Winning Friends and Influencing People: Naval Diplomacy with Chinese Characteristics

Chinese Maritime Studies Institute – In recent years, Chinese leaders have called on the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) to carry out tasks related to naval diplomacy beyond maritime East Asia, in the “far seas.” Designed to directly support broader strategic and foreign policy objectives, the PLAN participates in a range of overtly political naval diplomatic activities, both ashore and at sea, from senior leader engagements to joint exercises with foreign navies. These activities have involved a catalogue of platforms, from surface combatants to hospital ships, and included Chinese naval personnel of all ranks. To date, these acts of naval diplomacy have been generally peaceful and cooperative in nature, owing primarily to the service’s limited power projection capabilities and China’s focus on more pressing security matters closer to home. However, in the future a more blue-water capable PLAN could serve more overtly coercive functions to defend and advance China’s rapidly growing overseas interests when operating abroad.

Which Way the Dragon? Sharpening Allied Perceptions of China’s Strategic Trajectory

Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments – CSBA Nonresident Fellow Ross Babbage and colleagues argue for a new, scenario-based approach to defense and security planning in the Indo-Pacific. Drawing upon expert analysis of current conditions, three to four overarching scenarios for China should be considered as potential guideposts over the next 15 years.

What is China’s Strategy in the Senkaku Islands?

War on the Rocks – Chinese operational behavior in the waters around the small group of islands under Japanese administrative control known as Senkaku, and claimed by Beijing under the name Diaoyu, has entered a new, dangerous phase. In an unprecedented move, Chinese coast guard cutters in early July started to operate inside the islands’ territorial waters in a fashion that would suggest Beijing is there to exercise law-enforcement powers. It appears China no longer seeks to just showcase its “presence” in the waters around the islands. It is now starting to actively challenge Japanese control.

Ghost Gliders: Spanish Narco-Submarines

Small Wars Journal – We tend to think of (so-called) narco-submarines as a Latin American phenomenon. Properly speaking they are LPVs (Low Profile Vessels); alternatively SPSS (Self-Propelled Semi-Submersible—I do not use this term). Locally in Latin America they are known as ‘narcosubmarinos’ or ‘semisumergibles.’ Now we have another Spanish name to add to the list, ‘planeadora fantasma,’ meaning ‘Ghost Glider.’ This is because narco-submarines are not confined to the Americas. Similar methods being used elsewhere, most noticeably in Spain.

(Thanks to Alain)

China’s ‘Carrier-Killer’ Missiles: What Everyone Is Missing

National Interest – James Holmes writes that reports on the missile tests indicated that the DF-26 launch came out of Qinghai, deep in the backcountry of northwestern China. This is significant. It puts Washington and the region on notice that the PLA can target hostile shipping with rocket forces that are virtually invulnerable to counterattack. And, while important, that’s just for starters. 

South Korea To Double Down On F-35 And Procure STOVL Variant For LPX-II

Naval News – The South Korean Ministry of National Defense (MND) has decided in August to double its fleet of Lockheed Martin F-35 fighter jets. A total of forty additional “Joint Strike Fighters” will be procured, including 20 F-35B short take off and vertical landing (STOVL) variant for its light aircraft carrier project known as LPX-II.