Unusual Narco-Submarine Interdicted Off Colombia

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Covert Shores – The year end often sees a seasonal spike in narco-submarine activity. The Colombian military interdicted an LPV (low profile vessel) in the Pacific on December 24. The vessel was carrying 1,678 kilos of cocaine with an estimated value of $56,000,000. The design is unusual, being the first seen with a raised bow. There is a step down about halfway along the side. This is likely intended to improve seakeeping.

(Thanks to Alain)

Ukraine’s Drone Boats Are Now Firing Rockets At Russian Ships

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War Zone – Ukraine’s security service (SBU) claims it used a Sea Baby uncrewed surface vessel (USV) armed with rocket launchers for the first time to attack Russian ships near Sevastopol. The Ukrainian Pravda (UP) news outlet on Monday published a video provided by the SBU that it says shows the system’s first use. Still, the practicality of such a concept is questionable, with very limited use cases at best.

Russia’s BOSS Submarine Concept For Border Guards

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Covert Shores – Imagine a future where submarines prowl on the surface, launching aerial drones (UAVs) and engaging targets with gunfire and anti-tank missiles. It seems the antithesis of modern submarine operations. Yet Russia’s famous design bureau Rubin has been suggesting exactly that. The twist: it’s for border guard duties not regular combat. In Russia the border guard is part of the FSB.

(Thanks to Alain)

NATO’s Role in Protecting Critical Undersea Infrastructure

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CSIS – NATO is not ready to mitigate increasingly prevalent Russian aggression against European critical undersea infrastructure (CUI). Despite its depleted ground forces and strained military industrial base, Russian hybrid tactics remains the most pressing threat to CUI in northern Europe. Despite its current limitations, NATO is the primary actor capable of deterring and preventing hybrid attacks on its allies and has expedited its approach to CUI protection by establishing new organizations to that aim. At the 2023 NATO Vilnius summit, allies agreed to establish the Maritime Centre for the Security of Critical Underwater Infrastructure within NATO’s Allied Maritime Command (MARCOM), which focuses on preparing for, deterring, and defending against the coercive use of energy and other hybrid tactics. To help NATO planners and staff at the new center conceptualize and prioritize their efforts, this issue brief provides immediate and long-term recommendations to set the new center up for success.

2023 World Naval Operational News Highlights

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The ten most significant naval news stories/ trends / themes this year included:

  • The Ukrainian Navy’s closing of the Black Sea to the Russian Navy. What lessons can other navies learn from Ukraine’s anti-access area denial strategy?

  • The Houthi’s closing of the Red Sea (with help from their sponsor Iran) to merchant shipping. What lessons will other insurgencies learn from this anti-access area denial strategy?

  • The US Navy’s alarming ammunition expenditure while conducting successful anti-ballistic missile and cruise missile target practice against the Houthis in the Red Sea. Will the US Navy be able to use this experience to convince the US Congress to increase its surface to air missile procurement in order to have a more than adequate missile magazine depth in case of war with China?

  • The increasing emphasis Western navies are placing on countering sea bed warfare against all the critical national infrastructure that exists under the sea. When will naval budgets meet naval aspirations for this new arena of warfare?

  • The transformation of the Baltic Sea into a NATO sea, with Finland joining NATO this year and hopefully Sweden joining NATO next year. What will Russia do in response?

  • The awakening of Japan and the Philippines to the Chinese threat, as evidenced by their increase in defense procurement. How will they spend their funds in order to best deter China?

  • Taiwan’s beginning to adapt a porcupine strategy for its defense against a Chinese invasion. Will Taiwan be able to keep buying these low-cost, unglamorous, but effective weapons in ever-increasing numbers going forward, or will they again revert to buying high-cost, glamorous and ineffective weapons?

  • The European Union’s growing realization that it has a role to play in the Indo-Pacific theater, evidenced by increasing European naval deployments to that region, such as seen with France’s Charles De Gaulle strike group deployment this year. How can Europe get maximum use out of its constrained naval resources?

  • The US Navy’s interesting experiments with TF-59 in the Persian Gulf, its experimental unmanned surface vessel squadron. When will the US Navy have learned enough from experiments to start building medium and large unmanned surface vessels for use by the fleet?

  • The difficulties that Western navies (Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force, Royal Canadian Navy, Royal Navy, Royal New Zealand Navy, US Navy, US Coast Guard, US Maritime Administration) are experiencing in recruitment and retention. If these countries were to expand their fleets, how would they man them?

New Zealand naval chief talks future fleet, unmanned tech

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Defense News – On Nov. 15, the New Zealand Defense Ministry closed a request for information about replacing nearly the entire naval fleet. The Navy’s flagship — its 568-foot replenishment vessel HMNZS Aotearoa — has been in service for three years, but the remaining eight ships — two frigates, two inshore and two offshore patrol vessels, a sealift ship, and a dive and hydrographic ship — will reach the end of their service lives in the mid-2030s.

Admiral Hu to the Helm:China’s New Navy Commander Brings Operational Expertise

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China Maritime Studies Institute – China’s Navy, the world’s largest by number of ships, has a new leader. On 25 December 2023, Commander-in-Chief Xi Jinping, in his capacity as Central Military Commission (CMC) Chairman, promoted Vice Admiral Hu Zhongming (胡中明) to Admiral and appointed him Commander of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) (海军司令员). Hu’s predecessor Admiral Dong Jun (董军) attended the promotion ceremony, suggesting this is an orderly and expected transition—unlike recent removals of the PLA Defense Minister and the former Commander of China’s Strategic Rocket Forces.