China Maritime Studies Institute – Key takeaways:

• Since December 2008, the PLAN has deployed 46 counter-piracy escort task forces (TFs) to the Gulf of Aden on a UN-authorized mission.
• Most TFs have included two combatants—a combination of destroyers, frigates, and amphibious transport docks—and a supply ship. Starting with the 33^rd TF, which departed China in August 2019, every TF has comprised one Type 052D destroyer, one Type 054A frigate, and one supply ship.
• One TF generally is on station near the Horn of Africa at all times, while for less than half that time another TF is either on the way to relieve it or returning home after completing its mission.
• Until recently, the PLAN had normally dispatched three TFs per year, at roughly four-month intervals.
• However, the 45^th and 46^th TFs departed China on five-month intervals, suggesting a shift in deployment patterns.
• The PLAN has not explained the rationale for this apparent shift in its deployment pattern. It is possible that more onerous requirements for its surface fleet in operations around Taiwan and in the South China Sea have forced the PLAN to draw forces away from the Gulf of Aden mission, at least temporarily. Or it is possible that the PLAN may be desirous of keeping its ships clear of waters threatened by Yemen’s Houthi rebels.

Naval News – New Type 054A variant features larger flight deck and hangar for Z-20 helicopter, and new main gun. Ships under construction at two yards may grow Type 054A-fleet to 50 units or more.

China Maritime Studies Institute – Since the creation of the People’s Republic of China’s merchant fleet, the Chinese Communist Party has implemented a system of political control aboard oceangoing vessels through ship Party branches and ship political commissars. This report focuses on the ship political commissar, a Party representative assigned to oceangoing merchant ships, particularly within state-owned shipping enterprises, to carry out political and administrative work in the management of ship crews. Having peaked in authority and power during the Cultural Revolution, the ship political commissar position has evolved over the decades following economic reforms in the 1980s. Despite years of problematic implementation, the ship political commissar system is currently undergoing a revitalization in staterun shipping companies. The position has supporting roles to play in carrying out national tasking such as evacuations of overseas Chinese citizens. Most ship political commissars are former PLA officers. Chinese roll-on/roll-off ferry operators constitute a special case where the ship political commissar may have greater authority in the ship hierarchy and potentially a role in supporting PLA use of those vessels. This report focuses on the ship political commissar system over the last 20 years, providing a needed update on this understudied topic in the English-language literature.

Baker Institute – This paper addresses one of the most dangerous, consequential flashpoints on the planet today, and for years into the future: a potential attempt by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to annex Taiwan. The aftermath would likely trigger the worst economic shocks experienced in more than a century, unleashing a cycle of repression and diminishing the quality of life for populations across Asia and beyond, with devastating impacts on American interests and Americans’ well-being. Moreover, China’s annexation of Taiwan could exacerbate regional tensions and extend into a broader, global conflict. At stake are crucial interests such as the semiconductors that power today’s big data world and the national security of U.S. allies and partners. Neighboring states’ responses to PRC expansion could also result in the erosion of American military advantages as well as the destabilization of democracy and the international order. 

Mapping China’s Strategic Space – With an increasingly powerful People’s Republic of China (PRC) under paramount leader Xi Jinping engaging in meteoric military-maritime buildup and pressing disputed sovereignty claims with increasing assertiveness, it is more important than ever to consider Beijing’s “mental map”: how its leaders regard the physical nature of strategic space. As Andrew Rhodes argues cogently, “Being able to ‘think in space’ is a crucial tool for decision-makers, but one that is often deemphasized.” This applies to understanding both how PRC leaders envision China’s strategic space and how it is evolving in practice.