What I found on the secretive tropical island they don’t want you to see

BBC – Diego Garcia, a remote island in the Indian Ocean, is a paradise of lush vegetation and white-sand beaches, surrounded by crystal blue waters.

But this is no tourist destination. It is strictly out of bounds to most civilians – the site of a highly secretive UK-US military base shrouded for decades in rumour and mystery.

The island, which is administered from London, is at the centre of a long-running territorial dispute between the UK and Mauritius, and negotiations have ramped up in recent weeks.

The BBC gained unprecedented access to the island earlier this month.

Constellation-class: the US Navy’s struggle to forge a new generation of frigates

Navy Lookout – After the perceived failure of the Littoral Combat ship programme, the US Navy has shifted its focus back to building traditional frigates. In this piece, we examine the turbulent beginnings of the Constellation-class (FFG-62) project and look at the wider lessons for those involved in warship design and acquisition.

Analogous Response Redux: Vladimir Putin’s Aspirations for Altering the Maritime Balance

Newport PapersAnalogous Response was a term of analytical shorthand that American strategists and intelligence analysts developed in late 1983 and early 1984. The term characterized in two words a Soviet maritime strategy of deploying off the U.S. coast submarines armed with nuclear SLCMs. By making that deployment, the Soviet leadership could establish an endo-atmospheric nuclear threat to the continental United States (CONUS) that Marshal Nikolay V. Ogarkov, chief of the General Staff of the USSR, described as follows: “The Soviet systems to be deployed in the oceans and seas and relevant to the territory of the United States itself will be no less effective than American systems that are being deployed in Europe, in range, yield, accuracy, and, what is especially important, in time of flight to their targets.”

The Maritime Doctrine of Pakistan – Setting the Record Straight

CIMSEC – The second edition of the Maritime Doctrine of Pakistan currently under process is intended to build on the inaugural edition. It will dilate on the roles of Pakistan navy; what it does at and from the sea in much more eloquent manner and greater depth. It will also provide stakeholders with an extensive insight into military strategic environment in the Indian Ocean and its influence upon Pakistan’s maritime interests. The new edition will expound blue economy and its relationship with maritime security. It will explain Gwadar port under CPEC and prospective regional connectivity that it importantly offers. The benchmark for new edition will be National Security Policy of 2022-2026.

A World Without Carriers?​

Center for Maritime Strategy – What would happen if the United States no longer deployed nuclear-powered aircraft carriers? The answer is chilling and compelling. Without a robust fleet of nuclear-powered aircraft carriers, the United States would no longer be able to deploy a credible deterrent capability to contested regions around the world. Without the presence of American carriers, authoritarian rulers, terrorist organizations, and non-state actors would run amuck. This is particularly evident today in the Middle East.

A floating dock “Captain Anatoly Ermolaev” was laid in Kaliningrad

Korabel – The Baltic Shipbuilding Plant “Yantar” today held a solemn ceremony of laying the laying of the new floating dock “Captain Anatoly Ermolaev”, which will be built within the framework of the dock program of the OSC with the support of the Ministry of Industry and Trade of the Russian Federation. (In Russian)

(Thanks to Alain)

DMO and the Firepower Revolution: Evolving the Carrier and Surface Force Relationship

CIMSEC – Given the range advantage of surface fleet-based missiles, the range limitations of the carrier air wing, and the vulnerability of the carrier in certain threat environments, the role of the carrier and its air wing should evolve in tandem with the U.S. Navy’s changing firepower. The carrier and its air wing should serve as the force quarterback that scouts wide spaces, cues surface ship fires against targets, and provides crucial in-flight retargeting support to those salvos on their way through a contested battlespace. In this method, the air wing can be empowered to deliver much more than the force of the carrier – it can deliver the force of entire fleets.

Vietnam and the Four Nos—How Chinese Actions in the South China Sea Influence Vietnam’s Hedging Strategy

US Naval War College Review – Vietnam’s policy of nonentanglement called the “Four Nos”—intended to hedge against China’s political, economic, and military strength—is challenged by Beijing’s increasing aggression and maximalist claims in the South China Sea, opening opportunities for U.S. policy in the region.

U.S. Maritime Policy Needs an Overhaul

War on the Rocks – U.S. maritime policy is a grievous failure. Whether evaluated in terms of effectively meeting national security requirements or bolstering the country’s economy, America can point to few successes. Inefficient commercial shipbuilding barely registers as a rounding error in global output while costly U.S.-flagged shipping is typically only employed when other options are exhausted. A shocking lack of competitiveness has led to both considerable economic harm and the withering of these maritime industries into shells of their former selves. Such are the fruits of a maritime approach rooted far more in status quo bias and the guiding hand of entrenched special interests than 21st-century needs and realities.

Outsourcing Security at Sea—The Return of Private Maritime-Security Companies and Their Role in Twenty-First-Century Maritime Security

US Naval War College Review – Tracing the historical, political, and economic dynamics behind the medieval emergence and eventual disappearance in the nineteenth century of mercenary naval forces illuminates the modern development of private maritime-security companies to address piracy.

China Maritime Report No. 41: One Force, Two Force, Red Force, Blue Force: PLA Navy Blue Force Development for Realistic Combat Training

China Maritime Studies Institute – Since the mid-2010s, there has been a concerted effort to professionalize a PLAN “blue force” as an opposition force, or OPFOR, in maritime exercises and training. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) routinely refers to its blue forces as metaphorical “whetstones” used to sharpen the PLA for a future fight against enemies of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Efforts to develop a PLAN blue force appear to have accelerated over the past several years in response to Chairman Xi Jinping’s decade-long demand for more realistic combat training.

This report examines recent developments in the PLAN’s blue force. It comprises four sections. Part one provides background on PLAN efforts to professionalize its maritime blue force. Part two describes the PLAN’s blue force training units. Part three examines companies producing equipment and virtual environments for China’s blue force units, while part four discusses current blue force capabilities. The report concludes with a summary of findings and implications for the United States, its allies, and partners.

Marine Corps Force Design: A Smart U.S. Plan to Counter China

National Interest – General Eric Smith, the new Commandant of the U.S. Marine Corps, has reaffirmed his commitment to the “Force Design” initiative, originally launched by his predecessor, General David Berger. This strategy focuses on adapting the Marine Corps for island warfare in the Western Pacific, particularly in countering China’s ambitions.

Take the Conn! Steering a Course For Technical Talent in Modern Naval Warfare

CIMSEC –  The naval services – the Navy and Marine Corps – lack an implementation plan for how they will cultivate STEM talent. To succeed in 21st century naval warfare, the naval services must take a holistic approach to recruiting, education, and retention if they are to effectively compete with today’s advanced threats and the multitude of adversaries. Without clear actions and the right personnel, the naval services’ efforts to improve warfare today will remain, at best, aspirational.