The Navy Owes Congress Independent Honesty, Not Joint Harmony

CIMSEC – The U.S. is out of space, money, and time for the Navy’s multi-generational plans that avoid uncomfortable disagreements while awaiting tectonically slow shifts in OSD bureaucratic and strategic inertia. In a decade where China seeks ascendance with a likely vassal Russia in tow, the U.S. and its public needs a strong, forward, and mobile military to backstop American interests abroad. The military’s failure to understand its rightful place in answering both to the executive and legislative branches has impoverished the public debate on military and foreign policy matters, and weakened national security. Strong, innovative leadership comfortable with serious but professional public disagreements between OSD and other services is necessary to innovate and advocate for America’s pressing security needs. Such leadership is possible, as proven by Admiral Burke, General Shinseki, General Berger, Vice Admiral Copeman, and others who took the right risks for the right reasons. If Washington headquarters continue to fear dissenting conversations held in public more than war, our Navy – and military generally – will face brutal defeat and the ascendancy of a system determined by strategic adversaries.

 Eight New Points On The Porcupine: More Ukrainian Lessons for Taiwan

War on the Rocks – A number of recent assessments have called for Taiwan to pursue an “asymmetric” dragon-choking “porcupine strategy” prioritizing “a large number of small things” for its defense. The goal of these measures is to present a robust anti-access/area-denial threat to Beijing’s aspirations in Taiwan, clouding its prospects for military and political success and, ideally, keeping the threat of Chinese invasion hypothetical through this critical decade and beyond.

For Ukraine, the 1,000-Ship Navy Finally Sets Sail

CIMSEC – Being without a Navy, fortunately, does not mean that there is no seapower acting in Ukraine’s interest, or that there are no naval lessons or innovations coming from this terrible and hopefully short conflict. From Maine to Majorca, Turkey to Panama, a distributed network of international maritime actors has emerged in response to Russian aggression. It manifests a theory that was developed 17 years ago — the “1,000 Ship Navy” (TSN).

On Future Wars and the Marine Corps: Asking the Right Questions

War on the Rocks – A professional discourse on innovation, warfighting, and roles and missions is warranted to ensure the Marine Corps remains “ready to fight.” To wait until consensus or clarity, though, is to impose paralysis on innovation and adaptation. Iterating on ideas while simultaneously taking near-term action is the right approach. Given the national defense strategy, Berger is headed in the right direction, but there are important questions, as identified here, still needing answers.

An Anti-Access Denial Strategy for Ukraine

CIMSEC – To deny sea control to the Russians, Ukraine needs sea mines, coastal defense cruise missiles, and scouting assets, such as fast patrol boats and drones. These systems have a symbiotic relationship in layered defense. Mines slow down the adversary; during clearance operations, CDCMs have an opportunity to engage the slowed vessels; and scouting assets support maritime domain awareness for over the horizon targeting. NATO should rush these weapons to support Ukraine’s defense.

Carrier USS Abraham Lincoln in Sea of Japan Ahead of Key North Korean Anniversaries

USNI News – Aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN-72) is in the Sea of Japan, in time to coincide with key North Korean anniversaries like the 110th birthday of its late founding leader Kim Il-sung on April 15 and the founding anniversary of the North Korean People’s Revolutionary Army on April 25. The carrier’s recent move is the second time this year Lincoln has been employed to conduct a presence operation to deter North Korea.

China’s Role in the Exploitation of Global Fisheries

Congressional Research Service – China has emerged as the world’s largest exploiter of fisheries on a global, not just regional, scale. Chinese fleets are active in waters far from China’s shores, and the growth in their harvests threatens to worsen the already dire depletion in global fisheries. China leads the world in seafood production from aquaculture, inland (freshwater) fisheries, and marine fisheries. The expansion and modernization of fisheries is a key part of China’s broader industrial policy goals of upgrading their agricultural industries and improving domestic food security. China has developed the world’s largest fishing fleet of vessels operating in domestic and neighboring coastal inshore and offshore areas, as well as a distant-water fleet (DWF) active in many parts of the world. China is a major hub for value-added processing in seafood supply chains and it is the world’s largest seafood processor; much of what China processes is exported to other countries. China is also the largest importer and producer of fishmeal for use in aquaculture. The magnitude of China’s seafood production and consumption has implications for international trade, fisheries conservation and management, and allocation of fishery resources among fishing and coastal nations. Many in Congress are interested in China’s involvement in fisheries around the world because of efforts to conserve marine resources globally, and the fishing industry’s intersection with regional conflicts and transnational criminal activities that impact U.S. national security.

Japan Countering China’s Naval Build-up with Modern Fleet

USNI News – Japan doesn’t talk much about its naval capabilities because of its historical aversion to offensive capabilities following its defeat in World War II. This has been defined in Article 9 of its post-war constitution. However, as an island nation and a naval power, it has still been able to assemble a modern version of a big gun fleet, but it’s designed for defensive operations. But over the past two decades, the rise of China as a global power and North Korea’s attempts to develop long-range nuclear missiles present a two-fold threat to the island nation.

Reconsidering Russian Maritime Warfare

CIMSEC – How might Russian maritime forces be brought to bear against the United States and its allies? This question is particularly critical as fears of inadvertent escalation in Ukraine increase. Understanding the answer requires a close reading of what Russian military theorists themselves write about warfare, matched with an examination of maritime geography; combat power; and intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and targeting (ISR-T). Constraints in all of these areas mean that rather than solely seeking out targets at sea for a series of navy-on-navy fights, Russian maritime forces are likely to be more effective at operations that focus on striking “critical objects” on land rather than ship-to-ship combat at sea.