U.S. Navy Prepares For Protracted Middle East Conflict

Naval News – Helicopter Mine Countermeasures Squadron (HM) 15 Detachment IIA (DET IIA), based in Bahrain, embarked on the USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN 71) on August 2nd. At least two MH-53Es of HM-15 stopped in the United Arab Emirates before moving on to the Roosevelt‘s position in the Gulf of Oman, roughly 70 kilometers east of the UAE. One of many moves made by the U.S. Navy as the United States prepares for the possibility of an attack on U.S. and allied forces in the region.

China Maritime Report No. 40: Onboard Political Control – The Ship Political Commissar in Chinese Merchant Shipping

China Maritime Studies Institute – Since the creation of the People’s Republic of China’s merchant fleet, the Chinese Communist Party has implemented a system of political control aboard oceangoing vessels through ship Party branches and ship political commissars. This report focuses on the ship political commissar, a Party representative assigned to oceangoing merchant ships, particularly within state-owned shipping enterprises, to carry out political and administrative work in the management of ship crews. Having peaked in authority and power during the Cultural Revolution, the ship political commissar position has evolved over the decades following economic reforms in the 1980s. Despite years of problematic implementation, the ship political commissar system is currently undergoing a revitalization in staterun shipping companies. The position has supporting roles to play in carrying out national tasking such as evacuations of overseas Chinese citizens. Most ship political commissars are former PLA officers. Chinese roll-on/roll-off ferry operators constitute a special case where the ship political commissar may have greater authority in the ship hierarchy and potentially a role in supporting PLA use of those vessels. This report focuses on the ship political commissar system over the last 20 years, providing a needed update on this understudied topic in the English-language literature.

Deterring China’s Salami Tactics

Center for Maritime Security – Aside from statements reaffirming American commitment to the U.S.-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty, the U.S. response has thus far been hollow. This sends the signal that “gray zone” aggression against Philippine sovereignty will go unpunished. To help avoid a repeat of Scarborough Shoal at the Second Thomas Shoal, the United States must go beyond rhetoric and stand with its ally by imposing meaningful material costs on Beijing in response to Chinese escalation. 

Annexation of Taiwan: A Defeat From Which the US and Its Allies Could Not Retreat

Baker Institute – This paper addresses one of the most dangerous, consequential flashpoints on the planet today, and for years into the future: a potential attempt by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to annex Taiwan. The aftermath would likely trigger the worst economic shocks experienced in more than a century, unleashing a cycle of repression and diminishing the quality of life for populations across Asia and beyond, with devastating impacts on American interests and Americans’ well-being. Moreover, China’s annexation of Taiwan could exacerbate regional tensions and extend into a broader, global conflict. At stake are crucial interests such as the semiconductors that power today’s big data world and the national security of U.S. allies and partners. Neighboring states’ responses to PRC expansion could also result in the erosion of American military advantages as well as the destabilization of democracy and the international order. 

Geography Matters, Time Collides: Mapping China’s Maritime Strategic Space under Xi

Mapping China’s Strategic Space – With an increasingly powerful People’s Republic of China (PRC) under paramount leader Xi Jinping engaging in meteoric military-maritime buildup and pressing disputed sovereignty claims with increasing assertiveness, it is more important than ever to consider Beijing’s “mental map”: how its leaders regard the physical nature of strategic space. As Andrew Rhodes argues cogently, “Being able to ‘think in space’ is a crucial tool for decision-makers, but one that is often deemphasized.” This applies to understanding both how PRC leaders envision China’s strategic space and how it is evolving in practice.

Crew of USS Mason Adapted to Demands of Intense Red Sea Deployment, Sailors Say

USNI News – When sailors assigned to USS Mason (DDG-87) were in workups last year, many expected a standard Mediterranean Sea deployment…But after Hamas launched attacks in southern Israel on Oct. 7 and the Yemen-based Houthis started attacking commercial shipping in the Red Sea in response to Israel’s ongoing bombardment of the Gaza strip, the destroyer quickly became one of several U.S. warships to engage in sustained naval combat for the first time since World War II. 

CMSI Note #7: PLA Navy Reserve: Out of the Shadows and into the Forefront?

Chinese Maritime Studies Institute – As a part China’s goal to build a fully modernized military by 2035, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is improving its reserve forces through increased defense spending, critical policy changes, and organizational restructuring. Reserve forces (后备力量) encompass the PLA Reserve (预备役部队) and paramilitary forces, such as the militia, which fall under the leadership of the Central Military Commission and can be mobilized by the National Defense Mobilization Department to support combat. The many components that make up China’s fighting force such as active-duty PLA forces, China Coast Guard, and the militia have been studied in depth; however, the PLA Reserve remains an understudied and underreported topic. While the PLA Reserve represents a fraction of the force structure of their active-duty counterparts, recent changes in military reform specific to the PLA Reserve highlight the importance of this relatively small force and the evolving role reservists (预备役人员) may play within the PLA.

The Calm Before the Swarm: Drone Warfare at Sea in the Age of the Missile

War on the Rocks – We are not yet at a paradigm-shifting moment in the role of autonomous or robotic systems at sea. Nor are we likely to reach a revolutionary precipice within the period in which the U.S. Navy must begin making the transition to a truly hybrid fleet — that is, the integration of autonomous platforms designed to operate as part of an ocean-going battle force. This means the Navy’s approach to acquiring and fielding unmanned systems for deployment at sea should ultimately reinforce and support the maritime domain’s still-dominant weapons system: long-range anti-ship missiles.

Unmanned Maritime Systems and Warships: Interpretations Under the Law of the Sea

CIMSEC – Treating unmanned vessels as warships requires examining whether they meet the definition of a warship under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). The legal status of naval vessels under UNCLOS varies widely depending on whether a navy operates its ships as warships, non-commercial government vessels, or accessories to conventional warships.        

This paper discusses whether unmanned systems can be considered warships under UNCLOS, especially with today’s voracious appetite for developing the technology; however, the legal status of unmanned vessels as warships remains uncertain. International agreements on the legal status of unmanned vessels would help establish the legitimacy of naval operations employing them.