize an operating area in advance of the main body. This ability to diffuse command and control, disperse combat power, and contribute to sea control operations is imperative to fully realize the Distributed Maritime Operations (DMO) concept.

USNI Proceedings – Innovation is an important part of national security, but people are key.

CIMSEC – This article will discuss the role of the Naval Gunfire Liaison Officer (NGLO) as one human in a  JADC2-enabled theater. Any conversation about fires, lethality, and the Pacific leads either implicitly or explicitly to considerations of how naval vessels can support maneuver forces ashore. However, this legacy — maritime fires directed against terrestrial objectives — is now only one part of the equation. As concepts evolve for potential wars in the Pacific, the NGLO can provide maritime expertise that improves the integration of joint, multi-domain fires at the tactical and operational levels of war.

USNI Proceedings – U.S. sea power has always hinged on the nation’s ability to build and maintain partnerships.