China Maritime Studies Institute – “Above-the-neck” reforms in the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) that began in 2015 directed the development of a new joint operational command system that resulted in commensurate changes to PLA Navy submarine force command and control. Additional changes to tactical submarine command and control were driven by the evolution and expansion of PLA Navy surface and airborne capabilities and the introduction of new longer-range submarine weapons. Follow-on “below-theneck” reforms inspired significant organizational change across most of China’s military services. However, the PLA Navy submarine force, for its part, did not reorganize its command structure but instead focused on significant improvements to the composition and quality of its force. Between 2017 and 2023, the PLA Navy submarine force engaged in a notable transformation, shuffling personnel and crews among twenty-six submarines—eleven newly commissioned and fifteen since retired—relocating in-service submarines to ensure an equitable distribution of newer, more capable submarines across the fleet. Observations of infrastructure improvements at PLA Navy submarine bases portend even more changes to submarine force structure in the coming years.

Global Times – China has begun to build a dedicated port to support deep sea research in the South China Sea, a move experts said on Sunday will serve many ocean-related activities as well as national defense.

Global Times – H-6K bombers of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Air Force have carried out nighttime sorties encircling the island of Taiwan, a move experts said on Monday will become routine and will send a warning to everyone who attempts to separate the island from China.

National Interest – Recent data confirms that Chinese state ownership of ports, or investment firms that own ports, carries a unique array of economic, strategic, and political risks for recipient port states.

CIMSEC – This campaign analysis seeks to determine how long U.S. decision-makers can realistically have debates about intervening in a Taiwan crisis before the PLA seizes Taipei and the window for effective intervention with military force has closed. It does so by employing analytical modeling, informed by historical data, to determine how long the Taiwanese can resist a Chinese invasion absent direct U.S. military intervention given best-case-scenario timelines for the PLA. That is to say in this campaign analysis, tactical and operational chance favors the PLA, and Taiwanese resistance is more similar to that of the brave but desperate 2014 Ukrainian military fighting in the Donbass than the more successful and combat credible 2022 Ukrainian military which halted a Russian invasion. What follows is not meant to be predictive, but rather cautionary, and presents the most stressing timeline for U.S. decision-makers. Any deviations from this scenario would only serve to elongate the timeline for the PLA’s campaign, thereby increasing the decision-making space for U.S. leadership.

Chinese Maritime Studies Institute – The way the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) selects and manages its submarine officers increases the likelihood of human performance errors onboard a PLAN submarine. First, PLAN submarine officers are selected from applicants with among the lowest college entrance examinations of any PLA educational institution, suggesting that PLAN submariners are among the service’s least talented officers. Second, the Party Committee system at the apex of decision-making aboard PLAN submarines may be less agile than other approaches to command, at least in certain circumstances. Lastly, while the policy of embarking flotilla leaders senior to the submarine captain may reduce some of the negative effects associated with the first two conditions, it could lead to reduced performance when senior leaders are not present. If external events during wartime stressed these factors, the likelihood of human-induced error events in the PLAN submarine force could increase substantially.

War on the Rocks – Leading Northeast Asia security analyst Ian Easton argues that March through May is one of two ideal windows of meteorological opportunity for cross-strait amphibious operations, with the other occurring in September and October. For the U.S. joint force, the spring campaigning season in the Indo-Pacific is thus essential for strengthening regional partnerships, increasing multinational lethality, and instilling doubt in Chinese leaders’ minds about whether they could successfully invade Taiwan.

The Guardian – A dependence on food and energy imports could be China’s biggest weakness in a potential future conflict with Taiwan

CIMSEC – How does the PLAN see U.S.-China rivalry at sea? Based on sources cited from the December 20222 Conference of the Admirals, it should be obvious that the PLAN’s strategy is not fixated on peacetime “competition” for influence with the U.S. Navy. Nor is it bloated with abstract concepts or diluted by a laundry list of priorities. The answer could not be any clearer: the PLAN is almost singularly focused on high-end war with the U.S. Navy—deterring war, if possible, fighting and winning war, if necessary.

China Maritime Studies Institute – The China Maritime Studies Institute held an academic conference on the topic of the People’s Liberation Army Navy’s Undersea Warfare from 11–13 April 2023. The first two days involved unclassified presentations by scholars, government officials, and naval officers. Classified sessions were held on the third day and will be reported separately. The roughly 175 attendees were mostly US citizens, with several allied participants. Panel topics included 1) strategic and operational factors, 2) submarine force hardware, 3) submarine force human factors, 4) ASW, 5) seabed warfare, and 6) challenges and countermeasures for the U.S. Navy.

