China Maritime Studies Institute – Key takeaways:

• The PLAN is prioritizing the development of what it calls “four core operational capabilities.” These capabilities include 1) integrated near seas operations, 2) far seas mobile operations, 3) strategic deterrence and counterstrike, and 4) amphibious warfare.
• Analysis of Chinese writings suggest the focus of these efforts is on prevailing in a high-end conflict involving the U.S. military.
• The PLAN seeks the ability to dominate the near seas, strike U.S. bases and sea lines of communication in waters east of the first island chain and in the Indian Ocean, achieve “reliable, credible, and effective” deterrence against the U.S. through SSBN patrols within and beyond the first island chain, and execute sophisticated multi-domain amphibious operations against U.S. allies and partners.

Naval News – A Chinese shipyard in Wuhan has launched a submarine which is likely to be the country’s most advanced non-nuclear type. The new boat is larger than existing ones and is the first in the country to feature X-form rudders. There are indications that it may have a vertical launch system.

The War Zone – A Chinese Type 071 amphibious transport dock has emerged from a refit sporting a new laser directed energy weapon system.

USNI News – Philippine and Chinese Coast Guard vessels collided in the South China Sea near two disputed shoals on Monday morning in the latest encounter at sea between Manila and Beijing.

China Maritime Studies Institute – The report of the 20th National Congress of the Communist Party proposed “strengthening national defense mobilization and reserve force construction.” In the face of the Era’s requirements for strengthening the country and the military, the serious situation of national security, and the real existence of the risk of war, we must place the construction of national defense mobilization and reserve forces in a more important strategic position, and strive to promote the high-quality development of national defense mobilization and reserve force construction from a new starting point.

China Maritime Studies Institute – Key takeaways:

• Since December 2008, the PLAN has deployed 46 counter-piracy escort task forces (TFs) to the Gulf of Aden on a UN-authorized mission.
• Most TFs have included two combatants—a combination of destroyers, frigates, and amphibious transport docks—and a supply ship. Starting with the 33^rd TF, which departed China in August 2019, every TF has comprised one Type 052D destroyer, one Type 054A frigate, and one supply ship.
• One TF generally is on station near the Horn of Africa at all times, while for less than half that time another TF is either on the way to relieve it or returning home after completing its mission.
• Until recently, the PLAN had normally dispatched three TFs per year, at roughly four-month intervals.
• However, the 45^th and 46^th TFs departed China on five-month intervals, suggesting a shift in deployment patterns.
• The PLAN has not explained the rationale for this apparent shift in its deployment pattern. It is possible that more onerous requirements for its surface fleet in operations around Taiwan and in the South China Sea have forced the PLAN to draw forces away from the Gulf of Aden mission, at least temporarily. Or it is possible that the PLAN may be desirous of keeping its ships clear of waters threatened by Yemen’s Houthi rebels.

Naval News – New Type 054A variant features larger flight deck and hangar for Z-20 helicopter, and new main gun. Ships under construction at two yards may grow Type 054A-fleet to 50 units or more.

China Maritime Studies Institute – Since the creation of the People’s Republic of China’s merchant fleet, the Chinese Communist Party has implemented a system of political control aboard oceangoing vessels through ship Party branches and ship political commissars. This report focuses on the ship political commissar, a Party representative assigned to oceangoing merchant ships, particularly within state-owned shipping enterprises, to carry out political and administrative work in the management of ship crews. Having peaked in authority and power during the Cultural Revolution, the ship political commissar position has evolved over the decades following economic reforms in the 1980s. Despite years of problematic implementation, the ship political commissar system is currently undergoing a revitalization in staterun shipping companies. The position has supporting roles to play in carrying out national tasking such as evacuations of overseas Chinese citizens. Most ship political commissars are former PLA officers. Chinese roll-on/roll-off ferry operators constitute a special case where the ship political commissar may have greater authority in the ship hierarchy and potentially a role in supporting PLA use of those vessels. This report focuses on the ship political commissar system over the last 20 years, providing a needed update on this understudied topic in the English-language literature.

Baker Institute – This paper addresses one of the most dangerous, consequential flashpoints on the planet today, and for years into the future: a potential attempt by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to annex Taiwan. The aftermath would likely trigger the worst economic shocks experienced in more than a century, unleashing a cycle of repression and diminishing the quality of life for populations across Asia and beyond, with devastating impacts on American interests and Americans’ well-being. Moreover, China’s annexation of Taiwan could exacerbate regional tensions and extend into a broader, global conflict. At stake are crucial interests such as the semiconductors that power today’s big data world and the national security of U.S. allies and partners. Neighboring states’ responses to PRC expansion could also result in the erosion of American military advantages as well as the destabilization of democracy and the international order. 

