The F-35C’s Radar-Absorbent Skin Is Looking Pretty Rough After Months At Sea

War Zone – The U.S. Navy’s F-35C stealth fighters, one of which has recently grabbed unwanted attention after a landing mishap aboard the aircraft carrier USS Carl Vinson sent it into the sea, are also showing some fairly significant wear and tear on their debut operational cruise. Radar-absorbent skins are historically made of materials that are notoriously sensitive to environmental conditions. While it is known that significant leaps in the maintainability of radar-absorbent materials (RAM) were integrated into the F-35 design, recent images from the F-35C’s inaugural cruise raise potential questions about the ease of maintaining the jet’s coatings in the demanding maritime environment.

The Pentagon Is In Desperate Need of an Intervention From the Top

War on the Rocks – It’s time for an intervention. For the last decade, the Pentagon has been promising a more distributed and resilient posture in the Indo-Pacific, but it has not kept that promise. Highly concentrated with few active or passive defenses, American forces — and lives — remain dangerously vulnerable to attack. As Chinese military capability and capacity continue to grow, the failure to address this vulnerability is one major reason America has failed to reverse the erosion of the conventional military balance in the Indo-Pacific and restore the credibility of American deterrence.

Clarifying Maritime Strategy: “Non-Traditional Security” is Just “Security”

CIMSEC – It is high time that we remove the term “non-traditional security” from our consideration of maritime affairs, and either abandon it outright or confine it to the debates of sea-blind international relations pundits. A phrase that crept into the strategic lexicon in the long, calm lee of the last Cold War, “non-traditional security” is little more than a dismissive hand-wave relegating human-centric security issues to a nebulous category with no real meaning. As a term, non-traditional security at best adds no value in either the operational realm or in the analytic sphere. At worst, particularly in the maritime domain, it skews thinking and undermines a balanced approach to dealing with the challenges we face.

Taxed Out: The Sacrifice of American Sea Power to the Joint Force

USNI Blog – As 2020 ground to a close, the Air Force’s Deputy Chief of Operations, Lieutenant General Joseph Guastella, made the case for American sea power: “If you want airpower, if you want space power, then you have to be able to defend [it]. . . . What requirement does the Air Force levy upon the Joint Force? I’ll tell you, it’s called protection.” What in the world does the general’s call for protection have to do with sea power? The answer lies in America’s atrophied naval capabilities.

RDML Christopher Alexander on Accelerating Surface Navy Tactical Excellence

CIMSEC – CIMSEC had the opportunity to discuss the evolution of the Surface Navy’s tactical development with Rear Admiral Christopher Alexander, commander of Naval Surface and Mine Warfighting Development Center (SMWDC). In this discussion, RDML Alexander covers new initiatives on measuring tactical experience, the increasing demand for Surface Warfare Advanced Tactical Training (SWATT) exercises, and how SMWDC is transforming to accelerate tactical skill across the surface fleet.

Surface warfare boss unveils strategy to create ‘more ready ships,’ better trained sailors

Defense News – The head of the U.S. Navy’s surface fleet has laid out a plan to prepare his force to deter or defeat a top-notch adversary, calling for specific steps to improve ship maintenance, successfully and rapidly field new weapons, develop high-end tactics, and ensure sailors and officers have high-quality training and mentoring.

The Global Operating Model’s Contact and Blunt Layers: Cornerstones for U.S. Naval Strategy Part 2

CIMSEC – In Part 1, we summarized the principles and functions underpinning the 2018 National Defense Strategy’s (NDS) Global Operating Model (GOM). We outlined the factors that motivated GOM development, and showed how the GOM’s historical lineage informs its contemporary utility. In today’s second and final installment in this series, we will outline the strategic importance of forward “competition operations” to deterrence. We will then identify the necessary attributes for naval forces operating in the Contact and Blunt layers, as well as factors that strategists should consider when thinking about such operations. We will conclude with some thoughts regarding the GOM’s overarching implications for future naval strategy and force employment.

Winged Luddites: Aviators Are the Biggest Threat to Carrier Aviation

War on the Rocks – Today, leaders in naval aviation are impeding the rapid adoption of reconnaissance and strike-capable aircraft carrier drones through deliberate incrementalism, purposefully constraining autonomous platform capabilities and delaying deployment with cautious and lengthy feasibility studies — all while adversaries accept greater risks to rapidly field imposing capabilities.