Naval News – Taiwan is set to start construction of two 2,500-ton Light Frigates in June following a contract awarded to a local shipbuilder this month.
Royal Navy’s Type 31 frigates to be fitted with Mk41 vertical launch system
Navy Lookout – Speaking today at the First Sea Lord’s Sea Power Conference, Admiral Sir Ben Key, confirmed the Type 31 Inspiration Class frigates will be equipped with the Mk41 VLS.
New Zealand military plays catchup in pandemic aftermath
Defense News – New Zealand’s military has tested some of its beach-landing equipment in an overseas environment for the first time — a type of exercise one officer admitted hasn’t happened for a while amid recruitment woes and the pandemic.
Navy struggling to keep RFA Fort Victoria operational
Navy Lookout – RFA Fort Victoria, the UK’s only vessel capable of providing solid stores logistic support to the Carrier Strike Group has been non-operational since late 2021 with mechanical and crewing issues putting a question mark over her future.
German Navy Announces New Pacific Deployments as Global Navy Chiefs Call for More Pacific Cooperation
USNI News – The German Navy will deploy a frigate and a combat support ship to the Indo-Pacific in 2024.
Marine Force Design: Changes
Texas National Security Review – The Marine Corps’ Force Design 2030, written under the direction of the 38th commandant of the Marine Corps, Gen. David Berger, has been the target of much criticism since its release in 2020. In this article, former Undersecretary of the Navy and Deputy Secretary of Defense Bob Work addresses these criticisms and defends the document’s vision for the future of the Corps. Ultimately, he argues that it’s time for the self-proclaimed Chowderites, who have fought without success to oppose the commandant’s vision, to cede the field.
Quick Look Report – Chinese Undersea Warfare: Development, Capabilities, Trends
China Maritime Studies Institute – The China Maritime Studies Institute held an academic conference on the topic of the People’s Liberation Army Navy’s Undersea Warfare from 11–13 April 2023. The first two days involved unclassified presentations by scholars, government officials, and naval officers. Classified sessions were held on the third day and will be reported separately. The roughly 175 attendees were mostly US citizens, with several allied participants. Panel topics included 1) strategic and operational factors, 2) submarine force hardware, 3) submarine force human factors, 4) ASW, 5) seabed warfare, and 6) challenges and countermeasures for the U.S. Navy.
Fighting DMO, Part 10: Force Development Reform For Manifesting DMO
CIMSEC – The force employment of a military will largely be a function of how good its force development can make it. A military’s ability to fully manifest a new warfighting concept will depend on how well its force development can take the abstract notions of the concept and convert them into genuine force-wide improvement in warfighting skill. As the U.S. Navy explores the future of distributed warfighting and naval salvo combat, it must be prepared to make major changes to how its force development institutions cultivate warfighting skill so the fleet can effectively evolve alongside the intensifying threat environment.
Fighting DMO Part 9: Force Structure Implications of DMO and Massed Fires
CIMSEC – Distributed naval warfighting and massed fires offer a practical operational context for valuing the combat power of force structure. The broad fundamentals of these warfighting dynamics could provide an enduring basis for force design. By establishing criteria and frameworks based on lasting operational considerations, navies can preserve their relevance.
Reviewing Air Power in the Falklands Conflict
StrategyBridge – The line between celebrating heritage and creating a fully rounded history can be a fine one in many institutional histories. Appreciating this tendency, Royal Air Force-insider John Shields reassesses the 1982 Falklands Conflict, seeking to explode multiple myths while also providing a better assessment of the air campaign by focusing on the operational rather than the tactical level of war.
Upgrading the Mindset: Modernizing Sea Service Culture for Trust in Artificial Intelligence
CIMSEC – Winning on the future battlefield will undoubtedly require an organizational culture that promotes human trust in artificial intelligent systems.
NATO Navies in Review
USNI Proceedings – Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the accession of new members have reenergized NATO and increased unity.
