CIMSEC – Instead of going back to the drawing board to pack more high-end warfighting capability into an ever-smaller package, rethinking what a frigate contributes to the human-machine team allows us to see a small surface combatant in a new light. Instead of a platform for employing weapons, it provides a ringside seat for the humans to influence events, especially when mindful, eyes-on, hands-on actions are needed for success. It is a way to use the science of war to empower the art of war. It is a way to demonstrate that the United States is willing to risk involvement in a sticky situation and engage opponents in a meaningful way. The LUSVs, MUSVs, or XLUUVs that could serve as the primary weapons systems for the FFX will help its crew give as good as they get until the Joint Force Arrives. Even in the age of sail, no one could realistically expect a small surface combatant to do more than that.

CIMSEC – In the military today, a quiet Armageddon is about to occur as we watch the potential separation of up to 5% of the force for a condition known as Pseudofolliculitis Barbae (PFB).

CIMSEC – The chokepoints are the symptom, but the region is the system. The big Gulf bases have just shown how vulnerable they are, and strategic inertia moves toward dispersal and partnership. In that setting, Somaliland offers something rare: a stable, democratic partner you can keep rather than rent, one whose own course is already making the argument. Israel has taken the step to seize the opportunities afforded by an official relationship with Somaliland. To best secure its regional interests, the U.S. should be the next country to do the same.

Naval News – Vice Adm Rob Gaucher – the US Navy’s (USN’s) Director, Submarine Programs – has set out a four-pillar strategy for accelerating the navy’s submarine-building output. This process is designed to reflect and underpin the USN’s Chief of Naval Operations’ (CNO’s) testimony that a raised production rate will be in place by 2032.

US Naval War College Review – Evaluating strategic frameworks for today’s Navy involves updating historical strategies for current realities. Given the deindustrialization of the nation, paired with China’s rapid economic expansion, new strategies for maintaining a relevant naval force must be considered.

US Naval War College Review – Two cases, almost eighty years apart, in which a weaker power—the Confederacy and imperial Japan—sought to achieve an end to the war before the United States could mobilize its material advantages and before the weaker side’s limited resources ran out provide useful insights into this western Pacific conundrum. Studying the failure of both challengers bears particular lessons for the United States in its potential conflict with China, in ways that studying our past victories against these adversaries cannot.

US Naval War College Review – American war mobilization doctrine is built on an industrial-era paradigm that assumes the primary contest is material: who can most efficiently convert economic capacity into military power. An evaluation suggests that this paradigm, while necessary, is no longer sufficient.

US Naval War College Review – Ukraine’s suppression of Russian naval activity by using unmanned surface and aerial vehicles provides a backdrop against which the concept of a “reconnaissance strike complex” is updated for naval warfare today. This framework reflects a path forward for future naval operations.

US Naval War College Review – U.S. sealift capability, crucial in the defense of allies in Europe and beyond, has withered over many decades. Recent developments have left European allies scrambling to provide their own defense, leaving some looking to Norway’s large merchant fleet to cover the gaps in U.S. sealift capabilities.

Defense News – A PLA assessment of the proposed Trump-class ships probes for weaknesses.

The War Zone – At least two Iranian oil tankers were struck by the U.S. as part of Trump’s new tanker-for-a-tanker policy.