Danes Tout $340M Stanflex Frigate For US Navy – But What’s Real Cost?

Breaking Defense – Denmark really wants you to know they have a solution for the US Navy’s frigate problem. Pentagon officials are on the record that they’ll consider foreign designs in their quest for a more powerful small warship than the $450–$550 million, 3,400-ton Littoral Combat Ship. The Danish answer: their $340 million, 6,600-ton Iver Huitfeldt “Stanflex” frigate.

SOF’s Evolving Role: Warfare ‘By, With, and Through’ Local Forces

RAND – The role of U.S. special operations forces (SOF) in the Middle East has expanded steadily since the inception of the counter-ISIS campaign in 2014. In part, this expansion is due to the metastasis of ISIS into Libya, Yemen, and other countries beyond its major land-holding presence in Iraq and Syria. But the most notable feature of the expanded U.S. SOF role in the Middle East has been its work alongside indigenous forces in Iraq and Syria. Conventional and coalition forces provide additional numbers of troops. What makes this campaign so unusual is that U.S. forces are not providing the muscle of the frontline combat troops. Instead, the campaign is conducted “by, with, and through” others, a Special Forces phrase that the CENTCOM commander, General Joseph Votel, has adopted to call attention to this new way of warfighting. If the counter-ISIS campaign succeeds in dislodging ISIS from Iraq and Syria, this approach is more likely to be considered for other, similar conflicts.

America can succeed militarily in the Mideast. ISIS’s defeat in Mosul tells us how.

Washington Post – David Ignatius writes of what lessons can we take from the Islamic State’s defeat in Mosul and its coming eviction from Raqqa? The collapse of the caliphate tells us that the United States can succeed militarily in the Middle East if — and probably only if — it works with local forces who are prepared to do the fighting and dying.

Allies And The Maritime Domain Strike Enterprise

Breaking Defense – The UK, Norway and the US have signed an agreement to work together on anti-submarine warfare (ASW) in the North Atlantic which will leverage the joint acquisition of the P-8 aircraft, another example of the US and its allies an evolving defense capability in which allies are clearly key partners. The P-8s is part of a cluster of software upgradeable airplanes which are defining the way ahead for combat airpower: the Australian Wedgetail, the global F-35, and the Advanced Hawkeye, all have the same dynamic modernization potential to which will be involved in all combat challenges of maritime operations.

Latin American Navies and Antarctica

CIMSEC – Latin American governments have a strong presence in Antarctica, with two countries, Argentina and Chile, formally claiming Antarctic territories while several others carry out annual scientific expeditions (apart from having research bases there). Regional navies are of paramount importance in these operations as they are the spearhead of their respective nations’ expeditions and security initiatives in Antarctic waters. In fact, in recent months, there have been new developments that signal a greater Latin American naval presence in the Antarctic in the near future: Peru has commissioned its new oceanographic vessel while Chile has commenced the construction of a new icebreaker.

China and Russia’s Joint Sea 2017 Baltic Naval Exercise Highlight a New Normal in Europe

USNI News – China and Russia’s planned exercise in the Baltic Sea is raising eyebrows in northern Europe, NATO headquarters and Washington. Dubbed Joint Sea 2017, the China-Russia maritime exercise in late July will see the introduction of a People’s Liberation Army Navy destroyer, frigate, and a support ship into the Baltic Sea. The PLAN flotilla will join Russia’s Baltic Sea fleet off St. Petersburg for joint drills.

Chinese Missiles Can Wipe Out US Bases In Japan: Aegis, THAAD Can Stop Em

Breaking Defense – A Chinese surprise attack tomorrow could annihilate US forces and bases in Japan, two Navy officers found. But deploying more missile defenses — Army THAAD and Navy Aegis — would protect most targets north of Okinawa, Commanders Thomas Shugart and Javier Gonzalez found in simulations. Such a stronger defense, in turn, would reduce the temptation for Beijing to strike first in a crisis.

