Evaluating the Naval Response to the Red Sea Crisis

CIMSEC – This analysis evaluates the naval response to the Red Sea Crisis so far, from cooperating with merchant shipping, the cost effectiveness and vulnerabilities of using warships and missiles to counter drones, and the role of allies, to the potential implications for a future conflict with China and current efforts in defense innovation to prepare for it.

Forging the Force: A Joint Task Force in the Indo-Pacific

War on the Rocks – Referring to the People’s Liberation Army, the commander of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command recently reported to Congress that “we haven’t faced a threat like this since World War II.” The nature of this threat should compel allied militaries to strengthen their efforts in the Indo-Pacific. One way to do so is by creating a standing joint task force headquarters. The 2023 National Defense Authorization Act directed the establishment of such a headquarters in the Indo-Pacific by 1 Oct. 2024, but congressional leaders have conveyed concern with U.S. Indo-Pacific Command’s current approach.

Asymmetric Naval Strategies: Overcoming Relative Naval Power Weakness to Contest Command of the Sea

CIMSEC – Joint operations, while important in a general sense, and critical for first rate navies, are not the best option for weaker powers to contest command of the sea. Joint operations are resource-intensive and could prove more burdensome than helpful for a weaker naval power. Additionally, joint interoperability would likely be nonetheless reliant on the previous factors of asymmetric naval warfare, coalition leveraging, and attrition of distance sea lines of communication in order to be effective. Conversely, joint interoperability is not a prerequisite for those different factors. Asymmetric naval warfare can be conducted regardless of a joint force in a variety of ways, especially when possessing devastating technologies and employing surprise shifts in strategy that undermine an adversary’s understanding of the maritime environment.

RAND: What Does The U.S. Navy Need In Its Future Combatants?

Naval News – Naval News asked the RAND Corporation for their opinions on what the U.S. Navy’s next-generation destroyer, the DDG(X), should have in terms of designing the plug-in Payload Module. The DDG(X) Payload Module option is a hull insert that can accommodate, for example, additional vertical launch missile cells to a Mission Module Bay to additional interior rooms.

Make ASW Joint: Integrating the Joint Force Into Full Spectrum ASW

CIMSEC – During the Cold War, NATO maintained anti-submarine competency and internalized lessons learned during the Second World War. The collapse of the Soviet Navy during the 1990s shifted the U.S. focus to power projection ashore in the Balkans and the Middle East, and anti-submarine warfare competencies across the joint force atrophied. As the era of near-peer competition began, the Navy looked at ways to recapture the hard-fought competencies and lessons lost since the end of the Cold War. In particular, the whole government approach to anti-submarine warfare (ASW) was reintroduced, known as “full-spectrum ASW.” The Navy is the domain owner for undersea warfare. As such, the Navy must be prepared to educate and explain undersea warfare doctrine and its roles to the rest of the joint force so that lessons written in blood are not repeated.

Information Warfare is Integrated Warfare

CIMSEC – The U.S. Navy should take concrete steps to further promote an integrated warfighting ethos which better incorporates all elements of the IW community, starting from initial officer training to senior level carrier strike group operations. By defining what it means to be an integrated information warfighter rather than just being an Intelligence Specialist, Cryptologist, Meteorologist, or Information Professional, the IW community will better educate, train, and most importantly, recruit the next generation of IW personnel. Equally important is the need to enhance retention. To further maintain the impressive cadre of IW personnel in service, the Navy should improve its career opportunities with better advanced training and cross-detailing availability. In the aftermath of these changes, IW will be better positioned to dominate the information environment and enable mission success.