The Navy Has Good Reason To Focus on Cyber Warfare With China

The Messenger – James Holmes writes that the Department of the Navy’s inaugural Cyber Strategy starts off with a startling claim, namely that “the next fight against our major adversary will be like no other in prior conflicts.” Why? The strategy’s framers go on to prophesy that “the use of non-kinetic effects and defense against those effects prior to and during kinetic exchanges will likely be the deciding factor in who prevails.” In other words, brute force might not make the difference.

Resolute Dragon: Reassurance, Deterrence and a Call for Coordination

War on the Rocks – This October, American and Japanese forces conducted an operationally focused bilateral exercise, rehearsing missions that would have been unthinkable a few short years ago but that now prove vital when deterring Chinese aggression. Resolute Dragon 23.2 not only demonstrated each force’s lethality and interoperability but also strengthened their military partnership in defense of Japan.

It took Russia eight years to build K-564 Arkhangelsk nuclear sub

Bulgarian Military – The K-564 Arkhangelsk’s journey to completion has been a long one. Its foundation stone was laid on March 19, 2015, marking the beginning of an eight-year construction period till the launch in November 2023. A key reason behind this extended timeline was frequent funding delays that beleaguered its development. 

(Thanks to Alain)

Canceling the New Sea Launched Nuclear Cruise Missile is the Right Move

War on the Rocks – While critics have rightly focused on the program costs and timing of delivery, potential operational challenges for the Navy, and redundancy, proponents have countered that the new cruise missile will enhance deterrence and reassure allies facing adversaries with stocks of tactical nuclear weapons. This is an important claim and ultimately central to whether the program is worthy of funding. However, the deterrence and reassurance benefits of a sea-launched nuclear cruise missile are vastly overstated and may actually undermine the ability of the United States to deter adversaries by diverting scarce resources away from investments in more useful conventional platforms and munitions.  

Changing Surface Warfare Qualifications: Better Incentives Make Deadlier Officers

CIMSEC – The Surface Navy needs to cut itself free of its extraneous entanglements and make concrete changes to how it improves warfighting skill. Our most urgent target for reform should not be improving individual tactics on a piecemeal level. Rather, we should be focusing on systematic changes to the personnel and training systems throughout the Surface Warfare community that will cultivate more tacticians.

Stubbs Demonstrates Effectiveness Of Force Design For U.S. Navy

1945 – Force Design 2030 is a sound idea, but ideas exist to be falsified—in other words, debunked or amended. That’s how the scientific method works. No theory is ever proved—only disproved. Ideas about strategy, operations, and tactics are no exception. The retired marines were unconvincing when they appealed to Congress to overturn General Berger’s concept. They offered little more than sloganeering. But that doesn’t mean the concept is invincible. Bruce Stubbs raises problems that, while not insoluble, are eminently worth taking into account.