Spain-Based American Destroyers Are Sporting This Unique Electronic Warfare System

War Zone – The U.S. Navy’s quartet of Arleigh Burke class destroyers that are forward-deployed to Rota, Spain, and makeup Destroyer Squadron 60, sport a unique configuration. The most notable alteration is the inclusion of the self-contained SeaRAM Rolling Airframe Missile launcher system on the ships’ rear pedestal mount. This is in addition to the Phalanx Close-In Weapon Systemlocated on their bows. It was installed to beef-up the destroyers’ defenses against advanced anti-ship cruise missiles due to the high-threat areas they would be regularly operating in—especially the Black Sea, which is a nearly land-locked super anti-ship missile engagement zone. They were also among the first to receive an upgraded SEWIP Block II electronic warfare suite. But another unique and so far totally overlooked enhancement involves a far more obscure electronic warfare system, one that, as far as we know, is totally unique to these vessels. 

The Navy tried to cast Capt. Brett Crozier as a villain. New emails reveal how much support he really had

Task and Purpose – The Navy has repeatedly blamed Capt. Brett Crozier for the unprecedented novel coronavirus (COVID-19) outbreak aboard the aircraft carrier USS Theodore Roosevelt last year, but newly-released emails show several of Crozier’s colleagues instantly recognized that he had put the lives of his crew above his own career.

Advantage at Sea Requires Rethinking Influence

War on the Rocks – The U.S. Navy handicaps itself in great-power competition. “Though we are not exchanging fire with our competitors,” according to the chief of naval operations, “we are battling for influence and positional advantage.” Much of this battle is waged in information environments, and the new tri-service maritime strategy includes influence within the information domain in the very definition of “naval power.” Yet the U.S. Navy neglects part of its arsenal for influence, namely military information support operations.

Strategic Tradeoffs in U.S. Naval Force Structure – Rule the Waves or Wave the Flag?

War on the Rocks – What kind of navy should the United States build with its defense dollars? Does America want one that will win wars? Of course. How about one that deters other nations from starting a war in the first place? No doubt. Perhaps it is also useful to have a navy that can “show the flag” to generate diplomatic and economic influence, or to bolster the liberal international order? And wouldn’t it be nice if Americans could have more guns, and more butter, while also lowering their taxes?

Distributed Manufacturing for Distributed Lethality

CIMSEC – Budget justifications portray Medium Unmanned Surface Vehicles (MUSV) as both “attritable assets if used in a peer or near-peer conflict” and “key enablers of the Navy’s Distributed Maritime Operations concept.” American industry must build these and other key enablers even faster than the enemy can attrite them, but where? To overcome the limited capacity of American shipyards in pursuit of this requirement, Congress should develop a distributed shipbuilding industrial base through a variety of structured incentives.

F/A-18 Legacy Hornets Have Left The Navy’s Carrier Decks For The Last Time

War Zone – F/A-18C/D Hornets have ended their almost four-decade tenure aboard the aircraft carriers of the U.S. Navy. The final carrier deployment by the “Legacy Hornet” has officially concluded after the return of Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 323, or VMFA-323, the “Death Rattlers,” from its final cruise aboard the supercarrier USS Nimitz.

The Future is Unmanned: Why the Navy’s Next Generation Fighter Shouldn’t Have a Pilot

CIMSEC – The future of aviation is unmanned aircraft – whether remotely piloted, autonomously piloted, or a combination. There is simply no reason that a human needs to be in the cockpit of a modern, let alone next-generation aircraft. AI technology is progressing rapidly and consistently ahead of estimates. If the Navy waits to integrate AI into combat aircraft until it is mature, it will put naval aviation a decade or more behind.

Navigating the Shoals of Renewed American Naval Power: Imperatives For The Next Secretary of the Navy

War on the Rocks – This is a hell of a way to run a Navy. The Department of the Navy’s revolving door of senior civilian leadership over the past four years, including two secretaries and three acting secretaries, has done a disservice to U.S. national security. New leadership will soon arrive, but the department should not squander precious time on restarting strategic studies, force assessments, and process improvement programs. Instead, steady and strategic civilian leadership is required to make progress in the marathon implementation of integrated force redesign.

A Liberal Case For Seapower?

War Zone – A strong naval service operating routinely around the world has historically been viewed as the prerequisite for a liberal international order. Data support this idea, showing that maritime conflicts between countries are less frequent and managed more effectively when the U.S. achieves sea power dominance and helps to maintain naval parity in allies’ conflicts. Even eloquent advocates of moderating U.S. foreign policy ambition view the Navy as the military capability most essential for protecting America’s national interests.

Don’t Knock Yourself Out: How America Can Turn the Tables on China By Giving Up the Fight For Command of the Seas

War on the Rocks – The United States should give up its quest for command of the maritime commons in the Western Pacific. The struggle is based on a false premise — that if the United States loses command of the seas, China will step in the fill the vacuum. In fact, even if the United States loses command of the maritime commons, China is not positioned to gain it. However, by positioning China as an existential threat, the United States is boxing itself in politically. The United States courts disaster when it overextends itself