Advantage at Sea Requires Rethinking Influence

War on the Rocks – The U.S. Navy handicaps itself in great-power competition. “Though we are not exchanging fire with our competitors,” according to the chief of naval operations, “we are battling for influence and positional advantage.” Much of this battle is waged in information environments, and the new tri-service maritime strategy includes influence within the information domain in the very definition of “naval power.” Yet the U.S. Navy neglects part of its arsenal for influence, namely military information support operations.

Strategic Tradeoffs in U.S. Naval Force Structure – Rule the Waves or Wave the Flag?

War on the Rocks – What kind of navy should the United States build with its defense dollars? Does America want one that will win wars? Of course. How about one that deters other nations from starting a war in the first place? No doubt. Perhaps it is also useful to have a navy that can “show the flag” to generate diplomatic and economic influence, or to bolster the liberal international order? And wouldn’t it be nice if Americans could have more guns, and more butter, while also lowering their taxes?

Distributed Manufacturing for Distributed Lethality

CIMSEC – Budget justifications portray Medium Unmanned Surface Vehicles (MUSV) as both “attritable assets if used in a peer or near-peer conflict” and “key enablers of the Navy’s Distributed Maritime Operations concept.” American industry must build these and other key enablers even faster than the enemy can attrite them, but where? To overcome the limited capacity of American shipyards in pursuit of this requirement, Congress should develop a distributed shipbuilding industrial base through a variety of structured incentives.

F/A-18 Legacy Hornets Have Left The Navy’s Carrier Decks For The Last Time

War Zone – F/A-18C/D Hornets have ended their almost four-decade tenure aboard the aircraft carriers of the U.S. Navy. The final carrier deployment by the “Legacy Hornet” has officially concluded after the return of Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 323, or VMFA-323, the “Death Rattlers,” from its final cruise aboard the supercarrier USS Nimitz.

The Future is Unmanned: Why the Navy’s Next Generation Fighter Shouldn’t Have a Pilot

CIMSEC – The future of aviation is unmanned aircraft – whether remotely piloted, autonomously piloted, or a combination. There is simply no reason that a human needs to be in the cockpit of a modern, let alone next-generation aircraft. AI technology is progressing rapidly and consistently ahead of estimates. If the Navy waits to integrate AI into combat aircraft until it is mature, it will put naval aviation a decade or more behind.

Navigating the Shoals of Renewed American Naval Power: Imperatives For The Next Secretary of the Navy

War on the Rocks – This is a hell of a way to run a Navy. The Department of the Navy’s revolving door of senior civilian leadership over the past four years, including two secretaries and three acting secretaries, has done a disservice to U.S. national security. New leadership will soon arrive, but the department should not squander precious time on restarting strategic studies, force assessments, and process improvement programs. Instead, steady and strategic civilian leadership is required to make progress in the marathon implementation of integrated force redesign.

A Liberal Case For Seapower?

War Zone – A strong naval service operating routinely around the world has historically been viewed as the prerequisite for a liberal international order. Data support this idea, showing that maritime conflicts between countries are less frequent and managed more effectively when the U.S. achieves sea power dominance and helps to maintain naval parity in allies’ conflicts. Even eloquent advocates of moderating U.S. foreign policy ambition view the Navy as the military capability most essential for protecting America’s national interests.

Don’t Knock Yourself Out: How America Can Turn the Tables on China By Giving Up the Fight For Command of the Seas

War on the Rocks – The United States should give up its quest for command of the maritime commons in the Western Pacific. The struggle is based on a false premise — that if the United States loses command of the seas, China will step in the fill the vacuum. In fact, even if the United States loses command of the maritime commons, China is not positioned to gain it. However, by positioning China as an existential threat, the United States is boxing itself in politically. The United States courts disaster when it overextends itself 

Focus U.S. Navy Aircraft Carriers On China, Not Persian Gulf

1945 – James Holmes asks does countering Iran promise exceptional rewards for the U.S. Navy and the Pentagon, do the U.S. armed forces command decisive superiority over China and Russia, and can the armed forces keep up a Gulf aircraft-carrier presence without running grave risks in the strategic competition with those great-power rivals? Unless the answer to all three questions is a throaty yes, the Biden Pentagon should rethink the U.S. military posture in the Middle East.

Defense Strategy and the Empire State of Mind: How Preparing for the Best Can Leave Washington Vulnerable to the Rest

War on the Rocks – At a time when the United States is on the hook to deter four rivals across three theaters, all of its military services, including the sea services, are busy refocusing their attention on great-power competitors and reorienting their concepts, equipment, and operating patterns to deny aggression. Unless the United States scales back commitments or spends enough on defense to enjoy a surplus of power, overstretch is a very real possibility under these conditions.