Then What? Wargaming the Interface Between Strategy and Operations Part 2

CIMSEC – Wargaming is ubiquitous throughout the U.S. Armed Forces as a tool for research, education, training, and influence. It is a flexible tool, adaptable to different scenarios, purposes, and levels of war. It is in this last arena, levels of war, that gaming organizations and their sponsors can bump up against the limits of wargaming.

How the Fleet Forgot to Fight Part 8: A Force Development Strategy

CIMSEC – Whether artillery begins to rain on the Korean peninsula, or Iranian mines litter the Strait of Hormuz, or a major terrorist attack unfolds, the Navy must never again allow itself to totally do away with preparing for the high-end fight. The story of the modern American Navy is unfortunately that of an organization that was divorced from the main purpose that had long animated its spirit, and dysfunction radiated throughout its institutions as a result. A difficult transition looms ahead, its urgency underscored by the sudden naval ascendance of a great power rival.

Naval Intelligence’s Lost Decade

USNI Proceedings – Nearly ten years into its time in the Information Warfare Community (IWC), naval intelligence has not “left the beach” with a sense of urgency to acquire and field cutting-edge systems that will vault the community into the era of big data and human-machine pairing. Instead, it largely has remained complacent while watching dramatic change occur in the information domain. The past decade has witnessed the emergence of mass digitization, artificial intelligence, robotics, and rapid technological change: the big data era. Yet naval intelligence persists in using the same tools, people, and tradecraft as in 2009. In a global security environment where “margins of victory are razor thin,” this must rapidly be addressed.

2018 World Naval Operational News Highlights

The ten most significant naval news stories / trends / themes this year included:

  • The completion of the first Indian Navy SSBN deterrence patrol. When will India be able to do this routinely?

  • The US Navy’s purchase of its first operational UAV, the MQ-25 tanker. Will its commitment to this operational concept remain strong, or fade as it has in the past with prior US Navy UAV programs? And when will the US Navy start investing as heavily as the Chinese Navy has in USVs and UUVs?

  • The operational collapse of the German armed forces in general and the German Navy in particular. What is the point of having a navy that is not fit for sea?

  • The slow but steady NATO military build up in the Baltic against Russia topped off by Exercise Trident Juncture this fall. When will the US consider Russia contained and focus most of its energies on the Chinese threat?

  • The Royal Navy reacquiring a fixed wing aircraft capability at sea with the F-35B. Will they be able to afford enough aircraft to field a viable capability?

  • The US Marine Corps rededicating itself to an offensive mission of seizing and holding advance bases that they can use to practice their own form of anti-access area denial. Will this be a mission they hold uniquely or share with the US Army?

  • The Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force taking a more serious approach to defending the Senkaku Islands, including activating a Marine unit and buying F-35B’s for its Izumi-class carriers. Is the tale of the popular Japanese manga story Kubo Ibuki coming true?

  • China weaponizing its sand castles in the South China Sea with defensive and offensive missiles and aircraft. When will the US have the political will to hold military exercises in the South China Sea with its allies to counter these actions rather than just conducting FONOPs?

  • China’s use of predatory financing to take control of critical infrastructure around the world including ports and airports. When will the world realize you don’t want your greatest rival owning you?

  • The ever-increasing use of new commercial cubesat constellations to monitor commercial activities at sea and in port. When will they be weaponized and start being used to monitor operational naval activities at sea and in port?

Lack of Medical Readiness Is a War Stopper

USNI Proceedings – Medical support of the sick and wounded is a complicated, resource intensive, and vital aspect of every over-the-sea operation. Over the past 15 years, operational deployments in the Middle East have required U.S. Navy and Marine Corps forces to focus on stability and counterinsurgency operations, but looking ahead, traditional amphibious roles likely will be required once again. During these future operations, how long will it take for a latent but “hopefully” functionally effective medical support system to evolve? Will medical support of the anticipated sea-base concept of operations, for example, suffer the same sad evolution of repetitive mistakes committed during prior amphibious conflicts over the past century? It is imperative that those who bear responsibility for ensuring prompt and competent care is provided to the combat injured examine the lessons of history.