Navy Steers Well Away From An LCS Frigate

Breaking Defense – The US Navy has issued its official wishlist for its future frigate and set a 45-day deadline for shipbuilders to respond. As acting Navy Secretary Sean Stackley had promised, today’s Request For Information (RFI) opens the door wide to both US and foreign designs. It doesn’t lock the Navy into buying an upgraded variant of the current Littoral Combat Ships, but it doesn’t rule that out, either. Overall, the performance requirements in the RFI suggest a very different vessel than the original LCS, one capable not only of auxiliary duties but of escorting aircraft carriers and supply convoys in conjunction with Aegis destroyers.

Why America’s Mighty Military Doesn’t Always Dominate the Battlefield

National Interest – The United States Navy’s recent shoot down of a Syrian Arab Air Force Sukhoi Su-22 Fitter near the town of Tabqah over Syria is illustrative of a truth in modern warfare: Weapons do not always work as advertised. During the engagement between a pair of Boeing F/A-18E Super Hornets—flying off the aircraft carrier USS George H.W. Bush (CVN-77)—and the Fitter, advanced U.S. air-to-air missiles were decoyed at short-range. Indeed, as was reported by CNN, the Super Hornets first attacked the antiquated early-1970s vintage Su-22 strike aircraft with an infrared-guided Raytheon AIM-9 Sidewinder.

In a Blow to LCS, the US Navy Finally Admits it Needs a Real Frigate

War Zone – The U.S. Navy has released the first formal requirements for a proposed new frigate design, which it is now referring to as Guided Missile Frigate Replacement Program or FFG(X). The plan leaves open the possibility the service will buy a clean-sheet design in lieu of an “up-gunned” variant of the much maligned Littoral Combat Ship (LCS). Whatever happens, the new ships will finally include a robust area air defense capability.

Good Riddance to Rotational Crews

US Naval Institute Proceedings – I have heard it said that the “turning radius” of an idea is around 30 years. At that point, it becomes “new” again, and the reasons why it was dropped in the first place are forgotten. Here’s hoping the rotational crews concept is one idea that, when its time comes around again, will just keep moving into the graveyard of dead ideas.

Organization and Innovation: Integrating Carrier-Launched UAVs

US Naval War College Review – In spite of significant advances in robotics, artificial intelligence, and UAS technology, the Navy’s unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) remain predominantly intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets, and none are carrier based. Effective employment of UAVs by the Navy’s carrier air wings requires more than the acquisition of new technology, and without focused efforts to accelerate integration it likely will take several more decades before carrier-launched UAVs (CL-UAVs) are optimized across the entire spectrum of carrier aviation missions. Throughout history, organizational changes have been instrumental to enhancing the effectiveness of military technology. The integration of CL-UAVs can be accelerated by making organizational changes that facilitate the development of an internal constituency within the carrier aviation community and foster experimentation and bottom-up innovation.

Bring Back Fleet Battle Problems

US Naval Institute Proceedings – With the urgent need to rebuild the fleet’s capability and competence in sea control, a gap in the fleet’s operational repertoire has become increasingly apparent. Simply, there are few, arguably no, venues where operational-level naval formations are permitted to rehearse their wartime tasks free from the constraints of the formal training process or the distraction of technological experimentation. The fleet is overdue for a re-introduction of the Fleet Problem.

Impacts of the Robotics Age on Naval Force Design, Effectiveness, and Acquisition

US Naval War College Review – By embracing the robotics age, recognizing the fundamental shift it represents in how naval power is conveyed, and refocusing our efforts to emphasize the “right side” of our offensive kill chain—the side that delivers the packages producing kinetic and nonkinetic effects—we may hurdle acquisition challenges and bring cutting-edge technology to contemporary naval warfare. Incorporating robotics technology into the fleet as rapidly, effectively, and efficiently as possible would magnify the fleet’s capacity, lethality, and opportunity — all critical to strategic and tactical considerations. Doing so also would recognize the fiscal constraints under which our present force planning cannot be sustained.