Distributed Maritime Operations – Becoming Hard-To-Find

CIMSEC – The concept for Distributed Maritime Operations (DMO) is based on three bedrock tenets: the distributed force must be hard-to-find, hard-to-kill, and lethal. For decades, the Navy has been focused on and has continuously improved its fleet defense capabilities – the hard-to-kill tenet. And, with the recent increased emphasis on the offense, the Navy is making significant progress in becoming more lethal. In contrast, there is limited evidence of progress with respect to the hard-to-find tenet: the very lynchpin of the DMO concept, and the subject of this article.

 20 Years of Naval Trends Guarantee a FY23 Shipbuilding Play Failure

CIMSEC – In 2014, before the scale of Chinese naval development was widely appreciated, the Navy reported to Congress a Fiscal Year (FY) 2018 near-term requirement of 300 ships for “conducting a large-scale naval campaign in one region while denying the objectives of an opportunistic aggressor in a second region.” In the time since, the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) added more than 120 battleforce ships and countless maritime militia – while the U.S. Navy still remains short of the lapsed 300-ship goal, and 57 ships short of its current 355 ship requirement. In the past 20 years the Navy’s ideal battleforce goals have all exceeded 306, but the fleet has not broken 300 ships since 2003.

The International Commanders Respond

USNI Proceedings – This year, Proceedings asked the commanders of the world’s navies, “How is your nation’s maritime security environment changing? Have new regional threats, climate change, or the COVID-19 pandemic caused you to alter your future assumptions? How is the changing environment impacting operations, budget, and personnel policy for your Navy and/or Coast Guard?”

Jomini and Naval Special Operations Forces—An Applied-Competition Approach to Russia

US Naval War College Review – A version of Jomini’s campaigning theory, in combination with maritime special-operations capabilities, offers a convincing maritime approach for contesting Russia’s malign activity in Europe while remaining below the level of armed conflict and supporting a broader conventional effort to prepare a war-fighting environment by using irregular warfare to secure advantages prior to conflicts.

Seoul’s Misguided Desire for a Nuclear Submarine

US Naval War College Review – Rather than waste its money on nuclear submarines that would provide only a single-dimensional response, South Korea should lock down a superior ASW suite by combining new technologies with existing ROKN platforms to provide multiple mission capabilities for less money, including support by existing maintenance infrastructure.

Aircraft Carriers—Missions, Survivability, Size, Cost, Numbers

US Naval War College Review – A new, twenty-first-century design of the size of USS Midway with an air wing up to sixty-five aircraft, whether conventionally or nuclear powered, could complement larger nuclear flattops while still incorporating rugged survivability and being capable of independent operations—and could be built quicker and cheaper and in more shipyards.

The Limits of Sea Power

US Naval War College Review – Sea powers have many handicaps that often are forgotten, resulting in a dangerous overestimation of their safety, influence, and staying power in a competitive world. A more clear-eyed assessment of sea power—one less enamored of the grandeur associated with naval might—reveals that often their hopes were unwarranted and ended up having tragic results.

Innovation, Interrupted—Next-Generation Surface-Combatant Design

US Naval War College Review – Three ships designed in the 1930s that fought in the Pacific theater during the early months of America’s involvement in World War II represent three different ship design approaches that continue to create dissonance in the U.S. Navy’s current ship-design processes. The Navy must transition to a next-generation surface-combatant-design process to accommodate the future warfighting environment.

 Rightsizing the Fleet: Why the Navy’s New Shipbuilding Plan is Not Enough

CIMSEC – Rep. Luria writes that the 355-ship Navy appears to be a pipe dream, as fleet size has not surpassed 300 ships since 2002 in the Bush administration. She proposes a way to stop the Navy’s hemorrhaging at an acceptable cost. But what she would prefer most is for the Navy to develop appropriate triage measures itself instead of relying on the Congressional emergency room every year.

“Great Regional Engagement” Rather than “Great Sea Power”—Russia’s New Supply Point on the Red Sea Coast

US Naval War College Review – The Russian naval presence in the western Indian Ocean and recent acquisition of a naval base on the shores of the Red Sea do not reflect an oceanic ambition in the region but rather a primary motivation that is land-centric and littoral: to gain access to the African continent and maintain close relations with partners in the region.

War Studies Primer

We invite you to try War Studies Primer – an introductory course on the study of war and military history. Its purpose is to provide an introduction to the study of war.

War Studies Primer is presented as a lecture curriculum at the university level. It is a free, non-credit, self-study course that consists of 28 topics and over 1,900 slides and is updated on a yearly basis.

Look at slides 2 and 3 in the War Studies Primer for its Table of Contents, and then choose a lecture to read and enjoy.

How To Deter China From Making War

1945 – It’s important to note that strategic deterrence vis-à-vis China involves far more than doomsday weapons. The Chinese Communist Party has resolved to make geostrategic gains with the least amount of physical force possible. Preferably party chieftains want to intimidate Asian neighbors without warfare; they want not to fight, and pursue their aims accordingly. Therefore, deterring China in the “gray zone” and the conventional arena is strategic deterrence.