Yearly Archives: 2021

2021 World Naval Operational News Highlights

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The ten most significant naval news stories / trends / themes this year included:

  • China building new naval shipbuilding yards while the US Navy struggles with figuring out how to update the old shipyards it has so that they may efficiently handle the work assigned to them. When will the US Navy get serious about maintaining the fleet it has?
  • The ever-widening operating sphere of the Chinese Navy as it seeks naval bases in Africa on the Atlantic Ocean. How soon until we see Chinese naval bases in Central or South America?
  • China’s progress in obtaining the amphibious lift necessary to realistically attempt an invasion of Taiwan, through traditional amphibious ships and the utilization of civilian ferries and RORO ships. Why can’t the US Navy be as creative in its thinking as the Chinese Navy seems to be?
  • China creating its own reality at Sansha City in the South China Sea, from which it is governing the contested areas of the South China Sea as if they were Chinese territory. Clearly China believes that possession is 9/10’s of the law. Meanwhile, Western powers keep stepping up their South China Sea FONOPS. Is it all in vain?
  • France’s commitment to the stability of the Indo-Pacific through the naval forces it bases in the Indo-Pacific and the naval forces it rotates through the Indo-Pacific. When will the rest of the Western world acknowledge France’s contributions and treat them with the respect and partnership they deserve?
  • France’s commitment to replace the aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle with a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier. Is this fleet architecture sustainable for the French Navy and is it meaningful geopolitically?
  • The AUKUS agreement and the commitment of Australia to a future nuclear attack submarine force. Will this come to fruition in time to meaningfully contribute to the balance of power in the Indo-Pacific?
  • The deployment of the UK Carrier Strike Group around the world to Asia. Is this operationally sustainable for the Royal Navy on a regular basis and is it meaningful geopolitically?
  • While the US Navy’s surface and undersea warfare communities begin to honestly execute on their vision for Unmanned Surface Vehicles and Unmanned Underwater Vehicles in its future fleet by actively identifying and working to address the challenges these vehicles will face, the US Navy’s air warfare community pays minimal attention to unmanned aerial vehicles in its Naval Aviation Vision 2030-2035. How can they be so blind as to the role UAV’s should be playing in naval aviation by then?
  • Japan’s government’s public support for Taiwan’s independence and it’s public signaling that it would come to the defense of Taiwan if it is attacked. Are the Japanese people in agreement with their government on this issue?

Review Essay—Back to the Future? History, Energy, Climate, and the Fate of Nations: “The New Map: Energy, Climate, and the Clash of Nations”

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US Naval War College Review – The geopolitics of the twenty-first century will look very different from that of the twentieth century, but does that mean that the lessons of the latter do not apply to the former? Will competition for oil be eclipsed by that for rare earth metals or lithium, such that the form but not the substance will change? Or does the possibility of achieving self-sufficiency in energy consumption through renewables offer an alternative to interstate resource competition or interdependence? Most importantly, does the challenge of climate change compel Americans to rethink their rivalry with China? Reading “The New Map” will stimulate thinking along these lines, but doing so is only the first step.

China Maritime Report No. 17: The PLA Army’s New Helicopters: An “Easy Button” for Crossing the Taiwan Strait?

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China Maritime Studies Institute – This report examines the potential roles and missions of the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) new rotary wing capabilities in a cross-strait invasion. Looking specifically at the helicopter units of the PLA Army (PLAA), it discusses two possible scenarios in which these forces could serve as the main thrust in a campaign to seize control of Taiwan. In the first scenario, the PLAA would use nearly all of its rotary wing inventory simultaneously to overwhelm Taiwan’s defenses and quickly convince the country’s political leadership to surrender. In a second “unconventional” scenario, the PLAA would risk the destruction of older helicopters in order to launch a sudden attack against the island, thereby achieving the element of surprise while saving its most capable platforms for lengthy follow-on operations to fully subdue the island. Based on analysis of the scale, complexity, and frequency of recent PLAA exercises, this report argues that China is at best a decade away from having the ability to seize Taiwan by either approach.