Mapping China’s Strategic Space – With an increasingly powerful People’s Republic of China (PRC) under paramount leader Xi Jinping engaging in meteoric military-maritime buildup and pressing disputed sovereignty claims with increasing assertiveness, it is more important than ever to consider Beijing’s “mental map”: how its leaders regard the physical nature of strategic space. As Andrew Rhodes argues cogently, “Being able to ‘think in space’ is a crucial tool for decision-makers, but one that is often deemphasized.” This applies to understanding both how PRC leaders envision China’s strategic space and how it is evolving in practice.

Chinese Maritime Studies Institute – As a part China’s goal to build a fully modernized military by 2035, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is improving its reserve forces through increased defense spending, critical policy changes, and organizational restructuring. Reserve forces (后备力量) encompass the PLA Reserve (预备役部队) and paramilitary forces, such as the militia, which fall under the leadership of the Central Military Commission and can be mobilized by the National Defense Mobilization Department to support combat. The many components that make up China’s fighting force such as active-duty PLA forces, China Coast Guard, and the militia have been studied in depth; however, the PLA Reserve remains an understudied and underreported topic. While the PLA Reserve represents a fraction of the force structure of their active-duty counterparts, recent changes in military reform specific to the PLA Reserve highlight the importance of this relatively small force and the evolving role reservists (预备役人员) may play within the PLA.

The War Zone – Weaponized drones that look and fly like birds may sound like something out of a movie, but they are very real with a long history.

The War Zone – With a longer hull and possible vertical launch cells, the new design is further evidence of China’s rapid submarine developments.

War on the Rocks – Tensions between China and the Philippines have escalated dramatically in recent months around Second Thomas Shoal, a submerged reef in the eastern Spratly Islands…But while China has been escalating with the Philippines at unprecedented levels around Second Thomas Shoal, it has exercised striking restraint toward Vietnam’s far larger and more militarized expansion of its South China Sea outposts.

Global Times – The Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy’s second 10,000 ton-class hospital ship recently embarked on a voyage to islands and reefs in the South China Sea to conduct medical rounds and rescue exercises, with experts saying on Thursday that the vessel will enhance the PLA Navy’s logistics capabilities and provide extra public security goods to the international community.

China Maritime Studies Institute – Chinese state media’s Channel 7 recently released a series of videos that described China’s aircraft carriers and the carrier battle groups, including their history, composition, and operational theory.

National Interest – During a Q&A session, an Indian Navy student suggested that China’s People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLA Navy) could maintain fleet readiness by rapidly replacing or demoting aging ships instead of facing the maintenance issues typical of older vessels. 

Breaking Defense – With the months-long presence of Chinese warships at Cambodia’s Ream naval base and a major bilateral military exercise there in May, China’s newest overseas military facility appears to be up and running, confirming years of suspicions about China’s presence in the Southeast Asian country.

China Maritime Studies Institute – Submarine performance is not just measured in technical terms, but also in how crews operate over time. As the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) increasingly deploys its submarine force beyond the near seas on long-distance combat readiness and training missions, studying the force’s human components benefits a broader understanding its overall effectiveness. This report explores work and living conditions, crew endurance, service culture, political requirements, and approaches to resolving human issues in the submarine force. An inherently dangerous and challenging profession, the submarine force has gradually developed numerous solutions to address various challenges to prevent non-combat attrition among crews. Life and duty in the “Dragon Palace,” both an internal joke and the overarching embodiment of PLAN submarine culture, reveals a professional community focused on secrecy, safety, and expertise that is working to enhance its human performance.

CSIS – China has significantly increased pressure on Taiwan in recent years, stoking fears that tensions could erupt into outright conflict. Much attention has been paid to the threat of an invasion, but Beijing has options besides invading to coerce, punish, or annex Taiwan. One major step China could take is a “gray zone” quarantine led not by its People’s Liberation Army (PLA) but by its coast guard and other law enforcement forces. Rather than sealing off the island, a quarantine would aim to demonstrate China’s ability to exert control over Taiwan. A quarantine is more feasible for China and more likely than an invasion or blockade in the near term; it also presents unique challenges in terms of how Taiwan and the international community can respond. This brief explores two hypothetical maritime quarantine scenarios.

Global Times – A series of biomimetic submersibles independently developed by China have started practical deployment in the South China Sea, with larger variants for armed reconnaissance missions under development.

USNI News – Chinese forces seized Philippine small boats and firearms during Monday’s botched resupply attempt to BRP Sierra Madre (LT-57) at Second Thomas Shoal, Philippine military officials confirmed.

USNI News – A Chinese amphibious warship is operating near a disputed South China Sea feature that has been the site of a standoff between Chinese and Philippine Coast Guards.

The War Zone – Taiwan said it was monitoring the submarine that was spotted by fishermen when it came to the surface and began moving under escort in the Taiwan Strait around dawn today.