– Breaking Defense – By most metrics the war in Afghanistan is going badly. But…
– The Guardian – After 16 years and $1tn spent, there is no end to the fighting – but western intervention has resulted in Afghanistan becoming the world’s first true narco-state.
– New York Review of Books – Ahmed Rashid says prospects for any sort of positive outcome to the war in Afghanistan are as remote as they have been in this sixteen-year war.
– VOA – Vietnam is lengthening a military runway on a tiny islet to help hold off a larger, more aggressive China for control in Asia’s widest-reaching sovereignty dispute as other claimants keep quiet or seek negotiations. The government in Hanoi is extending the runway on one of the Spratly Islands, a disputed archipelago in the South China Sea, from 762 to 1,005 meters and building new hangars, according to the U.S. think tank Center for Strategic and International Studies. The longer runway would allow easier access for the air force’s maritime surveillance aircraft, it said. Historic use of the sea, strong national pride and a history of deadly conflicts are motivating Vietnam to fortify more than two dozen islands in the chain.
– New Yorker – Ashraf Ghani, the President of Afghanistan, wakes up before five every morning and reads for two or three hours…
– The Atlantic – Afghanistan’s outgoing president helped heal a shattered country. He also winked at corruption and ruled like a tribal chief. His successor will inherit a nation that’s in better shape than you might think—and a government with little power to keep it that way.
– San Diego Union Tribune – Q & A with Brig. Gen. Daniel Yoo, southwest NATO commander.
– New York Times Magazine – Enemies left, enemies right, and then there’s his family. Building an Afghan legacy is even more complicated than it appears.
– McClatchy – One statistic about the war in Afghanistan has stood out for weeks: the single U.S. Marine killed so far in 2013.
– New York Times Magazine – Digging out roadside bombs, running into ambushes and dancing with deranged informants — a week in the life of an Afghan National Army battalion, on its own in the wilderness.
– Washington Post – David Ignatius’ interesting take on the future of Afghanistan – “Who can say what the future holds for Afghanistan? Surely, the country’s turmoil and suffering won’t end when U.S. troops depart; the situation may get much worse. But it’s a mistake to assume that nothing changed during America’s years of struggle there, or that many of those changes weren’t for the good.”
– American Conservative – William S. Lind on how the Taliban mastered the operational art of modern war
– Washington Post – Top Pentagon leaders, White House advisers and members of Congress from both parties have long regarded the rapid expansion of Afghanistan’s army and police as a crucial element of the U.S. exit strategy. For years, they reasoned that generating a force of 352,000 soldiers and policemen would enable the Afghan government to keep fighting Taliban insurgents after U.S. and NATO troops end their combat mission. The U.S. military has nearly met its growth target for the Afghan forces, but they are nowhere near ready to assume control of the country. No Afghan army battalion is capable of operating without U.S. advisers. Many policemen spend more time shaking down people for bribes than patrolling. Front-line units often do not receive the fuel, food and spare parts they need to function. Intelligence, aviation and medical services remain embryonic. And perhaps most alarming, an increasing number of Afghan soldiers and policemen are turning their weapons on their U.S. and NATO partners. As a consequence, several U.S. officers and civilian specialists who have worked with those forces have started to question the wisdom of the 352,000 goal. To them, the obsession with size has been at the root of much that has gone wrong with the Afghan security services.
– New Yorker – Dexter Filkins asks will civil war hit Afghanistan when the U.S. leaves?
– Washington Post – An exceprt from Rajiv Chandrasekaran’s new book entitled “Little America: The War Within the War for Afghanistan.”
– Financial Times – Anatol Lieven writes that among other flaws, it was the ignorance of local realities that led to the failure of the western project in Afghanistan.
– New York Times Magazine – Fighting to the finish in Afghanistan’s most dangerous place.
– Vanity Fair – When First Lieutenant Jonathan Brostrom was killed by Taliban fighters in 2008, while attempting a heroic rescue in a perilously isolated outpost, his war was over. His father’s war, to hold the U.S. Army accountable for Brostrom’s death, had just begun. And Lieutenant Colonel William Ostlund’s war—to defend his own record as commander—was yet to come. With three perspectives on the most scrutinized engagement of the Afghanistan conflict, one that shook the military to its foundations, Mark Bowden learns the true tragedy of the Battle of Wanat.
– New York Times Magazine – Training Afghans to protect their homes and fight the Taliban seems to be working. The problem is that it’s also allowing them to fight their own personal wars.
– The Atlantic – To thwart the Taliban, marines in Helmand province are teaching the locals to read the Koran.
– National Journal – It isn’t just people who are dying in Afghanistan. So is an entire concept of war.
– National Post – An excellent review of Canada’s 10 year involvement in Afghanistan.
– New York Times – C.J. Chivers writes that if the American-led fight against the Taliban was once a contest for influence in well-known and conventionally defined areas – the capital and large cities, main roads, the border with Pakistan, and a handful of prominent valleys and towns – today it has become something else. Slowly, almost imperceptibly, the United States military has settled into a campaign for scattered villages and bits of terrain that few people beyond their immediate environs have heard of.
– Rolling Stone – Petraeus has a new plan to finish the war: Double down on a failed strategy.
– New Yorker – Excellent analysis by Dexter Filkins of the corruption that permeates the Afghan government. The telling quote:
“The allegations against many appear to confirm wider suspicions that the vast army of private gunmen here, many hired to escort supply convoys headed for NATO military bases, often accomplish their work by bribing the Taliban to hold their fire. These bribes are believed by officials here and in Washington to be one of the main sources of the Taliban’s income. One Western diplomat told me that bribes paid to Taliban commanders by the private security contractors, along with the other ways the Taliban extort Western money, are themselves enough to finance a robust insurgency. “It costs NATO a hundred and forty thousand dollars to keep a soldier in the field for a year, and a Taliban fighter a fraction of that,” he said. “If just ten per cent of that money gets to the Taliban—through bribes or extortion or whatever—that’s enough to keep five Taliban fighters in the field.””