The Russia-Ukraine Conflict: Blocking Access to the Black Sea
US Naval War College Review – Turkey’s prohibition of passage through the Black Sea straits by all foreign warships—including NATO’s—is difficult to justify under the Montreux Convention; Ankara more likely invoked it to mitigate repercussions from Moscow. Doing so tarnishes the country’s status as an honest broker and faithful guardian of the convention, which could have unintended long-term consequences.
David vs. Goliath: Southeast Asia Can Resist China’s Gray Zone Aggression in the South China Sea . . . with Help
USNI Proceedings – The efforts of Southeast Asian nations to push back against Chinese aggression at sea should be recognized and bolstered.
Friends, Partners, but Not Allies
USNI Proceedings – The U.S. Navy must maximize its relationship with Singapore—while respecting Singapore’s delicate position in the region.
Naval Considerations in the Russo-Ukrainian War
US Naval War College Review – Russia’s grand military strategy has a distinct maritime bent, the Ukrainian south coast is Russia’s most tangible strategic prize, and naval forces are crucial to holding it. Since the war’s beginning, Ukraine’s carefully planned strategy has applied stress to key elements of Russia’s maritime strategy, and Ukraine’s theory of victory is shaped by maritime considerations as thoroughly as Russia’s.
Naval Escalation in an Unmanned Context
CIMSEC – In practice, interactions-at-sea can escalate due to hyper-local misperceptions, influenced by factors like command, control, and communications, situational awareness, or relative capabilities. All of these factors are changing with the advent of unmanned and autonomous platforms. Escalation in this context cannot be an afterthought.
Beware the Allure of Mission Modularity
USNI Proceedings – Mission modularity has its place in a modern fleet, but it is not a panacea.
China: Growing and Going to Sea
USNI Proceedings – In 2022, the PLAN demonstrated why it may be the most dominant naval force in the western Pacific.
A Strategy of Denial for the Western Pacific
USNI Proceedings – China aspires to dominate the Indo-Pacific region—the impact of which would dramatically undermine Americans’ security, freedom, and prosperity. The only workable strategy is to deny China this goal. The naval services will play a central role.
Fighting DMO Part 9: China’s Anti-Ship Firepower and Mass Firing Schemes
CIMSEC – China’s ability to mass fires against warships is a product of a truly historic evolution. China was a third-rate maritime power only two decades ago, but it has transformed into a force that heavily outguns the U.S. Navy in major respects. China has clearly stolen a march on the U.S. when it comes to developing advanced anti-ship firepower, and now the U.S. is racing to close the gap. But it will still be many years before the U.S. has the tools in place to have decent options for massing fires. By then, the Chinese naval arsenal may have become something even more fearsome.
Xi Jinping’s Worst Nightmare: A Potemkin People’s Liberation Army
War on the Rocks – A worst-case Taiwan scenario for Chinese leader Xi Jinping would be a major military operation in which the People’s Liberation Army fails spectacularly or displays shocking incompetence akin to Russia’s in Ukraine. Could this happen?
Hard Truths: The Navy and Marines Need Another #METOO Moment: Part Two
CIMSEC – In Part One we shared our experience and gave some interpretations of the data. In this part we will finish that discussion and proceed to a set of recommendations. In the spirit of the discussion, it is important to understand that the trends are all heading in the wrong direction, indicating that policy and procedure changes are not enough. A culture change is required, starting at the unit level, if these trends are to be reversed.
Hard Truths: The Navy and Marines Need Another #METOO Moment: Part One
CIMSEC – This article is a collaboration between two authors with very different experiences, in the hopes that some combination of their views – one as a former Commanding Officer and the other as a federal agency chief counsel with 30-plus years of Sexual Assault/Harassment (SASH) experience – will resonate and drive tough conversations among mid-grade leaders. The Department of Defense has received over 65,000 reports of sexual assault since 2010 and each of us has a role in holding individuals who commit sexual assault and sexual harassment accountable for past crimes and creating an environment where sexual assault and sexual harassment are not tolerated.
Royal Navy Wildcat helicopters develop surface strike tactics in Norway
Navy Lookout – Exercise Tamber Shield saw four RN Wildcat helicopters deployed in Norway to develop tactics for the use of Martlet and Sea Venom missiles against fast attack craft.
You must be logged in to post a comment.