Revisiting the Hedge Strategy With Renewed Urgency

War on the Rocks – Deterring China in the Indo-Pacific requires a different set of U.S. capabilities than wars in the Middle East or Ukraine. The vast maritime expanse and China’s buildup across the South China Sea would make it difficult for U.S. forces to operate within the first and second island chains. Most of America’s major weapon systems are 30 years old and many of the new major systems for a high-end conflict won’t be operational until the 2030s…The United States should implement a hedge strategy across all domains. This strategy would require developing and purchasing small and low-cost, unmanned, many, and smarter weapons and designs to complement existing exquisite (costly, complex, massive, and few) weapon systems. The hedge strategy should leverage emerging technologies with an emphasis on adopting these technologies at scale within the next three years.

Exercise Digital Horizon: Accelerating the Development of Unmanned Surface Vessels

CIMSEC – Digital Horizon presages a new paradigm in the way navies will think about uncrewed assets, no longer as “vehicles” but rather as “systems” that are nodes in a web of assets delivering far greater capability than the sum of the parts. World navies will conduct ambitious unmanned exercises, experiments and demonstrations throughout 2023 and beyond, and the lessons learned from Digital Horizon will no doubt inform those efforts.

The US submarine force should be silent no more

Defense News – China’s recent announcements of new submarine-hunting technologies are probably more hype than hardware, but they highlight Beijing’s goal of countering the threat posed by U.S. attack boats, which remain essential to U.S. war plans. The U.S. submarine force will not be able to rest on its laurels as the world’s finest for much longer. Soon it will need new approaches and capabilities to operate and potentially fight in the bastions that China and Russia consider their home waters.

Campaign of Denial: Strengthening Simultaneous Deterrence in the Indo-Pacific and Europe

CNAS: This report begins with a discussion of how the United States lost sight of great-power deterrence and why its legacy presence-reliant approach to deterrence is unsuited to the current challenge. Instead, the department should embrace deterrence by denial to improve simultaneous deterrence of China and Russia in the near term without consuming resources earmarked for modernization. The report redefines campaigning to demonstrate how it could support a denial strategy through the rigorous linkage of campaigning to warfighting. It develops a framework for how the U.S. Department of Defense could implement this revised approach to campaigning. The framework is applied to the Indo-Pacific and Europe to demonstrate how the United States can reimagine its forces and capabilities, posture, and activities to simultaneously deter China from aggressing against Taiwan and Russia from aggressing against the Baltics. These plans are analyzed to determine the implications of two-theater deterrence for U.S. defense strategy, peacetime activities, and resource management. Finally, the report concludes with recommendations for the DoD and Congress on how to manage the simultaneous threat of two major adversaries in the near term.

These technologies could defeat China’s missile barrage and defend Taiwan

Breaking Defense – Earlier this year, a group of experts from RAND and the Special Competitive Studies Project launched a new wargame effort around China’s invasion of Taiwan — but unlike most DC-based wargames, this effort heavily involved members of the commercial technology sector, in order to understand what near-term capabilities might be brought to bear on a Taiwan scenario. In the exclusive analysis below, Jim Mitre of RAND and Ylber Bajraktari of SCSP lay out their key findings.

A Divorce Between the Navy and Cyber Command Would be Dangerous

War on the Rocks – Frustrated by reports of the U.S. Navy’s underperformance in cyber operations, Congress has made an unusual request. The Fiscal Year 2023 National Defense Authorization Act instructs the secretary of defense to report to Congress by 2024 on whether the Navy should continue contributing forces to U.S. Cyber Command. This request raises the unprecedented possibility that an armed service would not contribute forces to a joint combatant command. 

The U.S. Navy Is Now Paying A Price For Its Littoral Combat Ship Mistakes

1945 – As so often, Admiral Jim Stavridis called it right. Of this week’s decommissioning of USS Sioux City, a Freedom-class littoral combat ship (LCS), after less than five years’ service, the retired NATO supreme allied commander and Fletcher School dean declared: “Hard to figure this one out . . . . Hate to see anything decommissioned when we are so far behind China in overall ship count.” 

Navy Wants To Sideline Its Fast Transport Catamarans As Pacific Fight Looms

War Zone – Members of Congress are trying to block the Navy from putting just under half of its fleet of Spearhead class expeditionary fast transports into a state of reduced readiness with only skeleton crews assigned to them. Some of the vessels in question are very young, with one having first entered service just three years ago. This comes as the U.S. military is coming to terms with massive logistical hurdles if it were to go to war in the Pacific, which these fast, low-draft, multi-purpose vessels seem to be ideally suited for.