U.S. Expands Search for Contraband as Iranian Blockade Continues

USNI News – The U.S. reserves the right to search any Iranian vessels, sanctioned vessels and ships suspected of carrying a list of contraband items, according to a Thursday notice to mariners from U.S. Central Command. Contraband items include weapons, ammunition, explosives and military equipment, the notice reads. Conditional contraband –meaning contraband for aiding Iran’s military operations – includes crude oil, nuclear material, metals and machinery. A full list is included in the blockade update. To that end, the U.S. will pursue ships outside of the U.S. Central Command area of response, Chief of the Joint Staff Gen. Dan Caine told reporters Thursday.

Navy MQ-4C Triton’s Fate Unknown After Disappearing From Flight Tracking Over Persian Gulf

The War Zone – U.S. Navy MQ-4C Triton surveillance drone disappeared abruptly and unexpectedly from online flight tracking sites after declaring an in-flight emergency while flying over the Persian Gulf today. The uncrewed aircraft was also tracked rapidly losing altitude right beforehand, prompting widespread questions about its fate. This comes just two days after the United States and Iran agreed to a still very fragile ceasefire, which is heavily contingent on the reopening of the highly strategic Strait of Hormuz.

Closing the Air and Missile Defense Gap in the Indo-Pacific

War on the Rocks – Sensing vulnerability, the United States and its regional allies and partners are ramping up procurement of air and missile defense assets, though progress is likely to be constrained by competing spending priorities and already overstretched defense industrial bases. These constraints underscore the need for complementary approaches that can deliver near-term gains without relying solely on expanded procurement. Networking missile sensors and interceptors across the United States and its Indo-Pacific allies and partners is one such approach. Coalition air and missile defense can generate operational efficiencies in sensing and interception that have the potential to shrink Chinese air and missile advantages. While compelling in theory, is it feasible in practice? Can the United States and its allies and partners navigate the challenging geography and politics of the Indo-Pacific to counter Chinese air and missile advantages through coordinated air and missile defense?

Hedge With Non-Kinetic Defense

CIMSEC – The Navy needs hedge strategies that keep the force relevant in high‑end conflict without breaking the bank in peacetime—ways to augment the general purpose force and cover the most dangerous scenarios, which specifically includes a potential war with China. Layered non-kinetic defenses—employed as a combined system—offer one such hedge. For surface forces, the Navy should update the PCMS program with a new tile‑and‑paint system and pair it with radar reflectors that distort imaging seekers. For air forces, it should field decoys and radar reflectors, as seen in Ukraine, to cast doubt on the precise location of U.S. air assets. Finally, the Navy and joint force should combine small, mobile jammers and dazzlers to saturate adversary ISR and degrade battle damage assessment, preserving operational surprise.

Why America Needs a Four Ocean Navy

CIMESC – America’s strategic map must change. The two-ocean Navy of the past secured victory in World War II and sustained deterrence preventing great power conflict throughout the Cold War. With the inability to field high-end, multipurpose warships globally, we need a four-ocean Navy that recognizes the Atlantic, Arctic, Indian, and Pacific as distinct theaters with unique requirements. This is a call for clarity: matching missions to oceans and tailoring warships with crews to oceans.

Moving Toward Distributed Maritime Operations: Getting the Navy Out of its VLS Hole

CIMSEC – The U.S. Navy faces a period in which its missile-firing capacity is declining as strategic threats are rising. Distributing long-range fires across existing additional classes of ships with the help of containerized launchers offers a solution to fill the VLS gap, provide reload flexibility, and expand the number of shooters at sea. While some vessels might not possess the same organic communications, radars, and command and control capabilities as destroyers and cruisers, Navy efforts to improve the fleet’s connectivity and battle network could eventually mean these missiles can be used with the help of other ships in the theater. In distributing lethality this way, the Navy could dig itself out of its VLS hole faster, and achieve the virtues of mass without the vulnerabilities of concentration.

A Torpedo in the Trade Lanes: Naval Warfare Returns to the Indo-Pacific

War on the Rocks – The sinking of the IRIS Dena was a stark reminder that naval warfare follows its own logic. Engagements can occur far from home waters, unfold with little warning, and carry consequences well beyond the immediate tactical exchange. In this case, a single submarine strike intersected with global trade flows, alliance dynamics, contested information environments, and the legal realities of conflict at sea.