America’s rustbucket Reserve Navy: The haunting ‘ghost’ merchant ships sent to the scrapheap

– Daily Mail – These rusting ‘ghost’ ships are the last remnants of what was once the United States’ National Defense Reserve Fleet, set to protect and serve in the hour of need. The NDRF was set up in the wake of the Second World War, and at its peak in the 1950s, the fleet consisted of nearly 2,280 ships moored across the United States. But as the need for the fleet has diminished, so has the number of vessels, and today, just over 120 ships remain, posing a risk to the environment in the bays where they are moored.

The New Naval Strategy: A Mixed Bag

– Weekly Standard – In the middle of March, the Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard published a revised version of their 2007 paper, A Cooperative Strategy for the 21st Century. The 2007 edition reflected the strong influence of 9/11, U.S. operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, and the global campaign against Islamist jihadis. It suggested broadening the reach of U.S. seapower by cooperating with other navies; helping littoral states that might fail by providing them with military training; and bolstering such traditional naval missions as humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.

The US Navy’s Real Enemy: Math

– Real Clear Defense – Before we turn to the number of fighting ships the U.S. Navy needs in wartime, let’s close out our excursion into peacetime ship totals. The measuring stick for wartime fleets is straightforward: the doughtiest opponent they’re likely to encounter in some important theater. Easy standard to set, hard standard to meet. Likewise, the arithmetic of peacetime naval presence is “simple”—deceptively so.

Back to the Future

– The Bridge – From Operation Desert Storm to Operation Enduring Freedom, the United States Navy has enjoyed an asymmetric technological advantage over its adversaries. Uncontested command and control dominance allowed American commanders to synchronize efforts across broad theaters and deliver catastrophic effects upon the nation’s enemies. These years of uncontested command and control dominance birthed a generation of commanders who now expect accurate, timely, and actionable information. High levels of situational awareness have become the rule, not the exception. The Navy and its strike groups now stand in danger of becoming victims of their own technological success. An overreliance on highly networked command and control structures has left carrier strike groups unprepared to operate effectively against future near-peer adversaries.