How Japan Could Co-Produce the Navy’s Future Fleet

War on the Rocks – Although Japan is well-positioned to support high-tech manufacturing at scale, there are still significant legal, political, and security barriers on both sides of the Pacific. Overcoming these barriers, including security risks overseas and political resistance to offshoring in the United States, requires the correct balance of policy and financial incentives.

Five Issues For the National Commission on the Future of the Navy

CIMSEC – In 2022, Congress established the independent National Commission on the Future of the Navy to conduct two overarching studies, one examining naval force structure and the other focused on shipbuilding and innovation. The former will recommend the size and composition of the Navy, while the latter will identify opportunities to better integrate advanced technologies into shipbuilding, new construction, and repair shipyards. China now possesses the world’s largest navy by ship count, and its shipbuilding capacity vastly exceeds that of the United States. Chinese shipyards are producing warships faster than American yards can repair them. China has spent a generation building a fleet capable of contesting sea control and converting industrial scale into military power, while the United States has allowed its shipbuilding capacity, naval industrial base, and force structure to deteriorate over the same period. The Commission is required to submit an unclassified report in 2027, and its recommendations could shape American naval power for years to come. To fulfill its mandate, the Commission must resolve five foundational issues.

Rebuilding U.S. Missile Inventory: A Multiyear Project

CSIS – The 39-day bombing and air defense campaign against Iran depleted inventories of key U.S. munitions stockpiles, as a previous CSIS analysis detailed. The United States has enough munitions for any plausible scenario in the Iran war, but the depleted inventories have created a window of vulnerability for a potential Western Pacific conflict. The time needed to rebuild those inventories has thus become a major concern.

The Navy Needs Precise Mass and Here Is How to Get There

War on the Rocks – Investing in medium autonomous warships, lower-cost long-range munitions, and surface drones is not about affordably generating the volume and diversity of effects necessary to survive and fight in a contested environment. The Navy should treat these capabilities not as adjuncts to the existing fleet but as central components of future maritime power.

Maritime Cost Imposition: A New Approach to Great Power War

CIMSEC – The U.S. Navy remains intent on using its high-end platforms for sea denial. To its credit, it is developing the kinds of unmanned systems that are ideally suited for this mission, but only at too slow a pace. To optimize its force structure and accelerate the development of technology, the U.S. Navy should instead commit to a strategy of customized, low-end sea denial coupled with high-end global maritime punishment, and then tailor its doctrine, tactics, and weapons systems to each mission.