Performance is Not Eundurance – Sustaining Combat Power in Contested Operations

CIMSEC – Recent naval operations in the Red Sea and the Strait of Hormuz have demonstrated that the United States Navy remains extraordinarily capable in combat. Precision strike operations, integrated air and missile defense, continuous maritime presence, and sophisticated joint operations have reinforced the credibility of American naval power. By nearly any operational measure, the force has performed at a very high level under demanding conditions.

That success should not be mistaken for proof of how the Navy would perform in prolonged conflict against a peer adversary. The true benchmark in high-end warfare against a peer is whether naval power can be sustained over the course of a prolonged Pacific conflict. Therefore, it is important to establish a framework for examining the details that will determine success in protracted conflict. The framework suggests that success hinges on distributed forward-based logistics, renewed emphasis on neglected warfare competencies, and sufficient operational depth in munitions, ships, and manpower.

Toward a Navy Fatigue Management Program

CIMSEC – The first week of June 2026 marked a seminal event in the history of sleep and fatigue in the military. The Department of War (DOW) Fatigue Related Management Working Group hosted the first ever Sleep and Fatigue Summit with over 130 experts in the field from all military services, providing a huge burst of momentum in the area of fatigue management as an operational imperative for our warfighters. For the first time in years, there is hope that the military, and especially the Navy, is finally turning a corner in this critical arena. But there remains much work to be done.

Guam’s Logistic Capacity Must Be Increased

CIMSEC – Guam is the westernmost territory of the United States in the Pacific region. The Congressional Research Service notes that Guam is closer to Beijing than Hawaii, making it vital to the United States’ national defense for air and naval operations in the Indo-Pacific region. The Port of Guam is designated as one of eighteen National Port Readiness Network commercial seaports. Military and civilian logistical experts believe that Guam will be a critical logistical hub for any conflict in the Asia-Pacific. Despite the geographic importance of the island, Guam’s logistical capacity is far below the needs of the United States in the event of a conflict in the Indo-Pacific region.

Congress Nees to Fix Navy Posture Statements

CIMSEC – Congress already requires long-range reporting for ships and aircraft because force structure cannot be understood in a single fiscal year. Readiness and risk evolve over similarly long periods. Yet no comparable statutory mechanism exists to track the condition of the fleet, the persistence of readiness deficiencies, or the consequences of failing to address them.

Drone Ship Maker Saronic Announces New $3B Shipyard In Texas Capable of Building 850-Foot Vessels

The War Zone – Saronic, the company that makes the first sea drones ever to be used as kinetic weapons by American forces, announced it will build a big new shipyard in Brownsville, Texas where they plan to construct an array of crewed and uncrewed ships as big as 850 feet. It is a big step for a company whose largest vessel is a 180-foot drone boat called Marauder.

Navy Wants 1,000 Mile Combat Radius For Carrier Based Tactical Drone Fleets

The War Zone – The U.S. Navy is envisioning a future force of carrier-based uncrewed aircraft capable of attacking enemy forces at least 1,000 nautical miles away from the ship. They would also have to be able to do this without needing to refuel in mid-air, though tankers could further extend their reach. This, along with other details, offers the first real sense of the combat drone capabilities the Navy wants to add to its future carrier air wings.

Iran Series Concludes on CMISEC

CIMSEC – In the last two weeks, CIMSEC featured writing submitted to our Call for Articles on maritime conflict with Iran. Authors covered a wide range of topics, including strategic differences between allies, new paradigms in warfare, and underappreciated yet decisive dimensions of the conflict. The maritime domain has prominently featured in this conflict and exerted a major influence over the terms of war termination. The broader impacts of the war still remain to be seen, but could include a wider degradation of freedom of the seas and lesser readiness for great power conflicts. This war deserves the most careful examination from navies and maritime forces to better understand how the changing character of warfare and global connectivity is evolving the security maritime domain.

Sinews of War at Sea: The Armed Services Need a Common Watercraft Family

War on the Rocks – To sustain future maritime operations, the U.S military will need to run supplies through an environment that spans thousands of miles of open ocean, denied ports, contested straits, and archipelagic chokepoints against adversaries that have spent decades studying how to target American logistics. That problem does not require one identical vessel for every mission. It does require a more common family of watercraft for the manned ships that carry cargo and vehicles inside a theater, built for scale, interoperability, and wartime replacement. Getting this right is arguably the most important acquisitionproblem the joint force faces in the next decade.

Close Iran, Open Hormuz

Clios Musings – This post is the text that accompanies a slide presentation on a naval mine blockade strategy briefing entitled “Close Iran, Open Hormuz.” The briefing is by Bradford Dismukes, Capt., USNR (ret.), with Bruce F. Powers, SES-4 (ret.) and Peter M. Swartz, Capt., USN (ret.). It is currently being presented to interested people and institutions concerned with national and naval strategy. Its immediate purpose is discussion and critique with the aim of improving it. It is also hoped that this briefing will help make the existence of the naval mine blockade strategy option known to the nation’s senior leadership which, by all evidence in the public domain, has never been made aware of it.