In a Blow to LCS, the US Navy Finally Admits it Needs a Real Frigate

– War Zone – The U.S. Navy has released the first formal requirements for a proposed new frigate design, which it is now referring to as Guided Missile Frigate Replacement Program or FFG(X). The plan leaves open the possibility the service will buy a clean-sheet design in lieu of an “up-gunned” variant of the much maligned Littoral Combat Ship (LCS). Whatever happens, the new ships will finally include a robust area air defense capability.

Good Riddance to Rotational Crews

– US Naval Institute Proceedings – I have heard it said that the “turning radius” of an idea is around 30 years. At that point, it becomes “new” again, and the reasons why it was dropped in the first place are forgotten. Here’s hoping the rotational crews concept is one idea that, when its time comes around again, will just keep moving into the graveyard of dead ideas.

Organization and Innovation: Integrating Carrier-Launched UAVs

– US Naval War College Review – In spite of significant advances in robotics, artificial intelligence, and UAS technology, the Navy’s unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) remain predominantly intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets, and none are carrier based. Effective employment of UAVs by the Navy’s carrier air wings requires more than the acquisition of new technology, and without focused efforts to accelerate integration it likely will take several more decades before carrier-launched UAVs (CL-UAVs) are optimized across the entire spectrum of carrier aviation missions. Throughout history, organizational changes have been instrumental to enhancing the effectiveness of military technology. The integration of CL-UAVs can be accelerated by making organizational changes that facilitate the development of an internal constituency within the carrier aviation community and foster experimentation and bottom-up innovation.

Bring Back Fleet Battle Problems

– US Naval Institute Proceedings – With the urgent need to rebuild the fleet’s capability and competence in sea control, a gap in the fleet’s operational repertoire has become increasingly apparent. Simply, there are few, arguably no, venues where operational-level naval formations are permitted to rehearse their wartime tasks free from the constraints of the formal training process or the distraction of technological experimentation. The fleet is overdue for a re-introduction of the Fleet Problem.

Impacts of the Robotics Age on Naval Force Design, Effectiveness, and Acquisition

– US Naval War College Review – By embracing the robotics age, recognizing the fundamental shift it represents in how naval power is conveyed, and refocusing our efforts to emphasize the “right side” of our offensive kill chain—the side that delivers the packages producing kinetic and nonkinetic effects—we may hurdle acquisition challenges and bring cutting-edge technology to contemporary naval warfare. Incorporating robotics technology into the fleet as rapidly, effectively, and efficiently as possible would magnify the fleet’s capacity, lethality, and opportunity — all critical to strategic and tactical considerations. Doing so also would recognize the fiscal constraints under which our present force planning cannot be sustained.

Submariners Must Prepare for War

– US Naval Institute Proceedings – Victory in World War II was achieved because of that generation’s ability to radically alter its pre-war concept of operations, training, and personnel when faced with wartime realities that the U.S. Navy had not anticipated prior to December 1941. Submarine sailors and officers overcame the fact that the Navy leadership wasted the 1930s focused on the wrong missions and combat environment. Despite the timeless lesson of preparing in peace for future wartime operations, today’s submarine force is committing a similar error, albeit for different reasons. The current demand for peacetime submarine intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) operations is degrading wartime preparedness for a near-peer naval competitor such as China.

Normalizing Military Options in the South China Sea

– CIMSEC – The series of moves by Beijing in the South China Sea are not only tactical decision points, but part of a broader strategic narrative aimed at regional competitors, periphery countries, and the United States. Beijing is sidestepping concerns over its militarization in the region by simply continuing on its own agenda. By downplaying controversial decisions and promoting “standard” and “scheduled” actions or exercises, Beijing is shaping the narrative to its benefit. Additionally, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leadership is pursuing multiple avenues to promote mutual interests with its neighbors and shift attention away militarization efforts.