USNI Proceedings – In 2022, the PLAN demonstrated why it may be the most dominant naval force in the western Pacific.

CIMSEC – China’s ability to mass fires against warships is a product of a truly historic evolution. China was a third-rate maritime power only two decades ago, but it has transformed into a force that heavily outguns the U.S. Navy in major respects. China has clearly stolen a march on the U.S. when it comes to developing advanced anti-ship firepower, and now the U.S. is racing to close the gap. But it will still be many years before the U.S. has the tools in place to have decent options for massing fires. By then, the Chinese naval arsenal may have become something even more fearsome.

War on the Rocks – A worst-case Taiwan scenario for Chinese leader Xi Jinping would be a major military operation in which the People’s Liberation Army fails spectacularly or displays shocking incompetence akin to Russia’s in Ukraine. Could this happen? 

Global Times – Warships of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy have set out for Singapore to participate in the upcoming bilateral joint military drills and an international defense expo, with analysts saying on Wednesday that the events reflect pragmatic cooperation between the Chinese and Singaporean militaries and promote military openness and understanding in the South China Sea.

China Daily – The People’s Liberation Army Navy has helped evacuate nearly 700 Chinese and foreign nationals from the conflict-plagued African nation of Sudan on Thursday, according to the Navy.

Breaking Defense – For the second year in a row, China is poised to increase its defense budget at a higher rate than its national economy is expected to grow. That is an obvious reason for concern if you are one of the many nations worried about China’s global footprint, but it also raises important questions about the strategic thinking in Beijing. In a new analysis below, Dean Cheng, an expert on the Chinese military, picks apart just what is happening in Beijing and what it might mean for China’s many neighbors. 

Foreign Policy – As the United States was watching the skies in the aftermath of the spy balloon incident, China may have been acting at sea. In early February, maritime vessels disabled the two undersea cables connecting Taiwan’s Matsu Islands, a tiny archipelago just 10 nautical miles off China’s coast, to the internet. Now residents of the islands face highly reduced internet connectivity until the cables are repaired. The activity looks like targeted harassment by Beijing—or an exercise in preparation for cutting off the whole of Taiwan.

BBC – China said it was simulating “sealing off” Taiwan in a third day of drills as it appeared to use an aircraft carrier to launch jets towards the island.

War Zone – Two pieces of artwork from China’s Jiangnan Shipyard have recently emerged depicting what appears to be a new aircraft carrier design. This could be a glimpse at one concept for a planned future Chinese carrier commonly referred to as the Type 004. The images show a vessel that is distinct from the Chinese carrier Fujian, also known as the Type 003, which Jiangnan is building now. It also has some broad external similarities to the U.S. Navy’s Ford class and France’s future New Generation Aircraft Carrier.

BBC – China has simulated precision strikes against key targets on Taiwan and its surrounding waters during a second day of military drills. The drills – which Beijing has called a “stern warning” to the self-governing island – are a response to Taiwan’s president visiting the US last week.

BBC – China’s military is rehearsing the encirclement of Taiwan during three days of military drills.

Global Times – The aircraft carrier Shandong of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy reportedly started its first exercise in the West Pacific on Wednesday after sailing past the island of Taiwan, breaking the first island chain, with analysts saying that the voyage shows the PLA Navy’s second aircraft carrier is fully ready for far sea operations and safeguarding China’s national sovereignty and territorial integrity.

Naval News – Last week, the Southern Theater Command of the People’s Liberation Army released new images of the naval version of the Guizhou WZ-7 “Soaring Dragon” High Altitude Long Endurance drone, operated by the People‘s Liberation Army Naval Air Force.

CIMSEC – The role of civilian roll-on/roll-off (RO-RO) ferries in a PLA invasion of Taiwan deserves its growing notoriety. With port access secured or coupled with developing logistics over the shore capabilities, RO-RO ferries could deliver significant volumes of forces across the Taiwan Strait, offsetting shortfalls in the PLA’s organic sea lift. Some analysts have even described mobilized civilian assets like RO-ROs as a “central feature of [the PLA’s] preferred approach” to a cross-strait invasion.

But the PLA appears intent on assigning RO-RO ferries to another mission: launching amphibious combat forces directly onto beaches from offshore. The PLA has long lacked sufficient landing ships to deliver its full complement of amphibious assault forces, from both army and Navy Marine Corps forces, in the initial assault landing on Taiwan. Rather than building numerous grey-hulled traditional landing ships, the addition of RO-RO ferries into a combined landing ship fleet could quickly close this gap. 

CIMSEC – Chinese lessons from the Pacific War offer policymakers valuable insights about the PLA’s thinking and strategy.