The ‘Houthi Model’ of Asymmetric Naval Warfare: Implications for UK Littoral Response and Carrier Strike Group Doctrine

Wavell Room – The Red Sea crisis has settled into an uncomfortable new normal. While the initial shock caused by the use of anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBM) has faded, the strategic implications of the Houthi campaign remain dangerously under-analysed in the context of future British Naval Doctrine. For the Royal Navy, the conflict would appear to cast a shadow over amphibious operations in littoral waters, where both the Carrier Strike Group (CSG) and the Littoral Response Groups (LRGs) are expected to conduct their operations. The Houthi campaign has inadvertently provided an example of a scalable, repeatable model of sea denial that fundamentally challenges the operating and financial rationale of Western naval power projection.

The Houthi Model involves the integration of sensors and shooters at the state level with the expendability and mass of non-state actor operations. This model poses a significant challenge for the Royal Navy, which relies on low-density, high-value assets.

Navy’s new hedge strategy calls for ‘tailored’ unmanned forces to augment carriers

Breaking Defense – While the carrier strike group will remain the backbone of naval power projection, Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Daryl Caudle says its time to look for alternative options, especially unmanned systems, for more specialized regional scenarios — part of a Tuesday preview of what he called his forthcoming “hedge strategy” for the Navy.

One Size Doesn’t Fit All: Building US Navy Hedges Against Rising Threats

SeaPower – Rather than continuing to field a shrinking force of exquisite ships and aircraft, the Navy should field a larger force of crewed and uncrewed platforms that gain an edge over opponents through their payloads and ability to combine in a diverse array of changing effects chains across domains. By shifting complexity from inside individual ships and aircraft to the kill chains between them, this fleet could gain decision-making advantages over adversaries and generate capacity or capability when and where it is needed.

Atlantic Bastion: The Future of Submarine Warfare

FPRI – Atlantic Bastion represents the Royal Navy’s future plan for anti-submarine capabilities, defending the North Atlantic against the threat from the Russian submarine fleet. First formally revealed in the United Kingdom’s recent Strategic Defence Review, the program brings in emerging technologies to achieve persistent situational awareness in what is an extremely complex maritime domain. While the Russian threat in the North Atlantic is persistent and tackling it requires innovative thinking, a successful Atlantic Bastion will require the solution of a range of technological challenges and the answering of questions that have not yet been resolved in the brief plans that have emerged.

Indian Navy set to get Black Shark Torpedoes: Italy’s lethal submarine killer explained

Z News – The Indian Navy, which has around a dozen submarines, is all set to get a new weapon in its arsenal to kill enemy submarines and warships. The Indian Navy is in the process of acquiring 48 Black Shark Advanced (BSA) heavyweight torpedoes for a Rs 1900 cr deal with Italy’s defence firm WASS. According to reports, these torpedoes will be integrated across all 6 Kalvari-class submarines & later with other submarine systems.

(Thanks to Alain)

European coastal states warn Russian shadow fleet over Baltic and North Sea safety

Navy Lookout – European coastal states, including the UK, have issued a coordinated warning to the international maritime community over unsafe and deceptive practices linked to Russian maritime activity in the Baltic and North Seas. The statement signals a firmer enforcement posture, making clear that AIS manipulation and sanction-evasion by vessels associated with Russia will face closer scrutiny and reduced tolerance.  

The strategic logic and industrial peril of Trump’s battleship plan for the US Navy

Navy Lookout – The announcement of the Defiant-class battleship signals a sharp reorientation of US naval force structure, moving away from distributed lethality towards massed, concentrated firepower to address the widening magazine gap with China. However, the revival of such leviathans sits uneasily with a fragile US industrial base that has struggled to deliver even basic escorts, raising doubts over the programme’s deliverability.

Want of Frigates: Why Is It So Hard for America To Buy Small Surface Combatants?

FPRI – The United States is at a point where it hasn’t designed and built a good surface escort ship since the Arleigh Burke, at a time when its navy needs more and fast. The US Navy decommissioned the last of its previous frigate class in 2015 and is already retiring some of its LCS fleet after considerable operational problems. With no obvious small surface combatant to fill this gap on the horizon, America needs to figure out a new plan before the US Navy suffers from the same want of frigates as plagued Nelson.