The Case For a Baltic SNMG-3: Developing Regional NATO Forces at Sea

CIMSEC – NATO’s return to its core mission of deterrence and the defense of the Euro-Atlantic area has been made only more necessary by Russia’s continued aggressive actions both above and below the threshold of war. Ongoing restructuring of the operational components of the alliance is focusing on regional clusters of mutually supporting states. It is time for the maritime component to evolve in the same way the air and land components are. An SNMG-3 focused on the Baltic would not only allow SNMG-1 to concentrate on its core operational area in the North Atlantic, but it would also send a powerful signal of NATO’s intent to undermine and deter Russian malign actions in the region.

Parting Ways: A NATO Naval Strategy Without America

CIMSEC – In this era of increasing danger, great power competition, and uncertain loyalties, the time has come for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to declare its independence. As at the time of its founding, NATO’s strategic adversary is Russia. But unlike during the Cold War, the Alliance can no longer count on the military and industrial might of the United States in confronting the threat.

The Propulsion Disabler Will Be a Strategic Weapon

Clio’s Musings – A propulsion disabler (PD) is a small, passive, torpedo-like device that serves as a cheap, non-lethal mine and torpedo warhead. The proposed munition’s purpose is to destroy a ship’s external propulsion or direction-control mechanisms, leaving the vessel stationary. Production of PDs is possible with today’s emerging robotics technologies.Future PD devices could be used in an autonomous swarm that combines the smallest explosive charge with the greatest disabling effect by attacking a ship at its most vulnerable point. Once PDs become widely available, they may well be the weapon of choice by all navies against civilian ships. Similarly, disabling an enemy’s naval ship rather than sinking it will almost always be the superior choice, certainly for the U.S. Navy. The logic that makes this so will compel adversary navies to make the same choice.

CMSI Translations #17: Analysis of Problems with Warship Damage Control Plans and Methods for Preparing Damage Control Plans

China Maritime Studies Institute – “Damage control” (sunhai kongzhi, or just sunguan) refers to measures and actions taken by a warship for the prevention, control, and elimination of damage in order to maintain or recover its vitality (shengmingli). If a warship suffers an accident, this could result in major casualties among the crew and cause damage to the ship’s equipment; it might also impact the ship’s vitality. The crew’s normal level of damage control training determines the success or failure of damage control. In order to fully leverage the active role of crew members in damage control and fully leverage the effectiveness of damage control, a scientific and rational damage control plan must be prepared. The damage control plan resolves questions related to the deployment and responsibilities of personnel during the damage control process, according to certain principals and requirements.

Navy Wants Bollinger to Build First Landing Ship Medium Hull, Seeks Data Package for Dutch Tank Landing Ship

USNI News – The Navy wants a Louisiana shipyard to build the first hull for the Landing Ship Medium program as part of a plan to find an off-the-shelf design to support the Marine Corps’ new island-hopping regiments, a Navy official told USNI News. The Navy also wants the data rights for a Dutch tank landing ship used by international navies.

What a militarized Svalbard would mean for Russia

Navy News – The Russian government recently accused the Norwegian government of militarizing the Svalbard archipelago in the Arctic Region. According to Russian media, the Russians are concerned that the archipelago might be used in a potential conflict. They claim that that the territory of Svalbard is increasingly being drawn into Norway’s military and political planning together with NATO.

An Unmanned Hellscape Needs a 21st Century Hephaestus

CIMSEC – If an unmanned hellscape is to move from fantasy to credible threat in the eyes of an adversary, the U.S. Navy, as part of the Joint Force, must take concrete steps to address weaknesses in its current conceptualizations of unmanned future warfare. To overcome these obstacles, the U.S. Navy can lead the way by appointing a robotics and autonomous systems czar to interface and invigorate industry, develop forward deployed naval robotics formations, and oversee a deeper investment in the forces needed to operate these systems.