US Navy carrier Ford to go on unusual deployment this year

Defense News – The U.S. Navy has promised a first deployment for its new aircraft carrier Gerald R. Ford by this fall — but that deployment won’t be a typical one. Ford won’t fall under the operational command of a regional combatant commander. Rather, it will conduct a “service-retained early employment” period where the Navy keeps full control over the ship’s activities and schedule.

A Blast From The Past? The Role of Maritime Sabotage in Strategic Competition

Modern War Institute – Today, as the US military shifts priorities from counterterrorism to strategic competition, SOF have begun to rebalance to focus on both countering violent extremist organizations and competing with peer and near-peer actors. In light of SOF’s history with sabotage and recent renewed interest in the subject (strategic sabotage was listed as a priority research topic for the Joint Special Operations University in 2020, for example), the time is ripe for an analytical examination of the subject. Maritime sabotage operations in particular deserve further study given the growing importance of maritime regions from the Indo-Pacific to the Black Sea.

The F-35C’s Radar-Absorbent Skin Is Looking Pretty Rough After Months At Sea

War Zone – The U.S. Navy’s F-35C stealth fighters, one of which has recently grabbed unwanted attention after a landing mishap aboard the aircraft carrier USS Carl Vinson sent it into the sea, are also showing some fairly significant wear and tear on their debut operational cruise. Radar-absorbent skins are historically made of materials that are notoriously sensitive to environmental conditions. While it is known that significant leaps in the maintainability of radar-absorbent materials (RAM) were integrated into the F-35 design, recent images from the F-35C’s inaugural cruise raise potential questions about the ease of maintaining the jet’s coatings in the demanding maritime environment.

The Pentagon Is In Desperate Need of an Intervention From the Top

War on the Rocks – It’s time for an intervention. For the last decade, the Pentagon has been promising a more distributed and resilient posture in the Indo-Pacific, but it has not kept that promise. Highly concentrated with few active or passive defenses, American forces — and lives — remain dangerously vulnerable to attack. As Chinese military capability and capacity continue to grow, the failure to address this vulnerability is one major reason America has failed to reverse the erosion of the conventional military balance in the Indo-Pacific and restore the credibility of American deterrence.

Clarifying Maritime Strategy: “Non-Traditional Security” is Just “Security”

CIMSEC – It is high time that we remove the term “non-traditional security” from our consideration of maritime affairs, and either abandon it outright or confine it to the debates of sea-blind international relations pundits. A phrase that crept into the strategic lexicon in the long, calm lee of the last Cold War, “non-traditional security” is little more than a dismissive hand-wave relegating human-centric security issues to a nebulous category with no real meaning. As a term, non-traditional security at best adds no value in either the operational realm or in the analytic sphere. At worst, particularly in the maritime domain, it skews thinking and undermines a balanced approach to dealing with the challenges we face.

Taxed Out: The Sacrifice of American Sea Power to the Joint Force

USNI Blog – As 2020 ground to a close, the Air Force’s Deputy Chief of Operations, Lieutenant General Joseph Guastella, made the case for American sea power: “If you want airpower, if you want space power, then you have to be able to defend [it]. . . . What requirement does the Air Force levy upon the Joint Force? I’ll tell you, it’s called protection.” What in the world does the general’s call for protection have to do with sea power? The answer lies in America’s atrophied naval capabilities.