Brad Dismukes on the Soviet Navy and Attacking Ballistic Missile Nuclear Submarines

CIMSEC – CIMSEC discussed the 1980s Maritime Strategy and its relation to the Soviet Navy with Brad Dismukes, who served at the Center for Naval Analyses at the time. In this discussion, Dismukes discusses concepts of Soviet naval operations, whether the Maritime Strategy was a reaction to Soviet naval activity, and the follies of engaging in anti-submarine warfare against nuclear missile-carrying platforms.

Mike McDevitt on the Strategic Studies Group and Connecting Strategy With Programming

CIMSEC – CIMSEC discussed the development of the 1980s Maritime Strategy and the role played by the CNO Strategic Studies Group with Rear Admiral Michael McDevitt (ret.). RADM McDevitt served on the second SSG and went on to serve in operational and programmatic roles implementing the Maritime Strategy. In this discussion, he discusses changes brought about by the Maritime Strategy, the attempts to bureaucratically ensure that strategy informed navy programming, and what lessons the Maritime Strategy and the SSG have for the modern era.

Barry Posen on Risking Escalation and Scrutinizing Plans

CIMSEC – CIMSEC discussed the 1980s Maritime Strategy with Professor Barry Posen of MIT, who at the time emerged as a challenger of some of the strategy’s precepts. In this discussion, Posen discusses the possibly escalatory nature of the strategy, the nuclear risks involved, and how operational war plans deserve to be scrutinized by civilian policymakers.

Dr. Stanley Weeks on Briefing the Maritime Strategy and Making the Strategic Difference

CIMSEC – IMSEC discussed the 1980s Maritime Strategy with Dr. Stanley Weeks, who as a Navy Lieutenant Commander helped assemble the first briefed iteration of the Maritime Strategy in 1982. In this discussion, Weeks looks at how that briefing came together, how it rapidly traveled up the chain of command, and how maritime forces can make the strategic difference in great power conflict.

Robby Harris on Writing Strategy and Steady State Competition

CIMSEC – CIMSEC discussed the 1980s Maritime Strategy with Capt. Robby Harris (ret.), who helped draft the 1986 unclassified version of the strategy that published in Proceedings. In this discussion, Harris discusses how the unclassified version was initiated, how steady state competition and crisis response figured into the strategy, and how bold leadership at the highest levels of Navy leadership elevated the importance of maritime strategy.

John Hanley on Convening The Strategic Studies Group and Assessing War Plans

CIMSEC – CIMSEC discussed the development of the 1980s Maritime Strategy and the role played by the CNO Strategic Studies Group (SSG) with Dr. John Hanley. Dr. Hanley served as a core member of the SSG during the 1980s and 1990s. In this discussion, he provides unique insights into the changes brought about by the strategy, the organizations and factors that contributed to its development, what made the SSG effective, and what lessons the strategy and the SSG have for the modern era.

Peter Swartz on Defining the Maritime Strategy

CIMSEC – CIMSEC discussed the 1980s Maritime Strategy with Capt. Peter Swartz (ret.), who at the time served as a naval strategist on the OPNAV staff, and worked to refine and disseminate the Maritime Strategy. In this discussion, Swartz defines the contents of the strategy, its primary tenets, and how it maintained a remarkable degree of continuity across nearly a decade of naval leadership.

Secretary John Lehman on Strategic Credibility and Leveraging Command of the Seas

CIMSEC – CIMSEC discussed the 1980s Maritime Strategy with Secretary John Lehman, who served as the 65th Secretary of the Navy in the Reagan Administration from 1981-1987. In this discussion, Secretary Lehman looks at how the Navy tied the Maritime Strategy to force structure goals, how it built credibility with Congress, and how the Navy could offensively leverage command of the seas in a major conflict today.

The U.S. Navy’s Loss of Command of the Seas to China and How to Regain It

Texas National Security Review – In 2005, a U.S. Navy plan was forwarded to Congress: It entailed reducing force structure and transforming to a capabilities-based forward force posture. However, the Navy continued to pursue unattainable force levels and, today, has lost command of the seas to China in the Western Pacific. China’s pace of war is the speed of light through cyberspace, leaving U.S. forces blind and deaf, while America’s is 30 knots, taking weeks to arrive at the fight. A fundamental shift in mindset needs to be made. The focus should no longer be on the number of hulls, but on a return to the plan for a capabilities-based, more forward force posture, primarily by commanding cyberspace in order to regain command of the seas.

First SEWIP Block 3 Electronic Attack System Set for Land Testing Later This Year

USNI News – With limited and costly ways for a surface warship to physically take out an incoming anti-ship missile, the Navy has been pursuing more ways a warship could use the power of electronic spectrum to splash threats. To that end, the first array of a massive update of the Navy’s surface electronic warfare systems is preparing for its ground tests later this year. 

Showing Up is Half the Battle: U.S. Maritime Forces in the Indian Ocean

War on the Rocks – The world’s most important strategic chokepoints lie in the Indian Ocean, making the region a key theater in geopolitical competition. Then why is it still missing from Washington’s Indo-Pacific priorities? U.S. Pacific Command was recently re-named United States Indo-Pacific Command in order to highlight the importance of the Indian Ocean region. Yet, the Indian Ocean, in its entirety, remains largely absent from the command’s priorities and engagements.

Navy, Marines Unveil How They Will Buy and Operate Future Pilotless Aircraft and Crewless Ships

USNI News – The sea services see themselves moving toward a future where they are just as likely to perform a mission with an unmanned platform as a manned one, based on the specifics of the mission and what assets are available. A third of the Navy’s fleet and half of Marine Corps aviation could be unmanned under this hybrid vision the two services are pursuing, which they argue in a new Department of the Navy Unmanned Campaign Framework is necessary to stay ahead of adversary capabilities without breaking the bank.

Armed and Independent: Thinking Outside the Box on Small Carriers

CIMSEC – There is a long-running debate in the United States Navy over building smaller aircraft carriers. These arguments generally focus on cost and hull count. Rather than dive into these arguments and attempt to argue for what should be done, we will instead explore how we use these arguments to rethink requirements and produce a more robust concept.