RUSI – The ‘Bashi Breakout’ – China’s maritime operation east of Taiwan – is a warning that disruption to maritime trade is spreading to the Indo-Pacific.

War on the Rocks – Normandy was unprecedented in scale but not in kind. A Taiwan invasion would present the reverse problem: Taiwan’s size is not the unprecedented part — the operational challenges are. Analysis of a potential Chinese invasion of Taiwan typically emphasizes the People’s Liberation Army’s rapid modernization and the possibility of strategic surprise. Far less attention is paid to operational precedent. Three key missions at the heart of any cross-strait campaign have never been successfully executed under modern threat conditions: an amphibious landing against a credible coastal anti-ship missile threat, a large-scale airborne drop against modern air defenses, and a large, opposed air assault at extended range. In other words, the People’s Liberation Army would have to make history three times in the same campaign. I refer to these as the “Three Nevers,” a deliberately tongue-in-cheek nod to Chinese Communist Party doctrinal formulations, or tifa.

China Maritime Studies Institute – “Stand-In Forces” (SIF) is an operational concept proposed by the United States Marine Corps (USMC) within the context of strategic transformation, emphasizing the development of combat forces capable of sustained forward presence within the “weapons engagement zone” (WEZ). These forces can conduct surveillance and reconnaissance, gain long range target custody, and engage in interference, deception, littoral zone harassment, rapid littoral strike, sustainment, protection, and security operations, as well as other actions to address changing conditions and challenges. To counter the continuous penetration and encroachment into our near seas, we must proactively engage and establish effective countermeasures. We must focus on addressing weaknesses and enhancing our amphibious systems warfare advantages; prioritize innovation and advancement to accelerate the development of maritime unmanned combat capabilities; and emphasize advancing the establishment of cyber- and information systems to address our core priorities.

China Maritime Studies Institute – Since early June, the China Coast Guard (CCG) has maintained a continuous presence in waters east of Taiwan. Beijing describes these operations as a response to a joint statement issued by Japan and the Philippines in late May, in which the two countries pledged cooperation to delimit their maritime boundary.

Given their duration, these operations differ from past practice, in which CCG cutters appeared east of Taiwan for short periods of time, ostensibly to signal dissatisfaction with the island’s political leadership.

On 4 July, the original CCG task force deployed after the joint statement was issued was relieved by two new ships, suggesting that Beijing intends to normalize CCG presence in these waters.

Normalized CCG presence east of Taiwan would pose challenges for Japan and the Philippines, as China would likely apply elements of its longstanding East and South China Sea playbook to this new ocean area.

Aside from sovereignty patrols, the CCG could be directed to support operations that exercise China’s claimed coastal state rights east of Taiwan. It could, for instance, escort PRC survey and fishing vessels operating in this disputed space. Using a catalogue of non-lethal means, CCG patrol cutters might also obstruct the operations of foreign fishing and survey vessels.

Taiwan might face these same challenges, while also being confronted with the prospect that normalized CCG operations east of Taiwan could enable a more rapid transition to quarantine operations.

Naval News – China’s July 6 submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) test into the Pacific has drawn intense scrutiny not only for its political timing, but for what it reveals about the maturing state of Beijing’s sea-based nuclear deterrent.

Korea Institute for Maritime Strategy – This paper surveys the history and background of how the People’s Republic of China (PRC) became one of just six countries so far to possess nuclear-powered submarines, including the core subject of nuclear reactor development and improvement across three submarine generations. If South Korea decides to pursue and successfully develops indigenous nuclear-powered submarines, it will most likely become the seventh country to do so—offering six previous paths to study, of which China is a prominent example. Three-quarters of a century after beginning initial efforts under autarkic austerity, Beijing finally has a capable and growing fleet of modern nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs), nuclear-powered guided-missile submarines (SSGNs), and nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) equipped with long-range submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). What Mao sensed broadly through a geopolitical lens, modern military science shows with technical specificity: nuclear-powered submarines represent the absolute global “gold standard” for which there is no true substitute—with utterly unmatched potential in propulsion, endurance, sensor and weapons operations, and overall performance. As China’s experience shows, however, the road to success can be lengthy, expensive, and arduous. Ability to study preexisting foreign examples from afar helped somewhat, but tremendous national leadership, resources, and effort over decades have been required.

USNI News – The People’s Liberation Army Navy test fired a submarine-launched ballistic missile from the South China Sea to the Pacific Ocean on Monday, coinciding with the start of an annual naval drill with Russia.