Start Building Small Warships

CIMSEC – Small warships have a long history in the U.S. Navy and are poised to offer an evolutionary leap in capability. Small, highly automated, lightly crewed, blue-water warships will help offset the capabilities of competing fleets and ensure enduring maritime superiority for the U.S. Navy. It is time to build a prototype of the Lightly Manned Automated Combat Capability ship and its flotilla of innovations.

Flood the Zone: III Marine Expeditionary Force’s Mobility Mandate

War on the Rocks – In the Indo-Pacific, the first to arrive may not just win — their very arrival may prevent the fight. Without reliable mobility, III Marine Expeditionary Force risks becoming the most forward-postured but strategically stranded force in the joint arsenal. The task ahead is clear: fund the platforms, train the crews, and flood the zone before deterrence fails.

To Win the Fight We Must First Win the Mind: Create NDP-1.1 Naval Warfighting

CIMSEC – The central challenge of modern naval warfare is grappling with profound decision-making under uncertainty. Our current doctrine, NDP-1 Naval Warfare, is an essential description of our forces, but it is insufficient as a guide for thinking through the friction, fluidity, and ambiguity inherent in conflict. To truly equip our Sailors to fight and win for tomorrow, the CNO should supplement this document with a doctrine focused on the cognitive art of warfighting. The solution is to champion a new, companion publication – NDP-1.1 Naval Warfighting.

BAE Systems’ large uncrewed warship proposal

Navy Lookout – As part of the Royal Navy’s Future Air Dominance System (FADS) concept, BAE Systems has proposed low-cost, rapidly-built uncrewed/ minimally crewed vessels to supplement the Type 83 destroyer. Drawing on the legacy of the Triton trimaran demonstrator built for the RN in 2000, the proposed Sensor-Effector Platforms (SEP), could form a key element of the disaggregated air defence architecture.

The Indian Ocean an Opportunity to Strengthen Alliances and Deter China

CIMSEC – The U.S. Navy and its Pacific allies can promote cooperation with European navies in Indo-Pacific theater. It can mark a catalyst that mobilizes and focuses Western resources while improving burden sharing. This initiative will strengthen our friendship and naval cooperation, and will represent a key factor in strengthening deterrence.

CMSI Translations #23: The Elusive “Deep-Sea Beast”: Analysis of the Performance of the Main Equipment of the U.S. Navy Virginia-Class Nuclear Attack Submarine

China Maritime Studies Institute – In the vast expanse of the blue ocean, the U.S. Navy’s Virginia-class nuclear attack submarine, with its exceptional performance and advanced technology, has become the backbone of the U.S. Navy’s undersea force in the 21st century. As one of America’s most modern nuclear attack submarines, the Virginia-class leads the global development of nuclear submarine technology with its multifunctional and multi-purpose design, exceptional stealth, and powerful combat capabilities.

Anchor Acquisition and Force Development on Targeting China’s C4ISR

CIMSEC – The key to China succeeding is maintaining their anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) approach intended to keep adversary forces out of the first island chain. U.S. Navy operational concepts must make an explicit priority of targeting the C4ISR architecture that fundamentally enables China’s A2/AD approach and have it serve as a core organizing principle for Navy acquisition and force development.

The Submarine Force Needs More Flexible Training Tools

CIMSEC – Shore-based team trainers – attack centers – are critical for submarine crews preparing for deployment to exercise the full range of tactical skills in a challenging training environment. These trainers focus on modeling complex ocean environments, sensors, and warships, resulting in a high-cost trainer with only two to three attack centers at each shore facility. The limited number of trainers coupled with high demand means that submarine crews in shipyard availabilities are low priority for these trainers, often going weeks between opportunities to use them. If the Navy wants a more lethal submarine force, it requires more low-cost training options for Pre-Commissioning Units and those in long shipyard overhaul.

Unproven Littoral Combat Ships are replacing retired MCM ships in Bahrain

Naval News – The U.S. Navy retired its last Avenger-class mine countermeasures ships this week in Bahrain, ending a legacy of over three decades of service in the forward-deployed mine countermeasures mission as part of Task Force 55. The replacement ships, Independence-class littoral combat ships, have struggled to meet the requirements of operational mine countermeasures missions.

Royal Navy considering deploying OPV to Middle East with Peregrine RWUAS flight

Navy Lookout – With HMS Lancaster about to leave Bahrain for the last time, the Royal Navy is weighing options for maintaining a forward presence in the Gulf. One proposal under consideration is to deploy a Batch II River-class Offshore Patrol Vessel equipped with the Peregrine Rotary Wing Uncrewed Air System to cover some of the departing frigate’s capabilities.

Jet-Powered Kamikaze Drone Kratos Is Developing With Taiwan To Fly Next Year

The War Zone – A long-range kamikaze drone that U.S. firm Kratos is working on together with Taiwan’s National Chung-Shan Institute of Science and Technology (NCSIST) is set to make its maiden flight early next year. The jet-powered Chien Feng IV (Mighty Hornet IV) will feature artificial intelligence (AI) enabled systems and is being developed with a particular eye toward use as an anti-ship weapon. It could also be employed against targets on land and act as a decoy.

What Unifies the Foundry, Fleet, and Fighting Triad?Warfighting Focus

USNI News – Which part of a spear makes it lethal? The shaft. Without its alignment of all vectors behind the tip, a spear is no more deadly than a stone. Likewise, unless the Foundry and Fleet behave like a shaft, focusing all their energy toward delivering ordnance on target, the warfighting leg of the triad is compromised. Fleet readiness consists of the manning, training, maintenance, and security programs that underpin it. But not only do these programs often fail to support one another, they are usually in direct competition for limited resources. Achieving effective balance and coordination will require an inexorable focus on warfighting that only the CNO can provide.