Marine Force Design: Changes 

Texas National Security Review – The Marine Corps’ Force Design 2030, written under the direction of the 38th commandant of the Marine Corps, Gen. David Berger, has been the target of much criticism since its release in 2020. In this article, former Undersecretary of the Navy and Deputy Secretary of Defense Bob Work addresses these criticisms and defends the document’s vision for the future of the Corps. Ultimately, he argues that it’s time for the self-proclaimed Chowderites, who have fought without success to oppose the commandant’s vision, to cede the field.

Quick Look Report – Chinese Undersea Warfare: Development, Capabilities, Trends

China Maritime Studies Institute – The China Maritime Studies Institute held an academic conference on the topic of the People’s Liberation Army Navy’s Undersea Warfare from 11–13 April 2023. The first two days involved unclassified presentations by scholars, government officials, and naval officers. Classified sessions were held on the third day and will be reported separately. The roughly 175 attendees were mostly US citizens, with several allied participants. Panel topics included 1) strategic and operational factors, 2) submarine force hardware, 3) submarine force human factors, 4) ASW, 5) seabed warfare, and 6) challenges and countermeasures for the U.S. Navy.

Fighting DMO, Part 10: Force Development Reform For Manifesting DMO

CIMSEC – The force employment of a military will largely be a function of how good its force development can make it. A military’s ability to fully manifest a new warfighting concept will depend on how well its force development can take the abstract notions of the concept and convert them into genuine force-wide improvement in warfighting skill. As the U.S. Navy explores the future of distributed warfighting and naval salvo combat, it must be prepared to make major changes to how its force development institutions cultivate warfighting skill so the fleet can effectively evolve alongside the intensifying threat environment.

Fighting DMO Part 9: Force Structure Implications of DMO and Massed Fires

CIMSEC – Distributed naval warfighting and massed fires offer a practical operational context for valuing the combat power of force structure. The broad fundamentals of these warfighting dynamics could provide an enduring basis for force design. By establishing criteria and frameworks based on lasting operational considerations, navies can preserve their relevance.

Reviewing Air Power in the Falklands Conflict

StrategyBridge – The line between celebrating heritage and creating a fully rounded history can be a fine one in many institutional histories. Appreciating this tendency, Royal Air Force-insider John Shields reassesses the 1982 Falklands Conflict, seeking to explode multiple myths while also providing a better assessment of the air campaign by focusing on the operational rather than the tactical level of war.

The Russia-Ukraine Conflict: Blocking Access to the Black Sea

US Naval War College Review – Turkey’s prohibition of passage through the Black Sea straits by all foreign warships—including NATO’s—is difficult to justify under the Montreux Convention; Ankara more likely invoked it to mitigate repercussions from Moscow. Doing so tarnishes the country’s status as an honest broker and faithful guardian of the convention, which could have unintended long-term consequences.

Naval Considerations in the Russo-Ukrainian War

US Naval War College Review – Russia’s grand military strategy has a distinct maritime bent, the Ukrainian south coast is Russia’s most tangible strategic prize, and naval forces are crucial to holding it. Since the war’s beginning, Ukraine’s carefully planned strategy has applied stress to key elements of Russia’s maritime strategy, and Ukraine’s theory of victory is shaped by maritime considerations as thoroughly as Russia’s.

Fighting DMO Part 9: China’s Anti-Ship Firepower and Mass Firing Schemes

CIMSEC – China’s ability to mass fires against warships is a product of a truly historic evolution. China was a third-rate maritime power only two decades ago, but it has transformed into a force that heavily outguns the U.S. Navy in major respects. China has clearly stolen a march on the U.S. when it comes to developing advanced anti-ship firepower, and now the U.S. is racing to close the gap. But it will still be many years before the U.S. has the tools in place to have decent options for massing fires. By then, the Chinese naval arsenal may have become something even more fearsome.

Hard Truths: The Navy and Marines Need Another #METOO Moment: Part Two

CIMSEC – In Part One we shared our experience and gave some interpretations of the data. In this part we will finish that discussion and proceed to a set of recommendations. In the spirit of the discussion, it is important to understand that the trends are all heading in the wrong direction, indicating that policy and procedure changes are not enough. A culture change is required, starting at the unit level, if these trends are to be reversed.

Hard Truths: The Navy and Marines Need Another #METOO Moment: Part One

CIMSEC – This article is a collaboration between two authors with very different experiences, in the hopes that some combination of their views – one as a former Commanding Officer and the other as a federal agency chief counsel with 30-plus years of Sexual Assault/Harassment (SASH) experience – will resonate and drive tough conversations among mid-grade leaders. The Department of Defense has received over 65,000 reports of sexual assault since 2010 and each of us has a role in holding individuals who commit sexual assault and sexual harassment accountable for past crimes and creating an environment where sexual assault and sexual harassment are not tolerated.