Iran Series Concludes on CMISEC

CIMSEC – In the last two weeks, CIMSEC featured writing submitted to our Call for Articles on maritime conflict with Iran. Authors covered a wide range of topics, including strategic differences between allies, new paradigms in warfare, and underappreciated yet decisive dimensions of the conflict. The maritime domain has prominently featured in this conflict and exerted a major influence over the terms of war termination. The broader impacts of the war still remain to be seen, but could include a wider degradation of freedom of the seas and lesser readiness for great power conflicts. This war deserves the most careful examination from navies and maritime forces to better understand how the changing character of warfare and global connectivity is evolving the security maritime domain.

Sinews of War at Sea: The Armed Services Need a Common Watercraft Family

War on the Rocks – To sustain future maritime operations, the U.S military will need to run supplies through an environment that spans thousands of miles of open ocean, denied ports, contested straits, and archipelagic chokepoints against adversaries that have spent decades studying how to target American logistics. That problem does not require one identical vessel for every mission. It does require a more common family of watercraft for the manned ships that carry cargo and vehicles inside a theater, built for scale, interoperability, and wartime replacement. Getting this right is arguably the most important acquisitionproblem the joint force faces in the next decade.

Close Iran, Open Hormuz

Clios Musings – This post is the text that accompanies a slide presentation on a naval mine blockade strategy briefing entitled “Close Iran, Open Hormuz.” The briefing is by Bradford Dismukes, Capt., USNR (ret.), with Bruce F. Powers, SES-4 (ret.) and Peter M. Swartz, Capt., USN (ret.). It is currently being presented to interested people and institutions concerned with national and naval strategy. Its immediate purpose is discussion and critique with the aim of improving it. It is also hoped that this briefing will help make the existence of the naval mine blockade strategy option known to the nation’s senior leadership which, by all evidence in the public domain, has never been made aware of it.

The U.S. Navy’s Subsea Rare Earth Vulnerability

War on the Rocks – The Columbia-class ballistic missile submarine is the next generation of American nuclear deterrence. Twelve of these boats will replace the aging Ohio-class fleet, entering service over the 2030s and 2040s, each carrying 16 Trident IIs and driven by a ghost-quiet electric motor that renders them acoustically invisible to any adversary. What makes all of that possible — the propulsion, the stealth, the strike precision — depends almost entirely on rare earths refined in China. This is perhaps the Navy’s most consequential and least discussed vulnerability.

U.S. Navy Looks to Fleet-wide Expeditionary Mine Warfare in Wake of Operation Epic Fury

Naval News – The U.S Navy’s Explosive Ordnance Disposal Training and Evaluation Unit One (EODTEU1) will evaluate a new form of mine-clearing capability after identifying a series of new requirements in the Indo-Pacific—particularly for the service’s doctrine of distributed maritime operations, according to new documents published by EODTEU1.

How Japan Could Co-Produce the Navy’s Future Fleet

War on the Rocks – Although Japan is well-positioned to support high-tech manufacturing at scale, there are still significant legal, political, and security barriers on both sides of the Pacific. Overcoming these barriers, including security risks overseas and political resistance to offshoring in the United States, requires the correct balance of policy and financial incentives.