The Maritime Fulcrum of the Indo-Pacific: Indonesia and Malaysia Respond to China’s Creeping Expansion in the South China Sea

Chinese Maritime Studies Institute – China now is attempting to expand its control to the southernmost extent of its nine-dash-line claim in the South China Sea, in waters ever closer to Indonesian and Malaysian shores. This area of the South China Sea, spanning from Indonesia’s Natuna Islands to the South Luconia Shoals, has greater strategic importance than the Spratly or Paracel Island chains farther to the north. Whereas the Spratlys have for centuries been regarded as “dangerous ground” and commercial mariners have avoided them, the vital sea lines of communication (SLOCs) connecting the Pacific and Indian Oceans flow through this part of the southern South China Sea. Therefore, these areas are far more vital to international commerce and navigation than the dangerous grounds closer to China’s Spratly Islands outposts.

The Imperative of Political Navigation—India’s Strategy in the Indian Ocean and the Logic of Indo-U.S. Strategic Partnership

US Naval War College Review – The dissonance between the positions of India’s Nehruvian strategic community and of the Indian strategic establishment, especially regarding the freedom-of-navigation operations the U.S. Navy long has conducted in India’s exclusive economic zone, is rooted in realpolitik considerations, especially China’s rise as a great power, and the difference between international law and politics.

Japan Matters If China Invades Taiwan

1945 – James Holmes writes that more musclebound Japan Self-Defense Forces capable of defending the homeland on their own can restore some semblance of sanctuary in the Western Pacific, bolstering the alliance’s ability to vanquish cross-strait aggression. Japan guards the base while U.S. forces go abroad—sounds like an excellent division of labor.

Andrew Marshall’s Reflections on Net Assessment

CIMSEC – Today, who is making sure that the U.S. Navy is asking the right questions? Who is defining the vocabulary and the intellectual infrastructure of how we think about our contemporary challengers? And are we learning from each other, and developing the next generation of analysts who will be creative and intelligent enough to do the deep work, “read everything,” and come up with creative new ideas rather than rehashing old models? Andy Marshall believed in focusing on finding the right questions and defining their parameters. In Reflections on Net Assessment, naval and national security practitioners and analysts can still learn a great deal from Yoda in his own words, if we do the reading and remain reality-based in our search for wisdom in confronting the challenges of the 21st century.

Using the Enemy to Train the Troops – Beijing’s New Approach to Prepare For War

CIMSEC – The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has quietly changed the way it interacts with U.S. military forces in the Western Pacific. Instead of just tracking and monitoring U.S. ships and aircraft, demanding they leave sensitive areas, the PLA has embraced an approach that favors hostile encounters as preparation for future conflict with the United States. In PLA parlance, it is “using the enemy to train the troops.”

Bring Back the Fleet? A Review of NWP-3 Fleet Warfare, Change 1

CIMSEC – The Navy recently issued Change 1 to one of its key new doctrine books, Navy Warfare Publication 3, Fleet Warfare. The change was issued to update the definitions of a number of key terms to keep them in accordance with joint doctrine. The issuing command, the Navy Warfare Development Center, says “Ultimately, Change 1 to NWP-3 enhances fleet-centric warfighting effectiveness through establishing a framework for the execution of fleet warfare at the operational level of warfare.” Certainly there is an advantage to maintaining consistency across the services in the definition of terms, but NWP-3’s contribution to warfighting effectiveness is less than it could be due to its generic approach to the subject. Granted, it is an unclassified publication, but nonetheless, it could have offered more practical detail on the evolving nature of the Navy’s approach to warfighting. An unclassified practical framework would be vital to operationalizing the Navy’s renewed emphasis on fleet-level warfare.

Russia Has Built Its First Production Batch Of Poseidon Nuclear Torpedoes

War Zone – A report in the Russian media claims that the first production examples of the country’s Poseidon nuclear-powered, nuclear-tipped, ultra-long-endurance torpedoes have been built. These will initially be provided to the Russian Navy’s shadowy Project 09852 Belgorod, the world’s longest submarine — but, at this stage, it’s unclear if the torpedoes actually have their nuclear warheads fitted.