NATO Collective Legal Interpretations: Strengthening Alliance Deterrence and Protecting Baltic Undersea Assets Against Grey-Zone Threats​

Center for Maritime Security – Although UNCLOS was not adequately fabricated for irregular activities, NATO’s ability to ultimately address hybrid threat vectors solely relies on its political willingness. If adversaries suspect fissures within the alliance’s force structure, hybrid activities will escalate with grievous repercussions. Although NATO, particularly European member states, operates within a rules-based international order, allied governments must remain cognizant that adversarial states, most notably Russia, are increasingly willing to employ coercive and asymmetric maritime measures for strategic and geopolitical gain, despite being signatories to UNCLOS. Simultaneously, the United States must recognize that maintaining maritime order and alliance credibility requires operating in tandem with its European counterparts as a cohesive and perceivable hegemonic bloc, as the durability of U.S. strategic influence and the preservation of the state system’s rules-based order remain inherently connected to allied interoperability and joint deterrence.

Italian Navy commissions Tritone vessel for seabed warfare

Naval News – The commissioning of Tritone (A 5341) marks more than the addition of a new multi-purpose support vessel to the Italian Navy’s fleet; it reflects a notable shift in how the service approaches capability acquisition. By sourcing a commercial platform and adapting it rapidly for naval use, Italy is advancing a more flexible model focused on seabed warfare, operational experimentation, and the protection of critical underwater infrastructure (CUI).

First Ship Seized For Undersea Cable Cutting Since NATO’s Baltic Sentry Began

The War Zone – Finnish authorities have seized a Turkish-owned cargo vessel suspected of damaging an undersea telecommunications cable running from Helsinki to Tallinn, Estonia. This marks the first incident involving suspected sabotage of critical undersea infrastructure in the region since the creation of a NATO task force nearly a year ago to defend those cables, a NATO official told us.

Securing the Depths: Rethinking EU Critical Infrastructure Protection in a Contested Underwater Domain

Center for Security, Diplomacy and Strategy – Controlling and monitoring the undersea domain is becoming crucial for the European Union, with geopolitical and economic interests at risk in specific sea regions ranging from the Baltic to the Mediterranean.

The EU’s cable security plan puts the feasibility and security of new European underwater infrastructure at risk due to the legal, political and military implications, especially given Russia’s new assertiveness.

Instead of fixed cable sensors, Europe should prioritise investing in two alternative and combined solutions: EU-funded projects for unmanned vehicles and innovative fibre optic sensing solutions.

Achieving Depth: Subsea Telecommunications Cables as Critical Infrastructure

UN – Today, submarine fibre-optic telecommunications cable systems are the backbone of our data and communications infrastructure, essential to the general functioning and integrity of the internet and the broader information and communications technology (ICT) ecosystem. While satellites and the new constellations in low Earth orbit are breaking ground, especially in terms of lowering costs and accessibility, they are still no match to the high capacity and low latency that today’s subsea cable systems provide. As more countries are connected, the security and resilience of the infrastructure becomes ever more critical.

In 2023, UNIDIR published its first report on subsea cables, entitled Wading Murky Waters: Subsea Communications Cables and Responsible State Behaviour. The initial scoping study sought to raise awareness of this essential transmission technology. Since then, a slew of new initiatives have been proposed, including at the international level, signalling both the strategic importance of the infrastructure and the need to strengthen security and resilience across all of its components.

This follow-on study sets out to understand what it means in policy and practice when governments qualify or designate subsea telecommunications cables as critical infrastructure (CI). The report draws from the CI literature to frame government approaches to security and resilience, identifying how government policy and practice interact with core CI concepts such as absorptive, restorative and adaptive resilience capacities. While subsea cable systems are generally designed and deployed with these capacities in mind, effective government action on security and resilience can contribute to strengthening them.